Sentencing — old age

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United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Criminal

Sentencing — old age

It was not error for the sentencing court not to reduce a defendant’s sentence because of his old age.

“We have wrestled in previous cases with the question whether life expectancy statistics should figure in sentencing for offenses for which Congress has not authorized a life sentence. Our court has concluded, as have other courts, that a sentence which although it is a term of years is likely or even certain to be a de facto life sentence because of the defendant’s age is improper if the statute under which he was convicted provides that only a jury can authorize a life sentence (18 U.S.C. § 34, applicable to certain drug offenses). United States v. Martin, 63 F.3d 1422, 1432-34 (7th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 850-51 (2000); United States v. Martin, 115 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Martin, 100 F.3d 43, 46, 48 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Prevatte, 66 F.3d 840, 846-49 (7th Cir. 1995) (concurring opinion); United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 131-32 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Gullett, 75 F.3d 941, 950-51 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Williams, 775 F.2d 1295, 1299 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hansen, 755 F.2d 629, 631 (8th Cir. 1985). This is not such a case. The defendant’s age and physical condition do not make his sentence a de facto life sentence. And if it did, it would just be one more consideration that the judge might be asked to weigh in determining the sentence, properly so if the prospect of dying in prison is thought to make a sentence of otherwise appropriate length harsher.”

Dismissed.

11-3153 U.S. v. Johnson

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, Herndon, J., Posner, J.