$6.5 million judgment barred by subsequent judgment

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“Don’t be greedy!”

It’s a demand that we’ve all heard and made before. But rarely is the cost as great as that in a recent case from federal court in Illinois — more than $6.5 million.

Steven Manning was a former Chicago police office and FBI informant who was convicted of murder and kidnapping, and sentenced to death in Illinois. After his convictions were reversed, he filed suit against two FBI agents in federal court.

Manning sued under both the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and filed a civil rights claim pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

The two claims were tried together in a combined, though bifurcated, trial (claims under the FTCA may not be tried to a jury).

The jury hearing the Bivens claims found in favor of Manning and awarded him more than $6.5 million in damages. Six months later, the district court found in favor of the United States on Manning’s FTCA claims.

The government then moved to vacate the Bivens judgment, relying on 28 U.S.C. 2676, which provides, “The judgment in an action under section 1346(b) of this title shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.”

The district court judge granted the motion, and Manning appealed. But, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, in an opinion by Judge William J. Bauer.

Manning conceded that the two claims arose out of the same transaction, and by reason of the same subject matter.

But he argued that the bar does not apply to claims raised in the same action, and alternatively, the judgment bar should not apply retroactively to nullify a previous judgment.

The court disagreed.

Same Suit

The court found that the plain and unambiguous language of the statute provides that an FTCA judgment bars “any action,” including claims brought within the same action.

Bauer explained, “A claim is a part of the broader term action, and we do not see how the judgment bar could be read to preclude the whole while preserving its parts. An interpretation that sec. 2676 was intended to bar only subsequent lawsuits by the same party arising out of the same set of facts does not find adequate support in the text.”

Retroactivity

The court also held that the judgment bar applies, even to judgments previously entered.
Again, the court found the statutory language unambiguous.

The court cited with approval, a district court decision from Iowa addressing the same issue: “Although such retroactive operation of sec. 2676 may seem harsh, if not Kafka-esque, Plaintiffs pursued their claims against the United States at their own peril.” McCabe v. MacAulay, 2008 WL 2980013, at *15 (N.D.Iowa, Aug. 1, 2008).

Looking to the record before the district court, the court found that Manning acknowledged there was a risk in continuing to pursue the FTCA claim, but proceeded to judgment anyway.