01-1564 U.S. v. Monteiro

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“Mr. Monteiro cannot point to any specific abuse that might ensue from this special condition. In the absence of a more concrete objection on his part, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in allowing any law enforcement officers to conduct a search of Mr. Monteiro.

“Determining the propriety of the special condition’s authorization of warrantless seizure of Mr. Monteiro, his home, or his car, however, requires further analysis. In authorizing the imposition of special conditions of supervised release, Congress explicitly mandated that an imposed condition should involve ‘no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. …’ 18 U.S.C. sec. 3583(d)(2). In Germosen, Chief Judge Winter wrote that, ‘[a]lthough district courts have broad discretion in tailoring conditions of supervised release to meet the specific circumstances of a given case, they do not have “untrammeled” discretion.’ 139 F.3d at 131 (quoting United States v. Amer, 110 F.3d 873, 883 (2d Cir. 1997)). Nevertheless, if the condition is reasonably related to the ends of rehabilitation and the protection of the public from recidivism, it must be upheld. See Schave, 186 F.3d at 843.”

“We cannot discern from this record the reason why the district court was of the view that such broad authority to seize was required to ensure that the ends of rehabilitation and protection of the public were met. Indeed, at oral argument in this case, counsel for the United States candidly acknowledged that, although such an interpretation was compatible with the plain language of the condition, he did not believe that such a result was foreseen by the district court.”

Vacated and remanded.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, McCuskey, J., Ripple, J.