00-1737 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of New York, Inc., et al. v. Village of Stratton, et al.

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There is no doubt that the interests the ordinance assertedly serves-the prevention of fraud and crime and the protection of residents’ privacy-are important and that the Village may seek to safeguard them through some form of regulation of solicitation activity. However, the amount of speech covered by the ordinance raises serious concerns. Had its provisions been construed to apply only to commercial activities and the solicitation of funds, arguably the ordinance would have been tailored to the Village’s interest in protecting its residents’ privacy and preventing fraud. Yet, the Village’s administration of its ordinance unquestionably demonstrates that it applies to a significant number of noncommercial “canvassers” promoting a wide variety of “causes.” The pernicious effect of the permit requirement is illustrated by, e.g., the requirement that a canvasser be identified in a permit application filed in the mayor’s office and made available for public inspection, which necessarily results in a surrender of the anonymity this Court has protected. Also central to the Court’s conclusion that the ordinance does not pass First Amendment scrutiny is that it is not tailored to the Village’s stated interests. Even if the interest in preventing fraud could adequately support the ordinance insofar as it applies to commercial transactions and the solicitation of funds, that interest provides no support for its application to petitioners, to political campaigns, or to enlisting support for unpopular causes. The Village’s argument that the ordinance is nonetheless valid because it serves the two additional interests of protecting residents’ privacy and the prevention of crime is unpersuasive. As to the former, an unchallenged ordinance section authorizing residents to post “No Solicitation” signs, coupled with their unquestioned right to refuse to engage in conversation with unwelcome visitors, provides ample protection for unwilling listeners. As to the latter, it seems unlikely that the lack of a permit would preclude criminals from knocking on doors and engaging in conversations not covered by the ordinance, and, in any event, there is no evidence in the record of a special crime problem related to door-to-door solicitation.

240 F.3d 553, reversed and remanded.

Local effect:

While there is significant case law in the Seventh Circuit abrogating restrictions on when canvassers may solicit door-to-door, and case law reversing the denial of a permit to canvass, the case law seems to assume that the permit process itself is lawful, and has even been proposed as a less restrictive alternative to other ordinances the court has struck down. Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1557 (7th Cir. 1986). To the extent such an assumption exists, it is no longer valid in light of the Court’s decision in this case.

Stevens, J.; Breyer, J., concurring; Scalia, J., concurring; Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting.