Unilateral Conspiracy-Sentencing Guidelines

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Christopher Lloyd

Case No.: 25-1967

Officials: Scudder, Kirsch, and Taibleson, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Unilateral Conspiracy-Sentencing Guidelines

Defendant appealed a 96-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the district court applied U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) after finding that defendant had two qualifying prior felonies: Indiana dealing in cocaine as a controlled substance offense and Indiana conspiracy to commit armed robbery as a “crime of violence.” Defendant preserved his objection, so the Seventh Circuit reviewed de novo whether the prior conspiracy conviction qualified under Guidelines § 4B1.2. Defendant had fallen asleep with a gun on him at a White Castle restaurant in Indiana in 2024, leading to the federal firearm charge. The sentencing dispute turned not on the facts of his actual conspiracy, but on the elements of Indiana conspiracy under the categorical approach. Defendant argued Indiana Code § 35-41-5-2 is broader than generic conspiracy because Indiana permits unilateral conspiracy, including an agreement with an undercover agent who does not genuinely intend to commit the offense. The Government argued the relevant generic definition should be assessed as of 2023, when the Sentencing Commission moved inchoate offenses from commentary into the text of § 4B1.2. The district court agreed, treated 2023 as the relevant time, overruled the objection, calculated a Guidelines range of 77 to 96 months, and imposed 96 months. The Seventh Circuit held the 2023 amendment was a nonsubstantive relocation, so generic conspiracy must be defined as of 1989, when conspiracies were added to the “crime of violence” definition. Reviewing federal law, state law, dictionaries, and the Model Penal Code, the court concluded generic conspiracy in 1989 required bilateral agreement, while Indiana conspiracy did not. Defendant’s sentence was vacated, and the case was remanded for resentencing. Vacated and remanded.

Decided 08/12/26

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