Weekly Case Digests – June 24, 2019 – June 28, 2019

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7^th Circuit Digests

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Brian A. Weil, et al. v. Metal Technologies, Inc.

Case No.: 18-2556; 18-2440

Officials: EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Class Action – Attorney’s Fees

Brian Weil and Melissa Fulk filed class and collective actions against Metal Technologies, alleging wage violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Indiana wage laws. They had two basic complaints. First, they argued that Metal Technologies unlawfully paid employees only for the hours that they were scheduled to work even when employees’ timestamps showed that they were clocked in for longer than that. The district court conditionally certified—but then later decertified—those claims. After decertification, the plaintiffs proceeded in their individual capacities and secured a very modest damages award. Second, the plaintiffs contended that Metal Technologies withheld wages from employees’ paychecks for uniform rentals, even though Indiana law authorized withholding only for uniform purchases. The district court entered judgment for the class on the wage deduction claims, which had been split into two time periods, and they won a much larger damages award.

Both sides appealed. The plaintiffs argue that the district court should not have decertified the time-rounding claims, and Metal Technologies insists that Indiana law permitted it to deduct wages to cover uniform rentals. Each side thinks that the district court should have awarded it costs. And while the plaintiffs think that they have recovered too little in attorneys’ fees, the defendants say that the plaintiffs have recovered too much.

If the law remained as it stood on the day that the case was argued, we would affirm the district court across the board. After argument, however, the Indiana legislature introduced a wrinkle: it amended its wage-deduction law to authorize withholding for uniform rentals, and it made that amendment retroactive. Given this turn of events, we affirm the district court’s decertification order but vacate the judgment and remand the case for the district court to reconsider the wage deduction claim in light of the new law. That will likely also require the district court to recalculate attorneys’ fees and costs.

Affirmed in part. Vacated and remanded in part.

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Franklin V. Fennell

Case No.: 18-1969

Officials: KANNE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Court Error – Restitution

In federal criminal law, the amount of restitution for a fraud conviction depends on the victims’ actual losses, regardless of whether the defendant intended larger losses. When imposing restitution, the district court must say enough about its loss calculation, under all the circumstances, to permit meaningful review. One mechanism for meeting those requirements is 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a), which permits the court to order a detailed accounting by a probation officer.

Here, the evidence at Franklin Fennell’s trial showed an actual loss amount of $110,600 in kickbacks that he and a codefendant received for steering government contracts to a favored bidder. The presentence investigation report recited that amount as restitution, which the district court imposed, but the court referred to that amount orally as the “intended” loss. Fennell now seeks a remand, insisting that § 3664(a) requires that the presentence report contain its own detailed accounting rather than incorporate the trial evidence by reference, and that the district court erred by imposing restitution for intended loss instead of actual loss. We affirm. There was no plain error in the district court’s restitution calculation, and despite the mistaken oral reference to intended loss, the record shows beyond reasonable dispute that the amount awarded was the victim’s actual loss.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Devan Pierson

Case No.: 18-1112

Officials: KANNE, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Court Error – Sentencing

A jury found appellant Devan Pierson guilty of possessing drugs with intent to distribute and two related firearm crimes. Because of Pierson’s prior criminal record, his mandatory sentence was life in prison. He raises three issues on appeal. The first, raised for the first time on appeal, is whether events at his trial added up to a constructive amendment of the two firearm charges in his indictment, which charged him with possession of one particular gun. Under our precedent in United States v. Leichtnam, 948 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1991), we conclude that an error occurred. It was not, however, a “plain error” that warrants reversal, and it did not affect Pierson’s substantial rights. Second, Pierson argues that the court erred under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), by imposing the mandatory life sentence without having the jury find that he had two prior felony drug convictions. This argument is foreclosed by controlling Supreme Court precedent. See Almendarez‐Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). Third, he seeks the benefit of the First Step Act, which was enacted while Pierson’s appeal was pending and which lowered the mandatory minimum sentence. The Act does not apply to Pierson, whose sentence was imposed before the Act took effect. We affirm Pierson’s convictions and sentence.

Affirmed

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WI Court of Appeals Digests

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Fredrick Ramsey

Case No.: 2017AP1318-CR

Officials: Kessler, P.J., Brash and Dugan, JJ.

Focus: Admissibility of Evidence

Fredrick Ramsey, who is charged with one count of second-degree reckless homicide, appeals a non-final order denying his motion to admit third-party perpetrator DNA evidence. Ramsey contends that the trial court erred in denying the motion. He also contends that the test for the admission of third-party perpetrator evidence infringes on a defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense. We conclude that the proffered DNA evidence should be admitted at trial and that Ramsey may subpoena the alleged third-party perpetrator to testify at trial. We reject Ramsey’s constitutional challenge to the test for admissibility of third-party perpetrator evidence. Therefore, we reverse and remand.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Michael Gene Mayville

Case No.: 2018AP274-CR

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Michael Mayville appeals from his convictions for incest, as well as an order denying postconviction relief. He challenges the circuit court’s denial of his motion for resentencing. Mayville argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the use of allegedly inadmissible information at sentencing. He also disputes the court’s finding that it would have imposed the same sentences even if counsel had objected. We affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: Jackson Fairbanks Veit v. Angela Frater

Case No.: 2018AP442

Officials: Kessler, P.J., Brennan and Kloppenburg, JJ.

Focus: Court Error – Sanctions

Attorney Leah Poulous Mueller appeals an order of the trial court imposing on her a monetary sanction of $5,923.50 for “maintaining” frivolous proceedings for the improper purpose of harassing the defendants[.]” She also appeals the trial court’s order denying her reconsideration motion. Attorney Mueller served as plaintiff’s counsel in this case, which sought damages on the grounds that plaintiff had been wrongfully deprived of his investment in InfoCorp, LLC (“InfoCorp”) when it became insolvent and its assets were sold to a new company. This case was commenced in 2016, four years after the plaintiff’s prior lawsuit in Washington County Circuit Court concerning the same asset sale was dismissed and was not appealed. Attorney Mueller was also plaintiff’s counsel in the Washington County case. This case was dismissed on the grounds that it was barred by claim preclusion. The trial court imposed sanctions on Attorney Mueller because it concluded that “[g]iven the law on claim preclusion, plaintiff’s counsel [Mueller] should have known that [plaintiff’s] claims in this case were without merit.” Attorney Mueller asks this court to vacate the orders.

Attorney Mueller asserts that the sanctions were improperly imposed for the following reasons. First, she argues that the defendant’s motion was defective because (1) it impermissibly sought both monetary and nonmonetary sanctions and thus should have been brought as separate motions; (2) it did not identify the specific conduct alleged to be frivolous; (3) it did not provide her the required twenty-one-day safe harbor notice; and (4) it was untimely. Attorney Mueller also argues that the trial court erred in imposing the sanctions because (1) the elements for a claim of malicious prosecution were not present; (2) the underlying case did have a basis in law, and the trial court’s conclusion to the contrary was “a manifest error”; and (3) she was wrongly sanctioned on the basis of her client’s amended pro se complaint even though she had requested leave to amend the complaint again in order to cure the problems with it.

The record does not support Attorney Mueller’s assertions of fact, and her legal arguments are contrary to well-settled law. We conclude that the trial court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and reached a reasonable conclusion when it ordered the sanctions against Attorney Mueller, and we therefore affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: David Skindzelewski v. Joseph Smith, Jr.

Case No.: 2018AP623

Officials: Kessler, P.J., Brennan and Dugan, JJ.

Focus: Legal Malpractice – Actual Innocence Rule

David Skindzelewski appeals from an order of the circuit court that granted summary judgment to Joseph Smith, Jr., in this legal malpractice action. The circuit court concluded that in order to prevail, Skindzelewski needed to demonstrate his actual innocence on the criminal charge in the underlying case that precipitated the malpractice claim. Skindzelewski acknowledges the actual innocence rule, but argues that the facts of this case warrant creation of an exception. We conclude that the actual innocence rule controls, and we are not persuaded that we can craft an exception on these facts. We therefore affirm the circuit court’s order.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: Richard Selenske v. The Estate of Louise Selenske, et al.

Case No.: 2018AP762

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Estate – Asset Distribution

This is the latest in a series of appeals filed by Richard Selenske related to the probate and distribution of assets from the estate of his mother, Louise Selenske. In the instant appeal, Richard challenges a circuit court order determining that he is not entitled to any distribution from the Estate due to an offset for assets that he had already received from Louise or the Estate. Richard claims the circuit court erred in numerous respects. We reject each of his arguments and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Thaddeus K. McLaurin

Case No.: 2018AP1174-CR

Officials: Kessler, P.J., Kloppenburg and Dugan, JJ.

Focus: 4^th Amendment Violation

Thaddeus K. McLaurin appeals a judgment of conviction for possession of a firearm by a person adjudicated delinquent for an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult. See WIS. STAT. § 941.29(1m)(bm) (2015-16). McLaurin asserts the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. Because McLaurin was not seized for Fourth Amendment purposes until he was physically apprehended, we affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Jarvis Jermane Bester

Case No.: 2018AP1193-CR

Officials: Kessler, P.J., Kloppenburg and Dugan, JJ.

Focus: Unlawful-stop Claim

Jarvis Bester appeals the circuit court’s judgment convicting him of felon in possession of a firearm and possession of THC. Bester also appeals the court’s order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Bester argues that the police unlawfully conducted an investigative stop without reasonable suspicion. We disagree and conclude that the police reasonably suspected Bester of unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon. Accordingly, we affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Ulanda M. Green

Case No.: 2018AP1350-CR

Officials: Brennan, Brash and Dugan, JJ.

Focus: Miranda Warnings – Motion to Suppress

Ulanda M. Green appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered on her guilty plea, for receiving or concealing stolen property, a misdemeanor; and harboring/aiding a felon, a felony. She also appeals from the denial of her supplemental motion for postconviction relief. The charges related to what Green did with credit cards stolen from a man in a street robbery on July 25, 2016. Green attempted to use the credit cards, and then threw them in a sewer grate. The issue on review is whether the trial court erred in denying Green’s motion to suppress inculpatory statements she made to a law enforcement officer while in custody. Green argues that one statement should have been suppressed because it was made during a custodial interrogation before she was given a Miranda warning. Specifically, as the detective summarized the evidence prior to reading Green her Miranda rights, the detective stated that a person who lived with Green was also in custody.

Green also argues that incriminating statements after she was read her Miranda rights—admitting that she obtained the cards and threw them in the sewer grate—should have been suppressed because when she was given the Miranda warning and asked if she wished to make a statement, she unambiguously invoked her right to remain silent by saying, “No. I don’t know nothing.” After the detective asked “Just, we have to clarify that. Do you want to talk to me and clear your name, or, or–,” she responded, “Yeah, I’ll talk, but the only thing I can say is I ain’t did nothing.” We conclude that Green’s statement was a “disclaimer of any knowledge” and “an exculpatory statement” and therefore is not an unambiguous invocation of her right to remain silent. State v. Kramar, 149 Wis. 2d 767, 788, 440 N.W.2d 317 (1989) (“A defendant’s disclaimer of any knowledge … does not constitute an invocation of the defendant’s right to silence.”) and State v. Cummings, 2014 WI 88, ¶64, 357 Wis. 2d 1, 850 N.W.2d 915 (holding that the statement “I don’t know nothing about this” is “an exculpatory statement proclaiming … innocence” and “[s]uch a proclamation of innocence is incompatible with a desire to cut off questioning” (emphasis omitted)). Because Green’s first statement was a proclamation of innocence and a disclaimer of knowledge, it did not constitute an unambiguous invocation of her right to silence, and Green’s waiver was valid. We therefore affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Lavontae William Cooper

Case No.: 2018AP1695-CR

Officials: Kessler, P.J., Brennan and Brash, JJ.

Focus: Inconsistent Verdicts – Request for Discretionary Reversal

Lavontae William Cooper appeals from a judgment of conviction for one count of first-degree recklessly endangering safety and one count of armed robbery, both as a party to a crime. See WIS. STAT. §§ 941.30(1), 943.32(2), and 939.05 (2015-16). Cooper, who was acquitted of being a felon in possession of a weapon and found not to have used a dangerous weapon when he recklessly endangered safety, argues that the verdicts were inconsistent. He seeks acquittal or a new jury trial. In the alternative, he asks this court to order a new trial in the interest of justice pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.35 because the real controversy was not fully tried. We reject his arguments, deny his request for discretionary reversal, and affirm the judgment.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: Lori Jean Hagerty v. Kay Ellen Hagerty

Case No.: 2018AP1395

Officials: Lundsten, P.J., Blanchard and Fitzpatrick, JJ.

Focus: Summary Judgement – Issue of Material Fact

Lori Hagerty appeals an order of the Dane County Circuit Court which granted summary judgment in favor of Kay Hagerty and dismissed Lori’s complaint against Kay. The complaint alleged that Kay unduly influenced Lori’s and Kay’s father, James Hagerty, to execute a deed conveying his house to Kay. Lori argues that the grant of summary judgment was an error because there are genuine issues of material fact concerning whether Hagerty was unduly influenced to execute the deed. We agree with Lori, reverse the order of the circuit court, and remand for further proceedings.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: Northside Elevator, Inc. v. Jeffrey Alan Ossmann, et al.

Case No.: 2018AP1596

Officials: Sherman, Blanchard and Fitzpatrick, JJ.

Focus: Court Error – Priority of Security Interest

Northside Elevator, Inc. contends that the circuit court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment as to its claim that Northside’s security interest in certain collateral belonging to Jeffrey Ossmann has priority over Bremer Bank’s security interest in the same collateral. Northside argues that Bremer Bank’s filed financing statement for the collateral is “seriously misleading,” and thus not effective to secure its interest, because the statement did not state the name that was on Ossmann’s current, unexpired operator’s license and a search of the full name on Ossmann’s current, unexpired operator’s license does not reveal Bremer Bank’s financing statement. Based on an implied concession by Northside and our plain language interpretation of statutory and administrative code language, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in denying Northside’s motion for summary judgment and later dismissing Northside’s priority of security interest claim against Bremer Bank.

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WI Supreme Court Digests

WI Supreme Court

Case Name: State of Wisconsin ex rel. Ezequiel Lopez Quintero v. Michael A. Dittmann

Case No.: 2019 WI 58

Focus: Habeas Corpus

We review the court of appeals’ decision to summarily deny as untimely Ezequiel Lopez Quintero’s petition for habeas corpus seeking reinstatement of his right to file a direct appeal. Lopez-Quintero contends his petition satisfied all of the requirements under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.51 (2015-16), and the court of appeals erred when it presumed, without ordering a response from the State, that his nine-year delay in filing his petition caused prejudice. We hold that neither the language of Rule 809.51 nor principles of equity require a habeas petitioner to allege timeliness in the petition. We overrule State ex rel. Smalley v. Morgan, 211 Wis. 2d 795, 565 N.W.2d 805 (Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam) abrogated in part by State ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, 290 Wis. 2d 352, 714 N.W.2d 900, which imposed a “prompt and speedy” pleading requirement on habeas petitioners. We reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded

Concur: KELLY, J. concurs (opinion filed).

Dissent: ROGGENSACK, C.J. dissents, joined by ZIEGLER, J. (opinion filed).

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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: Leicht Transfer & Storage Company, et al. v. Pallet Central Enterprises, Inc.,

Case No.: 2019 WI 61

Focus: Insurance Claim – Coverage

Pallet Central Enterprises, Inc., (“Pallet Central”) forged certain delivery tickets and used them to bill Leicht Transfer & Storage Company (“Leicht”) for the sale and delivery of pallets that Pallet Central never sold or delivered. This case followed, and in the piece of it we address today, Leicht sought coverage for its losses under the Commercial Crime Insurance Policy issued to it by Hiscox Insurance Company, Inc. (“Hiscox”). Specifically, Leicht asserts that the forged delivery tickets comprise “directions to pay” within the meaning of the “Forgery or Alteration” insuring agreement of the Hiscox policy. We disagree, and so we affirm the court of appeals.

Affirmed

Concur:

Dissent: A.W. WALSH, J. dissents (opinion filed).

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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Javien Cajujuan Pegeese

Case No.: 2019 WI 60

Focus: Plea Colloquy

This is a review of an unpublished, per curiam decision of the court of appeals, State v. Pegeese, No. 2017AP741–CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jun. 21, 2018), affirming the circuit court’s order denying Javien Cajujuan Pegeese’s (“Pegeese”) postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Pegeese claims that the circuit court’s plea colloquy was defective under Wis. Stat. § 971.08 (2015–16) and State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), because the circuit court failed to sufficiently explain, and Pegeese did not understand, the constitutional rights he would be waiving by entering a plea. As a result of the claimed defects, Pegeese argues that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter his plea. Pegeese seeks to withdraw his plea and asks that this court remand to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing under Bangert. Pegeese also requests that this court exercise its superintending authority to require circuit courts to, at every plea colloquy, verbally advise a defendant of each individual constitutional right being waived and verify that a defendant understands the waiver of each right.

The State asserts that the circuit court’s plea colloquy was not defective because a “Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights” form (“Form CR-227”), completed by Pegeese with counsel prior to the colloquy, expressly listed each constitutional right Pegeese waived and required Pegeese to indicate next to each right that he knew and understood the right he was waiving. The State asserts that the in-court colloquy otherwise ensured that Pegeese was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his constitutional rights. The State therefore argues that Pegeese has not met his burden to show that he is entitled to a Bangert hearing, and that this court should not exercise its superintending authority, as Pegeese proposes, that circuit courts be required to personally advise defendants of each constitutional right being waived.

The circuit court’s colloquy with Pegeese verified that the constitutional rights at issue were contained in Form CR-227, that Pegeese completed and signed the form with counsel, and that he wanted no further time to discuss matters with his lawyer. The colloquy further verified that Pegeese comprehended the contents of the form, and he and his lawyer acknowledged that he understood each constitutional right he was waiving by pleading guilty. The circuit court concluded that Pegeese was “freely, knowingly[,] and intelligently” entering his plea.

We conclude that Pegeese has not met his burden to demonstrate that the plea colloquy was defective so as to entitle him to the relief requested. We further decline to exercise our superintending authority to impose a specific requirement that at a plea hearing circuit courts must individually recite and specifically address each constitutional right being waived and then otherwise verify the defendant’s understanding of each constitutional right being waived. Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals.

Decision

Concur: DALLET, J. concurs, joined by A.W. BRADLEY, J. (opinion filed).

Dissent:

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WI Supreme Court

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Emmanuel Earl Trammell

Case No.: 2019 WI 59

Focus: Objection to Jury Instructions

This is a review of an unpublished, per curiam decision of the court of appeals, State v. Trammell, No. 2017AP1206-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 8, 2018), affirming a jury verdict convicting Emmanuel Earl Trammell (“Trammell”) on one count of armed robbery and one count of operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent, and affirming the Milwaukee County circuit court’s order denying Trammell’s motion for postconviction relief. Though he failed to object at the jury instruction and verdict conference as required by Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3) (2015–16), Trammell claims that Wis JI—Criminal 140 (2017)3 unconstitutionally reduced the State’s burden of proof, and confused and misled the jury such that he should be entitled to a new trial. Lastly, Trammell alternatively claims that discretionary reversal is warranted under Wis. Stat. § 751.06.

We conclude that Trammell waived his right to object to the use of Wis JI—Criminal 140 by failing to object to its use at the jury instruction and verdict conference, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3). On that basis, the court of appeals properly denied Trammell’s appeal and correctly concluded that it could not consider whether Wis JI—Criminal 140 misstates the law, confuses the jury, and reduces the State’s burden. However, unlike the court of appeals, this court may nonetheless consider the instruction under its discretionary power of review. State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 409–10, 424 N.W.2d 672 (1988). We exercise that power here. The constitutional question with which we are presented is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow a conviction based upon insufficient proof. We conclude that Wis JI—Criminal 140 does not unconstitutionally reduce the State’s burden of proof below the reasonable doubt standard. Lastly, we conclude that discretionary reversal under Wis. Stat. § 751.06 is not warranted. We therefore affirm the court of appeals.

Affirmed

Concur: DALLET, J. concurs, joined by A.W. BRADLEY, J. (opinion filed).

Dissent:

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Supreme Court Digests

United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Luis A. Nieves, et al. v. Russell P. Bartlett

Case No.: 17-1174

Focus: 1^st Amendment Violation

Respondent Russell Bartlett sued petitioners—two police officers—alleging that they retaliated against him for his protected First Amendment speech by arresting him for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. The officers had probable cause to arrest Bartlett, and we now decide whether that fact defeats Bartlett’s First Amendment claim as a matter of law.

Reversed and remanded

Dissenting: SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Concurring: THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. GINSBURG, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.

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United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. George W. Jackson

Case No.: 17-1471

Focus: Class Action – General Removal

The general removal statute, 28 U. S. C. §1441(a), provides that “any civil action” over which a federal court would have original jurisdiction may be removed to federal court by “the defendant or the defendants.” The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) provides that “[a] class action” may be removed to federal court by “any defendant without the consent of all defendants.” 28 U. S. C. §1453(b). In this case, we address whether either provision allows a third-party counterclaim defendant— that is, a party brought into a lawsuit through a counterclaim filed by the original defendant—to remove the counterclaim filed against it. Because in the context of these removal provisions the term “defendant” refers only to the party sued by the original plaintiff, we conclude that neither provision allows such a third party to remove.

Affirmed

Dissenting: ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GORSUCH and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.

Concurring:

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United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Ricky Lee Smith v. Nancy A. Berryhill

Case No.: 17-1606

Focus: ALJ Error – Disability Benefits

The Social Security Act allows for judicial review of “any final decision . . . made after a hearing” by the Social Security Administration (SSA). 42 U. S. C. §405(g). Petitioner Ricky Lee Smith was denied Social Security benefits after a hearing by an administrative law judge (ALJ) and later had his appeal from that denial dismissed as untimely by the SSA’s Appeals Council—the agency’s final decisionmaker. This case asks whether the Appeals Council’s dismissal of Smith’s claim is a “final decision . . . made after a hearing” so as to allow judicial review under §405(g). We hold that it is.

Reversed and remanded

Dissenting:

Concurring:

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United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Kristina Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc., et al.

Case No.: 18-483

Focus: Statutory Interpretation

Indiana’s petition for certiorari argues that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit incorrectly invalidated two new provisions of Indiana law: the first relating to the disposition of fetal remains by abortion providers; and the second barring the knowing provision of sex-, race-, or disability-selective abortions by abortion providers. See Ind. Code §§16−34−2−1.1(a)(1)(K), 16−34−3−4(a), 16−34− 4−4, 16−34−4−5, 16−34−4−6, 16−34−4−7, 16−34− 4−8, 16−41−16−4(d), 16−41−16−5 (2018). We reverse the judgment of the Seventh Circuit with respect to the first question presented, and we deny the petition with respect to the second question presented.

Reversed and petition denied

Dissenting:

Concurring:

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