Statutory Interpretation – FDCPA

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United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Dennis Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus, LLP

Case No.: 17-1307

Focus: Statutory Interpretation – FDCPA

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act regulates “‘debt collector[s].’” 15 U. S. C. §1692a(6); see 91 Stat. 874, 15 U. S. C. §1692 et seq. A “‘debt collector,’” the Act says, is “any person . . . in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts.” §1692a(6). This definition, however, goes on to say that “[f]or the purpose of section 1692f(6)” (a separate provision of the Act), “[the] term [debt collector] also includes any person . . . in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.” Ibid.

The question before us concerns this last sentence. Does it mean that one principally involved in “the enforcement of security interests” is not a debt collector (except “[f]or the purpose of section 1692f(6)”)? If so, numerous other provisions of the Act do not apply. Or does it simply reinforce the fact that those principally involved in the enforcement of security interests are subject to §1692f(6) in addition to the Act’s other provisions?

In our view, the last sentence does (with its §1692f(6) exception) place those whose “principal purpose . . . is the enforcement of security interests” outside the scope of the primary “debt collector” definition, §1692a(6), where the business is engaged in no more than the kind of security interest enforcement at issue here—nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings.

Affirmed

Dissenting:

Concurring: SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion.
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Derek A Hawkins is trademark corporate counsel for Harley-Davidson. Hawkins oversees the prosecution and maintenance of the Harley-Davidson’s international trademark portfolio in emerging markets.