Employment — pregnancy discrimination

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United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Civil

Employment — pregnancy discrimination

Where the supervisor who fired an employee expressed animus towards pregnant women and treated the employee differently after learning she was pregnant, only a few weeks before she was fired, summary judgment should not have been granted to the employer on the employee’s pregnancy discrimination claim.

“Angel Corps asserts that we have ‘repeatedly held’ that these types of statements ‘do not constitute evidence of pregnancy discrimination,’ citing Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir. 1997). But Ilhardt only said that ‘statements expressing doubt that a woman will return to work full-time after having a baby do not constitute direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination.’ Id. at 1156 (emphasis added); see also id. (referring to ‘direct’ and ‘circumstantial’ evidence separately). Here, the supervisor’s potentially offensive statements are at least circumstantial evidence of pregnancy discrimination, because they can be a manifestation of precisely the kind of prejudiced belief that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was designed to combat—the stereotype that women, particularly mothers, belong in the home. See Cal. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 286 n. 19 (1986); Sheehan, 173 F.3d at 1045 (‘Discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is part of discrimination against women, and one of the stereotypes involved is that women are less desirable employees because they are liable to become pregnant. This was one of Congress’ concerns in passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.’); cf., e.g., Hackett v. Clifton Gunderson, L.L.C., No. 03 C 6046, 2004 WL 2445373, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2004) (‘Though statements voicing doubt that an employee will return to work after having a baby do not constitute direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination, these same statements may suffice under the McDonnell Douglas framework.’ (citation omitted)). We think that a reasonable juror could interpret the supervisor’s comment as reflecting this belief.”

Reversed and Remanded.

12-3515 Hitchcock v. Angel Corps, Inc.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Cosbey, Mag. J., Williams, J.