Tribal Sovereignty

Listen to this article

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Stockbridge-Munsee Community v. State of Wisconsin, et al.

Case No.: 18-1449

Officials: EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Tribal Sovereignty

The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21, establishes a framework under which tribes may conduct gambling on land held in trust for their use. Some kinds of gambling may be conducted by every tribe, in every state, without prior approval. But class III gambling, which includes slot machines and table games such as blackjack, may be offered only in states that allow at least some non-Indian groups to conduct similar gambling, and then only if tribe and state enter into a compact or contract covering the operation. 25 U.S.C. §2710. Both a federal commission (the National Indian Gaming Commission) and the federal judiciary oversee this process. See generally Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U.S. 782 (2014).

The Community has two legal theories. First, it contends that Ho-Chunk Gaming Wittenberg is not located on a parcel of land that was held in trust for the tribe on or before October 17, 1988, a critical date under 25 U.S.C. §2719(a). The parcel was conveyed to the Nation in 1969, but with a condition that the Nation did not satisfy and that was not lifted until 1989—too late, the Community asserts, even though the Department of the Interior declared in 1986 that the parcel is part of the Nation’s trust lands. Second, the Community observes that the contract between the Nation and the State treats the Wittenberg casino as an “ancillary” gaming facility, a word that the contract defines as a place where gambling is not the primary business. The Community insists that gambling is the primary business at Wittenberg and faults the State for failing to enforce this contractual limitation.

In this appeal the Community contends that it is not subject to any time limit, both because it is a sovereign (and Wisconsin does not set time limits for its own suits) and because it seeks equitable relief against an ongoing violation of law. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946). Wisconsin replies that, because the dispute involves commercial operations, the state itself would be subject to a time limit, so tribes are equally obliged to sue promptly. And the Nation leads with an argument that the federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Affirmed

Affirmed

Full Text

Derek A Hawkins is trademark corporate counsel for Harley-Davidson. Hawkins oversees the prosecution and maintenance of the Harley-Davidson’s international trademark portfolio in emerging markets.