01-2826, 01-2827 Curtis v. U.S.

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“Because Apprendi is concerned with the identity of the decisionmaker, and the quantum of evidence required for a sentence, rather than with what primary conduct is unlawful, it identifies a new rule of criminal procedure that falls within the set of legal changes to which the Teague standard applies.

“Thus we must ask whether the rights identified in Apprendi are so fundamental that any system of ordered liberty is obliged to include them. The Supreme Court considered a related argument in Cotton, where the defendant insisted that failing to name the drug quantity in the indictment and obtain a resolution (beyond a reasonable doubt) by the jury is so vital that it should be deemed a ‘structural error’ that always leads to reversal on direct appeal. The Court’s answer was that even if the error is ‘structural’ and even if the point is raised on direct appeal, the error may not necessarily justify reversal under the plain-error standard that applies to litigants who did not present their argument to the district court.

Whether it does (assuming that (1) there is error, (2) that is ‘plain,’ and (3) affects substantial rights) will depend on the evidence in the particular case. That is to say, Cotton held that a decision about drug quantity made by a judge (on the preponderance standard) rather than a jury (on the reasonable- doubt standard) is not the sort of error that necessarily undermines the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. To the contrary, the Court continued, the fairness and integrity of the criminal justice system depends on meting out to those inflicting the greatest harm on society the most severe punishments. The real threat then to the ‘fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings’ would be if [criminal defendants], despite the overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence that they were involved in a vast drug conspiracy, were to receive a sentence prescribed for those committing less substantial drug offenses because of an error that was never objected to at trial. 122 S. Ct. at 1787. This observation is no less applicable to collateral attacks. So no bedrock rule of procedure has been broken. Findings by federal district judges are adequate to make reliable decisions about punishment. See Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511 (1998). Apprendi therefore does not disturb sentences that became final before June 26, 2000, the date of its release.”

Affirmed.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, McDade, J., Easterbrook, J.