By: dmc-admin//March 4, 2002//
“It is clear that Meyer was not similarly situated to Patterson because they reported to different supervisors and had different levels of experience and job responsibilities. The most significant fact distinguishing Patterson from Meyer is that, at the time of Patterson’s termination, Patterson was subordinate to Meyer on the task force. When an employer is deciding whether to place a supervisor or a subordinate in a managerial position, the supervisor’s additional experience makes it next to impossible for a court to conclude that a subordinate is similarly situated to him. Hoffman-Dombrowski v. Arlington Int’l Racecourse, Inc., 254 F.3d 644, 651 (7th Cir. 2001); Hoffman v. MCA, Inc., 144 F.3d 1117, 1124 (7th Cir. 1998). Moreover, Patterson and Meyer were evaluated by different supervisors, and Patterson also had different qualifications and experience with process engineering than Meyer. On these facts, we cannot compare the treatment of Patterson and Meyer, and we hold that Patterson failed to meet her burden of establishing that Meyer is a similarly- situated employee.”
“We also hold that Patterson failed to demonstrate that she was similarly situated to Hillegonds. The only facts of record regarding Hillegonds’ position with the company show that he was the manufacturing logistics manager for Avery’s automotive division. Because Hillegonds held an entirely different position in another division of the company than Patterson, their positions cannot be remotely equated. Accordingly, we hold that Patterson has not identified a similarly-situated male employee.”
Affirmed.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Lozano, J., Coffey, J.