Search and Seizure — reasonable suspicion

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United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Criminal

Search and Seizure — reasonable suspicion

Where the defendant was a black male seated in a car with another black male two blocks from the report of a shooting by two black males, and he fled when approached, the officers had reasonable suspicion to frisk him for weapons.

“Riney contends that as soon as the officers began shouting commands at him, he was effectively arrested without probable cause and that any evidence recovered after that point—especially the revolver in his waistband—was recovered in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. He cites California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), for support, but under Hodari D. a person who flees from a show of authority by the police has not yet been seized. 499 U.S. at 626. Here, when the officers issued commands to Riney, he did not yield to their authority but walked away quickly. Given the circumstances—the proximity to a recent violent crime, the description of the shooters, Officer McKenna’s observation of a weapon, Riney’s flight—Officer McKenna had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Riney. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (evasive behavior is a factor that contributes to a reasonable suspicion); Terry, 392 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (‘the right to frisk must be immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop is, as here, an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence’); United States v. Patton, 705 F.3d 734 ,738–39 (7th Cir. 2013) (suspect’s refusal to comply with police orders and high incidence of crime in the area contributed to officer’s reasonable suspicion); Snow, 656 F.3d at 501 (affirming pat-down of burglary suspect: ‘some crimes by their very nature are so suggestive of the presence and use of weapons that a frisk is always reasonable when officers have reasonable suspicion that an individual might be involved in such a crime’) (internal quotation omitted); United States v. Richmond, 641 F.3d 260, 262 (7th Cir. 2011) (officer had reasonable suspicion sufficient for frisk when he saw handgun handle-shaped bulge in suspect’s waistband); United States v. Lenoir, 318 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2003) (‘[P]olice observation of an individual, fitting a police dispatch description of a person involved in a disturbance, near in time and geographic location to the disturbance establishes a reasonable suspicion that the individual is the subject of the dispatch.’). The district court did not err, much less plainly err, in denying Riney’s motion to quash or suppress evidence.”

Affirmed.

13-1491 U.S. v. Riney

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Kennelly, J., Hamilton, J.