United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
Parole — discharge
A defendant was still subject to parole supervision, even if he mistakenly was given a notice stating that his supervision was terminated.
“Here, the Notice of Discharge incorrectly stated that Matamoros was no longer subject to the Commission’s supervision. Matamoros, however, is unable to demonstrate that the notice and letter, although the product of affirmative acts—to be distinguished from a failure to discharge an affirmative obligation, which never amounts to affirmative misconduct, see Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 834-35 (7th Cir. 2002); Edgewater Hosp., Inc. v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 1123, 1138 n.8 (7th Cir. 1988), amended by 866 F.2d 228 (1989)— were anything more than the result of mere negligence. Savasta provided a plausible explanation for why he prepared the notice and letter: he looked at the most recent documents for a case that was over twenty years old and that had a fairly lengthy procedural posture. This explanation, coupled with the fact the Commission issued the Certificate of Special Parole prior to Matamoros’ criminal conduct on September 9, 2005, indicates that what transpired was more than likely the result of an inadvertent oversight. We do not view the record as demonstrating a situation in which Savasta or the Commission affirmatively concealed a material fact or engaged in “ongoing active misrepresentations.” Cf. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 707-09 (9th Cir. 1989). Matamoros urges us to consider that ‘it was clearly noted in the Commission’s file that Matamoros had an additional three-year [special parole] term to serve,’ but we do not see how this conclusory statement in any way undermines Savasta’s explanation.”
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Clevert, J., Bauer, J.