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08-3769, Estate of Sallenger v. City of Springfield, Ill., Central District of Illinois, Scott, J., Sykes, J.

By: WISCONSIN LAW JOURNAL STAFF//December 17, 2010//

08-3769, Estate of Sallenger v. City of Springfield, Ill., Central District of Illinois, Scott, J., Sykes, J.

By: WISCONSIN LAW JOURNAL STAFF//December 17, 2010//

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Civil Rights
Failure to provide medical care to arrestee; failure to train

Where police officers used a hobble to restrain a man undergoing a psychotic episode, and he subsequently stopped breathing and died, summary judgment was appropriate on his estate’s claim of inadequate response to his medical needs because the Fourth Amendment requires only a reasonable rather than an immediate response; and the Monell failure-to-train claim is similarly unavailing because there was no underlying constitutional violation by a city employee.

A “hobble” is essentially a cord that is looped around a suspect’s lower legs and then connected to a strap that is attached to handcuffs.

“The record does not reasonably support the inference that the officers waited seven minutes before rendering aid. As we have noted, the Estate’s argument rests on the timing of two calls from the scene that appear in the transcript of the police-radio tape recording. … Without something more, these two calls do not support a reasonable inference that the officers did absolutely nothing for seven minutes after realizing Sallenger was not breathing. And there is nothing in the record to supply the ‘something more’ that is necessary to make such an inference reasonable. To the contrary, all three officers and Sallenger’s sister, Kim Nolan-the primary witness for the Estate-testified consistently that as soon as the officers realized Sallenger was unconscious, they removed the hobble, began CPR, and summoned an ambulance. This took place immediately after Lieutenant Bridges arrived at the scene. Lieutenant Bridges corroborated this account. He also testified that it would be incorrect to interpret the call log as pinpointing the precise time of his arrival; it established only that at 2:22 a.m. he radioed the dispatcher to report that he had arrived. The log also reflects that paramedics were summoned just one minute later, at 2:23 a.m. Accordingly, all the witnesses agree that the officers administered medical care very soon, if not immediately, after realizing that Sallenger was not breathing; the call log is insufficient to undermine this testimonial unanimity.

“The Fourth Amendment requires reasonableness, not immediacy. Everyone agrees that the officers endured a tense and dangerous physical ordeal to subdue and restrain Sallenger, a very large man who was actively psychotic. Events unfolded rapidly: The officers arrived at the home just after 2 a.m., a violent struggle ensued, Sallenger was brought under control and stopped breathing some minutes later, and at 2:23 a.m. paramedics were summoned. On this record, the district court was right to conclude that the evidence does not support the Estate’s claim that the officers’ response to Sallenger’s medical needs was unreasonable.”
With regard to the failure-to-train claim, “Two alleged constitutional violations might have formed the basis for Monell liability: (1) the claim that the officers used excessive force against Sallenger, resulting primarily from their alleged misuse of the hobble; and (2) the claim that the officers inadequately responded to his medical needs during the arrest. But all three officers were cleared of any constitutional wrongdoing on the excessive-force claim following jury trials; the Estate does not challenge these verdicts on appeal. It is true as a general matter that we review the district court’s entry of summary judgment on the Monell claim by reference to the evidentiary record made on summary judgment, not at trial. Hildebrandt, 347 F.3d at 1024. But the jury verdicts are now the law of this case, and they conclusively establish that no excessive force occurred. See Teague v. Mayo, 553 F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (7th Cir. 2009). Nor can the medical-care claim against the officers provide an alternative basis for Monell municipal liability.

Affirmed.

08-3769, Estate of Sallenger v. City of Springfield, Ill., Central District of Illinois, Scott, J., Sykes, J.

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