Sexually Dangerous Persons Act-Fourteenth Amendment

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: James Howe v. Latoya Hughes

Case No.: 22-1368

Officials: Scudder, Kirsch, and Jackson-Akiwumi, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Sexually Dangerous Persons Act-Fourteenth Amendment

Illinois’s Sexually Dangerous Persons Act permits the commitment and indefinite detention of individuals charged with a crime who are found to suffer from a mental disorder and show criminal tendencies towards committing sex offenses. The Act mandates care and treatment for the committed person aimed at facilitating recovery. Once detainees are no longer deemed dangerous, the state must release them. In 1986, the Supreme Court ruled that the Act, on its face, adheres to the Due Process Clause, citing the lack of punitive intent, the availability of treatment, and the possibility of release.

Under the Big Muddy River Program, all detainees participate in a weekly core therapy group. Offense-specific and didactic groups are only available to detainees who have acknowledged their prior sexual misconduct. Individual therapy is not offered at Big Muddy, and therapists evaluate detainees twice a year, providing them with copies of evaluations and treatment plans. However, discussions about these evaluations with therapists can only occur in group therapy, not on a one-on-one basis. Wexford is contracted by the state to evaluate detainees for potential release. The plaintiffs argued that Big Muddy’s treatment program fell short of constitutional standards.

The district court ruled that the discrepancy between Big Muddy’s treatment program and professional standards constituted a constitutional violation and issued an injunction. The injunction required Big Muddy to provide the plaintiffs with a minimum of 7.5 hours of core group therapy each week, reinstate inactive groups, and use independent evaluators for discharge assessments.

The Seventh Circuit, while expressing concern about Illinois’s compliance with Fourteenth Amendment obligations, reversed the decision. It acknowledged that detainees receive minimal treatment, raising doubts about the realistic availability of rehabilitation and release. However, the court found that the district court’s injunction went too far under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A), which mandates the use of the least intrusive means available to address constitutional violations.

Reversed and remanded

Decided 07/24/23

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