02-3175 U.S. by and through Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., et al.

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“The VA hired Lockheed to solve problems. That Lockheed knew in advance that there were problems (the most charitable description of Garst’s allegations), some of which turned out to be insuperable (by Lockheed’s staff, at least), does not come close to alleging fraud with particularity. We could go on with other paragraphs of the complaint and statement, but there would be little point to the exercise. Some come closer to specific allegations of deceit but fail to link them to any claim for payment. (Lockheed says that it swallowed some of the costs, and did not submit bills, when it realized that certain objectives could not be achieved.) But even if it were possible to navigate through these papers to a few specific instances of fraud, why should the court be obliged to try? Rule 8(a) requires parties to make their pleadings straightforward, so that judges and adverse parties need not try to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud. Federal judges have better things to do, and the substantial subsidy of litigation (court costs do not begin to cover the expense of the judiciary) should be targeted on those litigants who take the preliminary steps to assemble a comprehensible claim. Garst’s lawyer filed documents so long, so disorganized, so laden with cross-references and baffling acronyms, that they could not alert either the district judge or the defendants to the principal contested matters.

“Complaints like this are pestilential, and the district court showed great restraint in wading through four iterations plus one ‘more definite statement’ before giving up. Garst received more judicial attention than his pleadings deserved.”

Affirmed.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Grady, J., Easterbrook, J.