Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Shane Crutchfield v. Jeff Dennison

Case No.: 16-1476

Officials: BAUER, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Shane Crutchfield was charged with several Illinois drug crimes and faced enhanced penalties based on his lengthy criminal record. The prosecutor offered a plea deal that would have capped his sentence at 25 years, explaining that Crutchfield would have to serve 85 percent of that term under state law. Crutchfield’s attorney advised him of the offer but did not correct the prosecutor’s mistake: under Illinois good-time law, Crutchfield would have been eligible for release after serving 50 percent of his sentence, not 85 percent. Crutchfield rejected the deal. A jury found him guilty, and the judge imposed a 40-year sentence.

After direct appeal and two rounds of postconviction proceedings, Crutchfield filed for federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claiming that his trial attorney’s flawed legal advice about the plea offer amounted to ineffective assistance in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under the rule of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). He says he would have taken the deal if his attorney had correctly advised him about the good-time law. But he did not raise this claim on direct appeal or in his initial state postconviction proceeding. Instead, he belatedly presented it in a successive postconviction petition. Applying Illinois rules of procedural default, the state courts refused to hear the claim. The district judge denied § 2254 relief based on the unexcused procedural default.

Crutchfield concedes the default but asks us to hold that Illinois prisoners may use the Martinez–Trevino gateway to obtain review of defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012); Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 429 (2013). We decline to do so. Illinois does not impose the kind of restrictive procedural rules on Strickland claims to warrant application of the Martinez– Trevino exception. Because Crutchfield procedurally defaulted his Strickland claim and has not shown cause to excuse the default, we affirm the district court.

Affirmed

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Derek A. Hawkins is a trademark corporate counsel attorney for Harley-Davidson, where he concentrates his practice on brand protection and strategy.