99-3656 Taylor v. U.S.

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“We held in Liegakos v. Cooke, 106 F.3d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1997), that the Constitution does not require the judge to tell the accused in open court that he is entitled to testify, and to obtain a formal waiver of this right. … Nor does the Constitution require an attorney to provide this advice in some prescribed formula … the accused may not be prohibited from testifying – not by a judge, not by a lawyer. So if a defendant’s theory were that he told his lawyer that he wanted to testify, but that his lawyer refused to allow this (for example, flatly refused to call his client to the stand without suggesting the possibility, if he thought that his client’s testimony would be perjury, that he could withdraw and allow the accused to represent himself, see Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1985)), this would be a sound constitutional claim. Yet Taylor does not contend that he told his lawyer that he wanted to testify and that counsel frustrated this objective, or even that he was ignorant of his right to testify. To the contrary, Taylor’s affidavits show that he discussed this possibility with counsel and decided not to testify after counsel pointed out the risks.

“Nothing in the Constitution (or any decision of the Supreme Court) justifies meddling with the attorney-client relationship by requiring advice to be given in a specific form or compelling the lawyer to obtain a formal waiver. Dealings between lawyer and client are supposed to be confidential from the government, not to be regulated by the state with an accompanying duty of oversight. Undue formality might undermine confidence between an accused and his client-either directly or through the effect of counsel’s belief that whatever was said or done would become the subject of a judicial inquiry, such as the one Taylor wants the district court to conduct. Perhaps a statute or rule could require warnings and waivers despite these costs, but no such statute or rule is on the books. The Constitution of its own force does not require them. Advice of rights and formal waivers are not essential to voluntary decisions.”

Affirmed.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, Beatty, J., Easterbrook, J.