Weekly Case Digests – November 5 – November 9, 2018

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7^th Circuit Digests

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Curtis K. Hall v. Nancy A. Berryhill

Case No.: 17-2628

Officials: BAUER, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: ALJ Error – Disability

While loading chemicals onto a truck, Curtis Hall felt a sharp pain in his back. This back pain formed the basis of his application for disability insurance benefits. An administrative law judge denied his application, and a district court upheld that determination. On appeal, Hall contends that the ALJ improperly discounted his treating physician’s opinion and discredited his own testimony. Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, we affirm.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Kelley Donley v. Stryker Sales Corporation

Case No.: 17-1195

Officials: MANION, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Title VII Violation – Retaliation Claim

Kelley Donley sued her former employer, Stryker Sales Corporation, for retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3. She argues that Stryker fired her in retaliation for filing an internal complaint against a sales manager who had sexually harassed another employee. The district court granted summary judgment for Stryker, finding that Donley did not offer evidence supporting a causal link between her harassment complaint and Stryker’s decision to fire her. Applying the familiar standard for summary judgment, we must give Donley as the non‐moving party the benefit of conflicts in the evidence and any reasonable inferences in her favor. Under that standard, we find a genuine issue of material fact about the reason Stryker fired her. We therefore reverse the judgment and remand for trial.

Our account of the facts here does not vouch for the objective truth of every detail but applies the summary‐judgment standard to the evidence, and there are some key disputed facts. In 2010, Donley began working as the corporate‐accounts director for Stryker, a medical‐equipment manufacturer and retailer. She repeatedly failed to submit her expense reports, however, and was demoted to clinical manager.

On appeal, Donley argues that the suspicious timing of the investigation could convince a reasonable factfinder that Thompson and Ferschweiler decided to fire her in retaliation for filing the internal complaint. She has offered evidence that both Thompson and Ferschweiler knew about the photo‐ graphs before the August 2014 investigation. Neither took any disciplinary action against her until after she reported the other manager for sexual harassment. She points to Stryker’s response to her EEOC charge. Stryker said that Thompson saw the photographs at the team meeting in Vail. That evidence is helpful to Donley, both in contradicting Stryker’s defense in the lawsuit and also in suggesting that Thompson did not think Donley’s actions in Vail warranted her firing, at least initially.

Stryker counters that the EEOC statement should not be admissible as evidence against it. Stryker contends that this court has been “reluctant to give substantial weight to a position taken in adversary proceedings before the Department [of Human Services].” See McCoy v. WGN Cont’l Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1992). In McCoy an employer accused of age discrimination asserted conflicting positions in administrative proceedings and federal court. We concluded that the discrepancy was not evidence of “per se pretext” be‐ cause parties in administrative forums are influenced by different factors and incentives that may not exist in federal court. Id. at 373–74.

While such comparisons often present factual issues for juries to decide, we agree with Stryker that in this case, Donley and the fired regional sales manager were too different fort his comparison to defeat summary judgment, at least on the record now before us.  Donley and the sales manager reported to different supervisors and were subject to different standards. The manager occupied a more senior position than Donley. Without additional information about the nature and circumstances of the sexual‐harassment complaint, the outcome of the internal investigation, and other mitigating and aggravating factors, we could not say that Donley and the sales manager engaged in misconduct of similar gravity so as to justify the comparison.

For these reasons, we REVERSE the grant of summary judgment for defendant and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and Remanded

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Solomon Smith, Jr.,

Case No.: 16-3575

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges

Focus: Sentencing – Supervised Release

Solomon Smith pleaded guilty to two counts of filing fraudulent federal tax returns. His appeal concerns only the supervised release portion of his sentence. He objects to two discretionary conditions imposed by the judge: one that forbids “excessive use” of alcohol, and one that obliges him to submit to visits from his probation officer at any reasonable time. Those visits may occur at his home, workplace, or any reasonable location that the officer designates. Smith, a teetotaler who stands convicted of tax fraud, views those conditions as unwarranted by his crime or character and ill-suited to the purposes of supervised release. He also asserts that a ban on excessive alcohol use is impermissibly vague.

Although there may be some substance to Smith’s complaints, the procedural history of this case complicates matters. After taking time to review the visitation condition, Smith’s attorney told the district court that it was reasonable. In so doing, the attorney waived Smith’s present objection that the court failed to provide an adequate rationale in support of the condition. As for the alcohol condition, a procedural error by the district court creates a problem, but one that we can fix on appeal. At Smith’s sentencing hearing, the district court purported to adopt, by reference to the presentence investigative report (PSR), a condition forbidding “excessive use” of alcohol. Importantly, the PSR explicitly defined the term “excessive use” to mean use that produces a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) in excess of 0.08%. Perhaps not coincidentally, that is the level used by the State of Illinois for purposes of its driving laws. See 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1). But that objective benchmark was not mentioned in either the court’s oral pronouncement of the sentence or its later written judgment.

The limitation in the PSR thus fell by the wayside, and the undefined term “excessive use” that is currently in the judgment is both vague and, for a non-drinker, unjustified without some explanation. Nonetheless, we conclude that remand is unnecessary, because we find no other reversible error in the conditions of supervised release and we can amend the judgment so that the definition of “excessive use” reflects the court’s evident intent to incorporate the BAC of 0.08%. We affirm the district court’s judgment as corrected.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Omeed Memar

Case No.: 17-3098

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.  

Focus: Sufficiency of Evidence

Anyone who has encountered medical billing, either from the provider side or the patient side, would agree that it could kindly be described as complex. But that does not mean that the rules are impossible to decipher, or that anything goes. There is a line between honest billing and fraud, and in the present case, the government charged Dr. Omeed Memar with crossing it.

The government focused on eight cases in which Memar diagnosed patients with a precancerous condition known as actinic keratosis, which produces distinctive skin lesions. He treated the patients in question by applying intense pulsed light (“IPL”) to supposed lesions on their faces and then billing their insurance providers for the procedures. The government suspected that there were no such lesions, and that in‐ stead this was a ruse to trick insurance companies into reimbursing the charges for cosmetic procedures outside the scope of the policies. A jury agreed with the government. On appeal, Memar primarily insists that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. We are not persuaded: we see ample evidence in this record from which the jury could find that Me‐ mar’s conduct was fraudulent. We find no reversible error elsewhere either, and so the convictions must stand.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Tommy Clark v. Jacqueline Lashbrook

Case No.: 17-2212

Officials: BAUER, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Habeas Corpus  

In 1999, petitioner-appellant Thomas Clark was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of robbery. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed his conviction. Clark filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied the petition. We affirm.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Michael Clark

Case No.: 18-1083

Officials: MANION, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Sentencing – Supervised Release

Michael Clark pleaded guilty to distributing fentanyl. The district court sentenced him to 71 months’ imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. Clark appeals that sentence, arguing the district court improperly calculated his criminal history category and inadequately justified the length of the term of supervised release. We affirm the district court.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Mario L. Sims, et al. v. New Penn Financial LLC

Case No.: 18-1710

Officials: BAUER, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges

Focus: ECOA Violation  – Discrimination

Mario and Tiffiny Sims, an African‐American couple, purchased a house in South Bend, Indiana, that they later discovered was subject to a mortgage that the seller had stopped paying. Ever since, they have tried to assume that loan to avoid a foreclosure sale. They sued the loan servicer, Shellpoint, under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–91f, alleging that Shellpoint discriminated against them based on race when it prohibited them from assuming the loan. The district judge concluded that the Simses did not produce enough evidence of discriminatory intent and entered summary judgment for Shellpoint. Because the Simses’ evidence of racial discrimination is too speculative to establish a dispute of material fact, we affirm.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Dwayne V. Daniels

Case No.: 17-3554

Officials: BAUER, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Probable Cause – Warrant for DNA Samples

Dwayne Daniels conditionally pleaded guilty to bank robbery, reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion for a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), to probe the credibility of the FBI agent who procured a warrant for samples of his DNA. We affirm because, although the wording of the warrant affidavit is misleading, curing the inaccuracy would not defeat probable cause. In any event, Daniels has not made a substantial preliminary showing that the misstatement was deliberate or reckless.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Fausto Lopez

Case No.: 17-2517

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges

Focus: Motion to Suppress Evidence Denied

Law enforcement officers detained and frisked defendant-appellant Fausto Lopez after observing him and his brother load paper bags into Lopez’s garage. The officer who ordered the stop had a “hunch” that the bags contained drug-trafficking contraband. That hunch was wrong. It had been based on a tip the officers had obtained the previous night from an informant detained for suspected drug trafficking. The informant stopped cooperating with the officers as soon as he was out of their sight.

After finding no contraband, the officer who had ordered the stop realized that his hunch had been mistaken. Nevertheless, eight officers continued to detain Lopez. At one point during this detention, the lead officer told Lopez that he was “free to go.” Yet the officers kept possession of Lopez’s cellphone and keys, effectively restraining his liberty to leave and stripping the assurance of meaning. While Lopez was still detained, the officers eventually obtained his permission to search his house based on another hunch that Lopez kept drugs there. This second hunch proved correct. Officers recovered drugs and a gun from the home. A grand jury indicted Lopez for illegal possession of the heroin and illegal possession of a firearm. Lopez moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that it had been obtained by violating his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The district court denied his motion, and Lopez then pleaded guilty to both charges while reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

We reverse the denial of the motion to suppress for two independent reasons. First, when the officers seized and searched Lopez, they did not have a reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in crime. Second, even if the original stop had been justified, the officers continued detaining Lopez beyond the original justification for the stop. Either violation was sufficient here to undermine the validity of Lopez’s eventual consent to the search of his house.

Reversed and Remanded

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Mario Loja v. Main Street Acquisition Corporation, et al.

Case No.: 17-2477

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.

Focus: FDCPA Violation

Mario Loja sued Main Street Acquisition Corporation and law firm Shindler & Joyce (collectively, “Main Street”) for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and the Illinois Collection Agency Act, 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 425/1 et seq. The district court dismissed the action, ruling that Loja was not a qualifying “consumer” under the language of the FDCPA. Loja appeals, contending he is a qualifying consumer and that his attorney properly preserved his right to amend the complaint. We agree that based on the text of the FDCPA and circuit precedent Loja is a qualifying consumer for purposes of the FDCPA. We reverse and remand for further proceedings and conclude Loja should be given leave to amend his complaint should he desire to do so.

Reversed and Remanded

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Marcos Castaneda

Case No.: 18-1541

Officials: BAUER, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Sentencing Guidelines

Marcos Castaneda pleaded guilty to transporting methamphetamine as part of a 20-person conspiracy. Though the district court sentenced his coconspirators based on findings that they distributed mixtures containing methamphetamine, it sentenced Castaneda based on his handling of a smaller quantity of “Ice,” or especially pure (at least 80%) methamphetamine. Pound for pound, the Sentencing Guidelines recommend punishing Ice-related crimes more severely than crimes involving less-pure methamphetamine. The court also denied Castaneda a Guidelines reduction for acceptance of responsibility, given his unwillingness to admit to the apparent scope of his involvement in the conspiracy. Castaneda challenges both rulings. We affirm his 20- year prison sentence.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. David L. Price

Case No.: 17-3077

Officials: FLAUM, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Statutory Interpretation – Restitution

David Price was convicted of 13 criminal charges related to a heroin distribution conspiracy he operated in Chicago. The district court sentenced Price to 37 years’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay over $11,000 in restitution. The primary issue on appeal is whether the statutory provision that prohibits ordering restitution to a participant in the defendant’s offense also prohibits ordering restitution to the participant’s family members. We hold that the statute does not prohibit such a restitution order in cases in which the family members are victims in their own right, whose losses are not merely derivative of the participant’s losses. We therefore affirm the district court’s order.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Nanette Tucker v. City of Chicago, et al.

Case No.: 17-2480

Officials: EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Due Process Violation

Does a six month delay between a property inspection and notice of a municipal ordinance citation violate due process? The district court said no, dismissing plaintiff-appellant Nanette Tucker’s amended complaint for failure to state a procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It also rejected her alternative theory that the City of Chicago misinterpreted the ordinance’s plain text.

We affirm. The administrative and judicial proceedings available for Tucker to challenge her citation satisfied due process, and the accuracy of the city’s interpretation of its ordinance does not implicate the U.S. Constitution. Given Tucker’s failure to allege facts supporting a plausible violation of her due process rights, dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) was appropriate.

Affirmed

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WI Court of Appeals Digests

WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Derrick D. Bradley

Case No.: 2017AP1756-CR

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Derrick Bradley appeals a judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury’s guilty verdicts, for two counts of first-degree recklessly endangering safety while using a dangerous weapon, as a repeater; and a single count of firearm possession by a felon, as a repeater. Bradley also appeals an order denying his postconviction motion. He raises various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and further contends his Confrontation Clause rights were violated by the admission of hearsay testimony that a firearm belonged to him. Bradley also argues he was sentenced based upon inaccurate information. We reject these arguments and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Kole R. Eichinger

Case No.: 2017AP1845-CR; 2017AP1846-CR; 2017AP1847-CR

Officials: HRUZ, J.

Focus: Expunction of Misdemeanor Crimes Denied

In these consolidated appeals, Kole Eichinger challenges the circuit court’s 2017 order denying expunction of misdemeanor crimes to which he pleaded guilty in 2012. Well after he completed his applicable sentence, Eichinger moved the circuit court to expunge his record, believing he met the requirements of Wisconsin’s expunction statute, WIS. STAT. § 973.015. Of particular significance, the statute has a timing component that restricts when a court may grant expunction. According to the statute, a circuit court may only make an expunction decision at the time it imposes a defendant’s sentence.

Eichinger presents unclear arguments that, in many ways, appear to be an attempt at challenging an alleged error made at sentencing, rather than addressing how the circuit court supposedly erred in its 2017 order denying his motion for expunction. In any event, Eichinger’s arguments regarding the 2017 order are either factually unsupported or flawed under existing law. We therefore affirm the circuit court’s 2017 order denying expunction.

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: Daniel J. White v. Labor and Industry Review Commission, et al.

Case No.: 2017AP1605

Officials: Neubauer, C.J., Gundrum and Hagedorn, JJ.

Focus: LIRC Review – Sufficiency of Evidence

Daniel J. White appeals from a circuit court order affirming an order of the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) holding that White’s employer, Sevenson Environmental Service, did not unreasonably refuse to rehire him because White abandoned his job. Because credible and substantial evidence supports LIRC’s conclusion, we affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Nikolas S. Czysz

Case No.: 2017AP1611

Officials: Neubauer, C.J., Gundrum and Hagedorn, JJ.

Focus: Postconviction Relief Denied

Nikolas S. Czysz appeals pro se from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. He contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion without a hearing. He further contends that he is entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice. We disagree and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Jesse J. Kain

Case No.: 2018AP951-CR

Officials: REILLY, P.J.

Focus: OWI – Probable Cause

Jesse J. Kain appeals from a judgment convicting him of operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC), third offense, under WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(b). Kain argues that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest him. We affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: Fond du Lac County v. S.R.H.

Case No.: 2018AP1088-FT

Officials: REILLY, P.J.

Focus: Abuse of Discretion – Request for New Counsel Denied

S.R.H. argues that the circuit court erred in denying his request for new counsel or to proceed pro se. As S.R.H.’s request to represent himself was not clear and unequivocal and as the court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying new counsel, we affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Dylan T. Hayes

Case No.: 2017AP1639-CR

Officials: Lundsten, P.J., Kloppenburg and Fitzpatrick, JJ.

Focus: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Dylan Hayes, by counsel, appeals his judgment of conviction. He also appeals the order denying his postconviction motion for a new trial. On appeal, Hayes argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and should be granted a new trial. We reject Hayes’s arguments and affirm the judgment and order.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: Karen Rosneck, et al. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, et al.

Case No.: 2017AP1682

Officials: Lundsten, P.J., Kloppenburg and Fitzpatrick, JJ.

Focus: Job Classification  – WERC

Karen Rosneck appeals a circuit court order affirming a decision of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) determining that her job is properly classified as a paraprofessional “Library Services Assistant-Advanced,” rather than as a professional “Librarian.” Because substantial evidence supports WERC’s decision, we affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: Thomas Zimmer Builders, LLC v. Kurt E. Roots, et al.

Case No.: 2017AP2037

Officials: Lundsten, P.J., Kloppenburg and Fitzpatrick, JJ.

Focus: Design Consultant Agreement – Arbitration Clause

Kurt and Monika Roots filed a third-party complaint against Mark Udvari-Solner seeking relief based on intentional misrepresentation, violation of WIS. STAT. § 100.18 (2015-16), and equitable contribution or indemnification. In support of their claims, the Rootses alleged that Udvari-Solner falsely represented himself to be an architect to induce the Rootses to enter into a Design Consultant Agreement with Udvari-Solner Design Co. for the design of the Rootses’ new house. Udvari-Solner moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in the Agreement. The circuit court denied the motion. This court granted Udvari-Solner’s petition for leave to appeal the court’s non-final order.

First, we take as admitted Udvari-Solner’s argument, supported by legal authorities, that the Rootses’ claims alleging fraud in the inducement of the Agreement challenge the validity of the entire Agreement and are therefore subject to the arbitration clause in the Agreement. We deem this argument admitted because the Rootses fail to address it or the cited supporting legal authority in any meaningful way in their response brief. Second, we follow the “rule,” fashioned by federal case law and cited by both Udvari-Solner and the Rootses, to the effect that an employee or agent of a company is entitled to invoke a clause requiring arbitration in a contract to which the company is a party even if the employee or agent is not a party to the contract. We follow this rule because it appears to apply here and the Rootses do not develop an argument as to why the rule should not apply. It follows that Udvari-Solner, as an employee or agent of the Design Company, is entitled to arbitration on the Rootses’ claims for monetary damages.

Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s denial of Udvari-Solner’s motion to compel arbitration and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: Orchard Estates, LLC. v. Randal Alvin Meyer

Case No.: 2018AP341

Officials: KLOPPENBURG, J.

Focus: Retaliatory Eviction

Orchard Estates, LLC brought an eviction action against Randal Meyer. Meyer filed a counterclaim, alleging that the eviction was retaliatory. The circuit court entered a judgment of eviction and dismissed Meyer’s counterclaim. Meyer appeals the court’s dismissal of his counterclaim, arguing that the court failed to follow the procedure outlined in WIS. STAT. § 799.209(1) when it curtailed his argument concerning retaliatory eviction at the eviction hearing. For the reasons set forth below, I affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: City of Watertown v. Jeffrey Donald Perschke

Case No.: 2018AP555

Officials: FITZPATRICK, J.

Focus: OWI – Reasonable Suspicion

Jeffrey Perschke appeals a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration. WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a), (b). Perschke challenges only the reasonableness of the traffic stop that led to his conviction. I affirm.

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WI Supreme Court Digests

WI Supreme Court

Case Name: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Michael A. Tjader

Case No.: 2018 WI 96

Focus: Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings

We review the supplemental report filed by Referee John Nicholas Schweitzer, adopting an amended stipulation entered between the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) and Attorney Michele A. Tjader.

After careful review, we accept the referee’s recommendation and parties’ stipulation wherein Attorney Tjader stipulates that she does not contest six counts of misconduct alleged in the OLR’s complaint and the OLR seeks dismissal of three counts. We agree with the parties and the referee that a public reprimand is an appropriate level of discipline for Attorney Tjader’s misconduct, that restitution is not required, and that Attorney Tjader should be assessed the full costs of the proceeding, which are $3,298.19 as of June 26, 2018.

Affirmed

Concur:

Dissent: A.W. BRADLEY, J., dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON, J.

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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Ryan P. Thompson

Case No.: 2018 WI 97

Focus: Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings

We review the report and recommendation of Referee James W. Mohr, Jr., concluding that Attorney Ryan P. Thompson committed 16 counts of professional misconduct and recommending the court suspend his law license for 15 months, order him to pay restitution to one client, A.K., and impose the costs of this proceeding on him.

Upon careful review of this matter, we uphold the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and agree that a 15-month suspension is an appropriate sanction for Attorney Thompson’s misconduct. We further agree that Attorney Thompson should pay restitution to A.K. in the amount of $1,000. We also find it appropriate to impose the full costs of this proceeding on Attorney Thompson, which are $7,370.73 as of August 24, 2018.

Affirmed

Concur:

Dissent:

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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Adam J. Wiensch

Case No.: 2018 WI 98

Focus: Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings

We review a stipulation filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 22.12 by the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) and Attorney Adam J. Wiensch. In the stipulation, Attorney Wiensch admits that he committed professional misconduct, and he agrees with the OLR’s request that his license to practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for a period of two years.

After careful review of the matter, we accept the stipulation and impose the requested discipline. Because Attorney Wiensch entered into a comprehensive stipulation prior to the appointment of a referee, we do not require him to pay the costs of this proceeding.

Affirmed

Concur:

Dissent:

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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Brian P. Mularski

Case No.: 2018 WI 99

Focus: Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings

Attorney Brian P. Mularski appeals Referee Jonathan V. Goodman’s report recommending that we deny Attorney Mularski’s petition for reinstatement of his license to practice law in Wisconsin. After fully reviewing this matter, we agree that Attorney Mularski has not satisfied the criteria required to resume the practice of law in this state, and we deny his petition for reinstatement. We also determine that Attorney Mularski should be required to pay the costs of this reinstatement proceeding, which are $6,000.60 as of September 19, 2018.

Affirmed

Concur:

Dissent:

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