Criminal Procedure — double jeopardy

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U.S. Supreme Court

Criminal

Criminal Procedure — double jeopardy

A directed verdict based on an error of law that did not resolve a factual element of the charged offense is an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes.

Retrial following a court-decreed acquittal is barred, even if the acquittal is “based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation,” Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U. S. 141, such as an erroneous decision to exclude evidence, Sanabria v. United States, 437 U. S. 54?69; a mistaken understanding of what evidence would suffice to sustain a conviction, Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U. S. 462; or a “misconstruction of the statute” defining the requirements to convict, Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 303. Most relevant here, an acquittal encompasses any ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82; Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1. In contrast to procedural rulings, which lead to dismissals or mistrials on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, acquittals are substantive rulings that conclude proceedings absolutely, and thus raise significant double jeopardy concerns. Scott, 437 U. S., at 91. Here, the trial court clearly “evaluated the [State’s] evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction.” United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564. Evans’ acquittal was the product of an erroneous interpretation of governing legal principles, but that error affects only the accuracy of the determination to acquit, not its essential character. See Scott, 437 U. S., at 98.

491 Mich. 1, 810 N. W. 2d 535, reversed.

11-1327 Evans v. Michigan

Sotomayor, J.; Alito, J., dissenting.