09-1498 U.S. v. Tinklenberg

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Criminal Procedure
Speedy Trial Act

18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(1)(D) stops the Speedy Trial clock from running automatically upon the filing of a pretrial motion irrespective of whether the motion has any impact on when the trial begins.

Several considerations, taken together, compel the conclusion that Congress intended subparagraph (D) to apply automatically. First, subparagraph (D) and neighboring subparagraphs (F) and (H)contain language that instructs courts to measure the time actually consumed by the specified pretrial occurrence, but those subparagraphs do not mention the date on which the trial begins or was expected to begin. Second, during the 37 years since Congress enacted the statute, every other Court of Appeals has rejected the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation. Third, the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation would make the subparagraph (D) exclusion significantly more difficult to administer, thereby hindering the Act’s efforts to secure fair and efficient trials. Fourth, the Court’s conclusion is reinforced by the difficulty of squaring the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation with the “automatic application” rule expressed in, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 476 U. S. 321, 327. Fifth, the legislative history also supports the Court’s conclusion. Sixth, because all the subparagraphs but one under paragraph (1) begin with the phrase “delay resulting from,” the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation would potentially extend well beyond pretrial motions and encompass such matters as mental and physical competency examinations, interlocutory appeals, consideration of plea agreements, and the absence of essential witnesses.

579 F. 3d 589, affirmed.

09-1498 U.S. v. Tinklenberg

Breyer, J.; Scalia, J., concurring.

TAG: Criminal Procedure Digest

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