By: Derek Hawkins//May 7, 2019//
WI Court of Appeals – District I
Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. T.R.C.
Case No.: 2018AP820
Officials: BRENNAN, J.
Focus: Termination of Parental Rights
T.R.C. appeals from an October 17, 2017 order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, D.U.C. (D.), on grounds of continuing need of protection or services. See WIS. STAT. § 48.415(2). At birth, D. weighed just one pound and five ounces. She remained in the hospital for the first fifteen months of her life. She then lived with T.R.C. for ten months. She was removed from T.R.C.’s home at age two based on repeated referrals to child welfare officials and, between that point and the time of the disposition of this case, was continuously in out-of-home placement for forty-six months. She was almost six at the time of the TPR order. T.R.C. seeks reversal of the order on three grounds.
First, T.R.C. argues that her no contest plea at the grounds phase was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because the trial court failed in its mandatory duties in the plea colloquy to explain the different standard of proof that would apply at the dispositional hearing and because she did not in fact understand the consequences of the no-contest plea. Second, T.R.C. argues that at the dispositional hearing, trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in four ways: (1) when the family case manager testified about D.’s episodes of diarrhea after visits with T.R.C., trial counsel failed to object that the family case manager was not a medical expert; (2) trial counsel failed to call as witnesses one of D.’s pediatric specialists and a doctor who had conducted a psychological evaluation that included positive statements about T.R.C.; (3) trial counsel failed to argue that WIS. STAT. § 48.415 was unconstitutional as applied to T.R.C. because her parental rights were terminated in spite of evidence that she was capable of caring for D. and because there were other alternatives to termination; and (4) trial counsel failed to argue that the State had not proved that T.R.C. had “caused [D.] to be sick.”
Third, T.R.C. asks that this court reverse the order in the interest of justice, claiming that subsequent criminal allegations in a separate matter against the guardian ad litem created a conflict of interest that “tainted” the proceedings and claiming that “there are no compelling reasons to terminate” T.R.C.’s parental rights. For the reasons below, we conclude that T.R.C. has not satisfied her burden to show that her plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. She has not shown that trial counsel performed deficiently. She has not shown that reversal in the interest of justice is warranted. We therefore affirm.