Civil Procedure — consent to magistrate

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United States Court of Appeals

Civil

Civil Procedure — consent to magistrate

Where parties did not object to transfer of a case from one magistrate judge to another, they implicitly consented to it.

“[P]laintiff Stevo and defendants impliedly consented to the reassignment to Magistrate Judge Finnegan by proceeding in her court through discovery and summary judgment without objection. See Roell, 538 U.S. at 590-91. As in Roell, id. at 584, the parties also stood silent as Magistrate Judge Finnegan made clear her belief that the parties had consented. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, S.A. at 10 (“The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).”). More important, the parties also had an earlier opportunity to object when the reassignment was first entered in the docket. See Dkt. No. 37 at 1, 2 (noting the parties’ consent to reassignment, as specified ‘on the attached form(s)’). After Roell, litigants who have knowingly proceeded without objection through lengthy discovery and summary judgment proceedings with one or more magistrate judges are deemed to have impliedly consented to section 636(c) jurisdiction. See 538 U.S. at 590. It would frustrate justice and reason to permit such parties to wait until they learn that they have lost before citing technical defects in the form of any party’s consent to secure a do-over. Id. (noting the harm in allowing parties to ‘sit back without a word about their failure to file the form, with a right to vacate any judgment that turned out not to their liking’).”

Affirmed.

11-1271 Stevo v. Frasor

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Finnegan, Mag. J., Hamilton, J.