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Foreclosure judgment can be appealed

What the court held

Case: Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Moore, No. 05-2941.

Issue: Can a prevailing party appeal a district court judgment?

Holding: Yes. Where the district court’s only actual holding was adverse to the party, it can appeal, to avoid potential application of the doctrine of issue preclusion.

Summary judgment in a foreclosure action has issue preclusive effect, even if it is not sufficiently final to be appealable, the Seventh Circuit held on May 4.

Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. brought a diversity suit in Illinois federal court against James E. Moore seeking foreclosure of its mortgage on his home, an order that the home be sold, and, if the proceeds of the sale were insufficient to satisfy Chase’s debt, entry of a deficiency judgment for the unpaid balance.

Chase moved for summary judgment, which the district judge denied. Chase moved to reconsider and the court, upon discovering that the documents Moore had submitted in opposition to the first motion were fake, granted summary judgment for Chase, and entered judgment.

However, the court never granted Chase any relief, such as ordering the home sold.

Moore appealed, and Chase argued that the court lacked jurisdiction of the appeal because the judge did not enter a final judgment. In a decision by Judge Richard A. Posner, the court held that it did have jurisdiction, but that the appeal was meritless, and so affirmed.

Finality

The court rejected Chase’s argument that, because the judgment did not order Moore to do anything or to pay anything, therefore, it was not final.

The court wrote, “that does not negate finality. The test is not the adequacy of the judgment but whether the district court has finished with the case. If it has, ending the lawsuit, the judgment can be appealed, for otherwise a plaintiff who had received a favorable ruling but no relief would have to ask the court of appeals to mandamus the district judge.”

The court cited Munson Transpor-tation, Inc. v. Hajjar, 148 F.3d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1998), in which the court concluded that a district court order was final, despite not addressing all the claims, because it contained language “calculated to conclude all the claims before the district court” and indeed said “this case is terminated.”

The judgment order in the case at bar stated that judgment is awarded to Chase Manhattan; thus, the court held it was final.

Standing

The court then turned to standing, because Chase was not the party appealing, nor did it file a cross-appeal; only Moore, who was not ordered to pay anything and remains in possession of the home, despite defaulting on its mortgage, decided to appeal.

The court began: “The judgment is radically defective. It’s as if the judge had said midway through the case ‘I am tired of this case so I’m entering a judgment terminating it.’ It would be a final order but not a proper disposition. But can we do anything about it? Chase Manhattan has not appealed, so we cannot alter the district court’s judgment in its favor. Moore is the appellant; but if he was not harmed by the judgment, he lacks standing to appeal (cites omitted).”

However, the court found that Moore was harmed by the judgment, because of its potential collateral estoppel effect.

In LaBuhn v. Bulkmatic Transport Co., 865 F.2d 119, 122 (7th Cir. 1988), the court noted that a winning party can appeal in order to challenge an adverse finding by the trial court that might form the basis for a plea of collateral estoppel in a subsequent suit. However, the court also observed in that case that a finding which a party had no incentive, other than fear of collateral estoppel, to appeal, because he had won, has no collateral estoppel effect; so the fear is baseless.

However, the court found that was not the situation in this case, calling the case “unusual.”

The court reasoned, “it is not as if Moore had really won in the district court. The only ruling the court made went against him — the ruling that he really did owe Chase Manhattan the money that Chase was trying to collect by foreclosing the mortgage on his home.”

Finding that that ruling fixed Moore’s liability, the court concluded that, if Chase instituted a new action (and was not barred by res judicata), then collateral estoppel would bar Moore from relitigating the issue of his liability.

The court also noted that, even if res judicata did bar a new suit by Chase to foreclose the mortgage, interest is continuing to accrue on the note secured by the mortgage, and Moore remains liable to Chase not only for that interest but also on the note itself.

The court concluded that, even if the note is no longer secured by the mortgage, Chase could use the liability determination to attempt future collection of the debt.

Related Links

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Related Article

Case Analysis

For support, the court cited In re Brown, 951 F.2d 564, 570 (3d Cir. 1991), which held that the finding that the defendant in a foreclosure action was liable had collateral estoppel effect in other proceedings even though the finding had not yet led to a final order of foreclosure. That court found the liability finding sufficiently final to be given preclusive effect.

The court concluded, “If it were certain that Chase could get no relief against Moore, either by filing a new suit or by filing a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, then Moore was the practical winner in the district court, and so cannot appeal. But as it is virtually certain that the district judge was simply mistaken in terminating the case when and how she did, Chase’s prospects in further proceedings in the district court must be reckoned highly promising, in which event Moore does have something to gain from getting the present judgment reversed.”

Accordingly, the court held the rule in Brown controlling, and that Moore has standing to appeal. Nevertheless, the court did not even address the actual merits, but made only a conclusory statement that the appeal “has no possible merit.”

The court acknowledged that affirming the district court’s “premature judgment” leaves the dispute “in limbo,” but concluded it had no authority to do otherwise, and so did affirm.

Click here for Case Analysis.

David Ziemer can be reached by email.

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