Weekly Case Digests – April 8, 2019 – April 12, 2019

Listen to this article

7^th Circuit Digests

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: LAJIM, LLC, et al. v. General Electric Company

Case No.: 18-1522; 18-2880

Officials: FLAUM, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs-appellants purchased land near a former General Electric Company manufacturing plant that had operated for sixty years; the plant leached toxic chemicals that seeped into the groundwater. The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency filed suit under state law against General Electric in 2004 and has been working with the company since then to investigate and develop a plan to address the contamination. In 2013, plaintiffs filed suit under the citizen suit provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, seeking a mandatory injunction ordering General Electric to conduct additional investigation into the scope of the contamination and ordering the company to remove the contamination. The district court found the company liable for the contamination on summary judgment but denied plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief because, despite the many opportunities the court provided, plaintiffs did not offer evidence establishing a need for injunctive relief beyond what the company had already done in the state action. We affirm.

Affirmed

Full Text

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Jason Galloway

Case No.: 18-1304

Officials: BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Sentencing Guidelines

Jason Galloway pleaded guilty to possessing ammunition as a felon. He now appeals his sentence, raising an unpreserved argument that the district court used an incorrect guideline range. We dismiss his appeal, however, because in his plea agreement Galloway waived his appellate rights.

Dismissed

Full Text

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: William Liebhart, et al. v. SPX Corporation, et al.

Case No.: 18-1918; 18-2598

Officials: BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Court Error – Abuse of Discretion

William and Nancy Liebhart together own three houses on the same block in Watertown, Wisconsin. Besides a few other houses, the rest of the block was previously occupied by an abandoned transformer factory, last owned by SPX Corporation. In 2014, SPX demolished the building with the assistance of TRC Environmental Corporation and Apollo Dismantling Services (collectively, “the defendants”). The Liebharts allege that dust and debris containing toxic chemicals migrated onto their properties, contaminating their yards and jeopardizing their health and the health of their tenants.

The Liebharts sued under federal statutes authorizing private rights of action for environmental contamination. They also brought various state-law claims. Following discovery and the submission of expert witness reports, the district court denied the Liebharts’ motion for partial summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the defendants with costs. Although the district court adequately evaluated the expert witnesses and did not abuse its discretion in its procedural decisions, the court set the bar unnecessarily high for the plaintiffs to show a violation of the applicable federal statutes. For that reason, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand for reconsideration.

Vacated and Remanded

Full Text

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Jesus Salgado

Case No.: 18-2194

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Sentencing Guidelines

Jesus Salgado pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. At sentencing, over Salgado’s objection, the district court applied an aggravating role enhancement and calculated the Guidelines range to be 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment. The court sentenced Salgado below that range, to 192 months’ imprisonment. It explained, however, that even if it were wrong on the enhancement’s application, it would have imposed the same sentence. Salgado appeals, challenging the district court’s application of the aggravating role enhancement and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm.

Affirmed

Full Text

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Steve Briggins

Case No.: 18-1921

Officials: MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Sentencing Guidelines

In 2017 Steve Briggins was convicted of robbing multiple banks over several months. This was not Briggins’s first foray into bank robbery. Eighteen years earlier, in 1999, Briggins was convicted of and sentenced for ten bank robberies he committed over a span of a few months. When the district court sentenced Briggins for the 2017 robberies, it accounted for the 1999 robberies in calculating his criminal history points under the Sentencing Guidelines. Briggins now appeals, contending that the district court, when determining his advisory sentencing range, improperly determined his criminal history category by imposing too many criminal history points for the 1999 robberies. Seeing no error, we affirm.

Affirmed

Full Text

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Anthony Sansone v. Megan J. Brennan

Case No.: 17-3534; 17-3632

Officials: KANNE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Jury Instructions

Tony Sansone, who is confined to a wheelchair, needs a parking place with room to deploy his van’s wheelchair ramp. For years, the Postal Service, his employer, provided him one. But in 2011, it took that spot away and failed to provide him with a suitable replacement. Sansone then retired and sued the Service under the Rehabilitation Act for failing to accommodate his disability. A jury returned a verdict in his favor and Sansone recovered compensatory damages, as well as back and front pay.

The Service asks us to vacate the district court’s judgment because of two jury instructions: one about an employee’s obligation to cooperate with his employer in identifying a reasonable accommodation and the other about how the jury should evaluate the Service’s expert witness. We hold that the district court did not err with respect to the former, but its instruction about the expert was both wrong and prejudicial. The Service also appeals the district court’s award of back and front pay, but it forfeited that argument by failing to raise it.

Vacated and remanded in part. Affirmed in part.

Full Text

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Charles Greenhill and Amphib, Inc. v. Richard M. Vartanian, et al.

Case No.: 17-3526

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Statue of Limitations – Laches Doctrine

Hermann Göring, head of the Luftwaffe in World War II, remarked: “When I saw those Mustangs over Berlin, I knew that the war was lost.” The P-51 Mustang fighter entered service in January 1942, and long-range variants introduced late in 1943 could escort Allied bombers to Germany and back. (With external fuel tanks, they had a range exceeding 1,600 miles.) More than 15,500 Mustangs were built; the plane served as this nation’s main fighter until jets succeeded it during the Korean War. Some Mustangs remained in military use in other nations until 1984. The picture below shows one of the long-range versions. Surviving aircraft are collector’s items, “warbirds” lovingly rebuilt and maintained by private aficionados, displayed in museums, and occasionally flown at air shows. One is in the collection of the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum. The Federal Aviation Administration has more than 100 airworthy Mustangs on its register today. This suit is about one of them—or perhaps s two of them.

Still more: Even if Illinois would not apply a statute of limitations, the doctrine of laches would remain. Between 1985 and the beginning of this suit Waterman Brown died, and the parties’ inability to obtain his evidence would cause prejudice that is amributable to Vartanian’s long delay. Four other potential witnesses died in the decades between 1985 and the filing of Vartanian’s counterclaim; they might have addressed topics such as whether Vartanian abandoned the plane between 1965 and 1985. All of the principals (Vartanian, Greenhill, and Martin) are in their 80s and experiencing difficulty remembering events of decades ago. Important business records from the 1960s through the 1990s cannot be located. It is too late for the judicial system to make a reliable decision about what happened to Vartanian’s plane (or parts of it) and which components of Greenhill’s plane might be traced to the Mustang that the Royal Canadian Air Force sold as surplus in 1960.

Affirmed

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals Digests

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Jarmel Dontra Chisem

Case No.: 2017AP1114-CR

Officials: Brennan, Brash and Dugan, JJ.

Focus: 6^th Amendment Violation – Confrontation Clause

Jarmel Dontra Chisem appeals his judgment of conviction after a jury convicted him of first-degree reckless homicide as a party to a crime while using a dangerous weapon, as a repeater, and first-degree recklessly endangering safety as a party to a crime while using a dangerous weapon, as a repeater. Chisem also appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion for postconviction relief.

Chisem argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for severance from his codefendant, Howard Davis. Chisem’s basis for this argument is focused on out-of-court inculpatory statements made by Davis to three witnesses for the State, which were admitted at trial. Chisem asserts that since these statements implicated only Davis, they were not admissible for two reasons: (1) because Davis exercised his Fifth Amendment right not to testify, and Chisem was unable to cross-examine Davis regarding these statements, Chisem argues that his right to confrontation was violated; and (2) that even if there was no confrontation violation, the testimony relating to these statements by Davis would have been inadmissible hearsay at a separate trial against Chisem. He also alleges that the trial court did not receive notice prior to trial that the State planned to introduce those statements.

We agree with the trial court that there was no Confrontation Clause violation in this case. We also agree that there was no discovery violation based on the lost recording, as the record indicates that Chisem had actual notice of that witness’s statement. We further conclude that even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that all of the challenged statements would have been inadmissible hearsay in a separate trial, any error in their admission was harmless. We therefore affirm.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: Auto Owners Insurance Company v. The Estate of Michael Janey, et al.

Case No.: 2017AP1754

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Insurance Coverage –  Homestead Property

David Mader appeals a summary judgment granted in favor of Martha Janey and an order denying his motion for reconsideration. Martha’s husband, Michael Janey, settled a dispute with Mader by granting Mader a note secured by a mortgage (the “Mader mortgage”) that encumbered three properties: the Janeys’ homestead property and two non-homestead properties they owned. A subsequent fire at one of the non-homestead properties led to an insurance coverage dispute that ultimately involved the Janeys, their insurer— Auto-Owners Insurance Company (Auto-Owners)—and multiple third-party creditors, including Mader.

This appeal addresses three issues that arose out of the insurance coverage dispute. More specifically, it addresses the following issues presented by Martha’s successful challenge to the validity of the Mader mortgage: (1) whether Martha has standing to challenge the validity of the Mader mortgage by invoking the homestead protections afforded by WIS. STAT. § 706.02(1)(f) (2017-18), even though her interest in the homestead property encumbered by the mortgage has been extinguished by a mortgage foreclosure in a separate action by U.S. Bank; (2) whether the Mader mortgage is void in its entirety for failing to satisfy the signing requirement of § 706.02(1)(f); and (3) if the Mader mortgage is void in its entirety, whether it may nevertheless be reformed under the equitable relief provisions of WIS. STAT. § 706.04.

We conclude that: (1) Martha has standing to assert that the Mader mortgage is void under WIS. STAT. § 706.02(1)(f), regardless of her current interest in the homestead property encumbered by that mortgage, because she has a present interest in showing that the mortgage was void ab initio; (2) the Mader mortgage is void in its entirety because it was a single conveyance that failed to satisfy § 706.02(1)(f); and (3) the Mader mortgage may not be equitably reformed. Accordingly, we affirm.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Christopher Deshawn McGinnis

Case No.: 2017AP2224-CR

Officials: Kessler, P.J., Brash and Dugan, JJ.

Focus: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Christopher Deshawn McGinnis appeals from a judgment of conviction, following a jury trial, for first-degree intentional homicide with use of a dangerous weapon as a party to a crime, first-degree recklessly endangering safety with use of a dangerous weapon as a party to a crime, and possession of a firearm by a felon. He also appeals the trial court’s order denying his postconviction motion.

McGinnis asserts that the trial court erred by admitting at trial, over the defense’s objection, four hearsay statements, and by subsequently denying his postconviction motion for a new trial based on the allegedly erroneous admission of that evidence. McGinnis also asserts a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel premised on the failure of trial counsel to adequately object to multiple levels of hearsay in the testimony of two witnesses.

We are not persuaded that the trial court erred. We conclude that with the exception of one statement, the trial court properly admitted the challenged statements and, that with respect to the one statement, the error was harmless. We also conclude that McGinnis has not established his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and order.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: Gloria Skodowski v. Allan Edward Skodowski, Jr.

Case No.: 2017AP2425

Officials: Brennan, Brash and Dugan, JJ.

Focus: Divorce – Maintenance Award

Allan Edward Skodowski, Jr. appeals that portion of the divorce judgment requiring that he pay maintenance to Gloria Skodowski. He also appeals the order denying his motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, for a new trial.

The trial court awarded indefinite maintenance to Gloria in a monthly amount based on Allan’s likely annual income and forty-five percent of any annual income exceeding Allan’s likely annual income, payable within ten days of Allan’s filing his state and federal tax returns or April 15, whichever occurs sooner. Allan asserts that the trial court erred in its maintenance award because (1) it imputed the income that he received from his former employer in 2016 to him as his current income and (2) it did not consider the support and fairness objectives in making the maintenance award. We disagree and, therefore, affirm.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Larry L. George

Case No.: 2018AP92-CR

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Sentencing Modification

Larry George, pro se, appeals an order denying his motion for sentence reduction and “emergency motion for release.” The State contends George’s present claims are procedurally barred or otherwise precluded by the law of the case doctrine. We agree and, therefore, affirm the order.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: Sayuri Gildersleeve v.  Troy D. Gildersleeve

Case No.: 2018AP120

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Divorce – Maintenance

Sayuri Gildersleeve appeals a divorce judgment that terminated her marriage to Troy Gildersleeve. Sayuri argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when awarding maintenance and dividing the parties’ property. Specifically, she contends the court erred by: (1) failing to order a maintenance award that satisfies the twin objectives of maintenance—i.e., support and fairness; (2) including certain debts in its division of property while excluding the assets that corresponded to those debts; and (3) failing to determine whether Troy incurred over $40,000 in debt after the court issued a temporary order prohibiting either party from incurring any additional debt.

We conclude: (1) the circuit court’s maintenance award fails to satisfy the support and fairness objectives as it unfairly consigns Sayuri to live at a subsistence level while allowing Troy to continue living at his pre-divorce standard of living; (2) the court failed to adequately explain why it assigned certain debts to the parties in the property division without including their corresponding asset values; and (3) the record is unclear as to whether Troy incurred the challenged debts in violation of a temporary order. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the circuit court to reconsider the ordering of maintenance and the property division in a manner consistent with our decision.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Michael Wade

Case No.: 2018AP614-CR

Officials: BRASH, J.

Focus: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Michael Wade appeals his judgment of conviction entered after a jury convicted him of misdemeanor intimidation of a witness and two counts of knowingly violating a domestic abuse injunction, all charged as a habitual criminality repeater. He also appeals an order of the circuit court denying his postconviction motion.

Wade argues that his trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest because he had previously represented the victim in Wade’s case. The court that heard his postconviction motion found that the situation was brought to the trial court’s attention and that Wade had personally waived any conflict, which was sufficient to establish the waiver of any conflict that may have existed. We affirm.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Kevin Ian End

Case No.: 2018AP1437-CR

Officials: NEUBAUER, C.J.

Focus: OWI – Suppression of Evidence

Kevin Ian End appeals from a judgment convicting him of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) and with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC), both second offenses, and challenges the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained through an unlawful stop. Because the information given by a motorist-caller combined with the observations of the arresting officer provided the requisite level of suspicion to conduct a stop, we affirm.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: Racine County Human Services Department v. L.R.H.-J

Case No.: 2018AP2065

Officials: REILLY, P.J.

Focus: Termination of Parental Rights

L.R.H.-J. appeals from the involuntary termination of her parental rights (TPR) to her daughter, J.N.J.-W. Birth mother was found unfit at the “grounds” stage of the TPR proceeding pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 48.415(9m) after the Racine County Human Services Department (the department) moved uncontested for summary judgment. Birth mother argues that § 48.415(9m), allowing summary judgment against a parent who has committed a “serious felony” against a child, is unconstitutional both facially and as applied to her and that her trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective for failing to challenge the summary judgment motion. As we conclude that § 48.415(9m) is constitutional and, therefore, trial counsel did not perform deficiently, we affirm.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. William E. Hampton

Case No.: 2018AP876-CR

Officials: Lundsten, P.J., Blanchard and Fitzpatrick, JJ.

Focus: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

William Hampton appeals a judgment of conviction and an order denying postconviction relief entered by the Crawford County Circuit Court. Following a jury trial, Hampton was convicted of homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle. Hampton filed a postconviction motion seeking a new trial on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, specifically the attorney’s failure to pursue a suppression motion. Because we conclude that Hampton has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance, we affirm the judgment of conviction and the order denying postconviction relief.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: S.D. v. A.V.

Case No.: 2018AP1150

Officials: KLOPPENBURG, J.

Focus: Termination of Parental Rights

The circuit court entered an order terminating the appellant A.V.’s parental rights to his daughter, M.D. (the child), following a “grounds” hearing at which the court determined that the grounds for terminating A.V.’s parental rights had been established. A.V. makes two arguments on appeal. First, A.V. argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the grounds hearing and that, as a result, this case must be remanded for the circuit court to conduct a new grounds hearing. Second, A.V. argues that the court erroneously entered the termination order without first holding a dispositional hearing on the question of whether terminating his parental rights serves the child’s best interests and that, as a result, the order must be reversed and this case remanded to the circuit court for it to conduct a dispositional hearing.

As to the first issue, A.V. fails to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the grounds hearing. As to the second issue, the respondent S.D. concedes that the circuit court improperly terminated A.V.’s parental rights without first holding a dispositional hearing on the question of the child’s best interests. Accordingly, I reverse the order terminating A.V.’s parental rights and remand to the circuit court for it to conduct a dispositional hearing.

Full Text

WI Supreme Court Digests

WI Supreme Court

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. A.L.

Case No.: 2019 WI 20

Focus: Statutory Interpretation – Juvenile Competency

The Milwaukee County Circuit Court, T. Christopher Dee presiding, denied the State’s motion to recall A.L.’s juvenile delinquency proceedings. We review the court of appeals’ decision reversing the circuit court. A.L. seeks review of two issues: (1) whether a circuit court can resume suspended juvenile delinquency proceedings to reexamine the competency of a juvenile who was initially found not competent to proceed under Wis. Stat. § 938.30(5)(d) (2015-16) and not likely to become competent within the statutory time limits; and (2) whether the circuit court retains competency over juvenile delinquency proceedings after an accompanying juvenile in need of protection or services (JIPS) order has expired.

We conclude that a circuit court can resume suspended juvenile delinquency proceedings to reexamine the competency of a juvenile who was initially found not competent and not likely to become competent within the statutory time frame. We also conclude that a circuit court retains competency over juvenile delinquency proceedings even after an accompanying JIPS order has expired. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Affirmed

Concur: KELLY, J. concurs (opinion filed).

Dissent:

Full Text

Supreme Court Digests

United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, et al.

Case No.: 17-571

Focus: Statutory Interpretation – Copyright Infringement

Impelling prompt registration of copyright claims, 17 U. S. C. §411(a) states that “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until . . . registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.” The question this case presents: Has “registration . . . been made in accordance with [Title 17]” as soon as the claimant delivers the required application, copies of the work, and fee to the Copyright Office; or has “registration . . . been made” only after the Copyright Office reviews and registers the copyright? We hold, in accord with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, that registration occurs, and a copyright claimant may commence an infringement suit, when the Copyright Office registers a copyright. Upon registration of the copyright, however, a copyright owner can recover for infringement that occurred both before and after registration.

Petitioner Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation (Fourth Estate) is a news organization producing online journalism. Fourth Estate licensed journalism works to respondent Wall-Street.com, LLC (Wall-Street), a news website. The license agreement required Wall-Street to remove from its website all content produced by Fourth Estate before canceling the agreement. Wall-Street canceled, but continued to display articles produced by Fourth Estate. Fourth Estate sued Wall-Street and its owner, Jerrold Burden, for copyright infringement. The complaint alleged that Fourth Estate had filed “applications to register [the] articles [licensed to Wall-Street] with the Register of Copyrights.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 18a. Because the Register had not yet acted on Fourth Estate’s applications, the District Court, on Wall-Street and Burden’s motion, dismissed the complaint, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 856 F. 3d 1338 (2017). Thereafter, the Register of Copyrights refused registration of the articles Wall-Street had allegedly infringed.

We granted Fourth Estate’s petition for certiorari to resolve a division among U. S. Courts of Appeals on when registration occurs in accordance with §411(a). 585 U. S. ___ (2018). Compare, e.g., 856 F. 3d, at 1341 (case below) (registration has been made under §411(a) when the Register of Copyrights registers a copyright), with, e.g., Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F. 3d 612, 621 (CA9 2010) (registration has been made under §411(a) when the copyright claimant’s “complete application” for registration is received by the Copyright Office).

Affirmed

Dissenting:

Concurring:

Full Text

United States Supreme Court

Case Name: BNSF Railway Company v. Michael D. Loos

Case No.: 17-1042

Focus: FELA – Compensation

Respondent Michael Loos was injured while working at petitioner BNSF Railway Company’s railyard. Loos sued BNSF under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U. S. C. §51 et seq., and gained a $126,212.78 jury verdict. Of that amount the jury ascribed $30,000 to wages lost during the time Loos was unable to work. BNSF moved for an offset against the judgment. The lost wages awarded Loos, BNSF asserted, constituted “compensation” taxable under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RRTA), 26 U. S. C. §3201 et seq. Therefore, BNSF urged, the railway was required to withhold a portion of the $30,000 attributable to lost wages to cover Loos’s share of RRTA taxes, which came to $3,765. The District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the requested offset, holding that an award of damages compensating an injured railroad worker for lost wages is not taxable under the RRTA.

The question presented: Is a railroad’s payment to an employee for working time lost due to an on-the-job injury taxable “compensation” under the RRTA, 26 U. S. C. §3231(e)(1)? We granted review to resolve a division of opinion on the answer to that question. 584 U. S. ___ (2018). Compare Hance v. Norfolk S. R. Co., 571 F. 3d 511, 523 (CA6 2009) (“compensation” includes pay for time lost); Phillips v. Chicago Central & Pacific R. Co., 853 N. W. 2d 636, 650–651 (Iowa 2014) (agency reasonably interpreted “compensation” as including pay for time lost); Heckman v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R. Co., 286 Neb. 453, 463, 837 N. W. 2d 532, 540 (2013) (“compensation” includes pay for time lost), with 865 F. 3d 1106, 1117–1118 (CA8 2017) (case below) (“compensation” does not include pay for time lost); Mickey v. BNSF R. Co., 437 S. W. 3d 207, 218 (Mo. 2014) (“compensation” does not include FELA damages for lost wages). We now hold that an award compensating for lost wages is subject to taxation under the RRTA.

Reversed and remanded

Dissenting: GORSUCH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined.

Concurring:

Full Text

United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Rimini Street, Inc, et al. v. Oracle USA, Inc., et al.

Case No.: 17-1625

Focus: Statutory Interpretation – Copyright Act – Costs

The Copyright Act gives federal district courts discretion to award “full costs” to a party in copyright litigation. 17 U. S. C. §505. In the general statute governing awards of costs, Congress has specified six categories of litigation expenses that qualify as “costs.” See 28 U. S. C. §§1821, 1920. The question presented in this case is whether the Copyright Act’s reference to “full costs” authorizes a court to award litigation expenses beyond the six categories of “costs” specified by Congress in the general costs statute. The statutory text and our precedents establish that the answer is no. The term “full” is a term of quantity or amount; it does not expand the categories or kinds of expenses that may be awarded as “costs” under the general costs statute. In copyright cases, §505’s authorization for the award of “full costs” therefore covers only the six categories specified in the general costs statute, codified at §§1821 and 1920. We reverse in relevant part the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded

Dissenting:

Concurring:

Full Text