00-4109 Navin v. Park Ridge School District 64, et al.

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“If the divorce decree had given Margaret not only custody but also every instrument of influence over J.P.’s education, then the district court’s decision would be correct. Although the IDEA grants rights to ‘parents,’ and the regulatory definition of ‘parent’ includes all biological parents, see 34 C.F.R. sec.300.20, which implies that a divorced parent retains statutory rights, nothing in the IDEA overrides states’ allocation of authority as part of a custody determination. See Susan R.M. v. Northeast Independent School District, 818 F.2d 455, 457 (5th Cir. 1987). If the decree had wiped out all of Patrick’s parental rights, it would have left him with no claim under the idea. But this is not what the divorce decree does. The district court did not analyze its language, but it is in the record and shows that Patrick retains some important rights, including the opportunity to be informed about and remain involved in the education of his son. If Patrick and Margaret disagree about educational decisions, then Margaret’s view prevails – unless under state law the school district’s view prevails over either parent’s wishes, and in that event Patrick’s rights under the decree to influence the school’s choices are even more important.

“On remand the district court must decide whether Patrick’s claims are incompatible, not with the divorce decree itself, but with Margaret’s use of her rights under the decree.”

Vacated and remanded.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Conlon, J., Per Curiam.