By: Derek Hawkins//October 15, 2018//
7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Case Name: International Union of Operating Engineers Local 399, et al, v Village of Lincolnshire, et al.
Case No.: 17-1300; 17-1325
Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
Focus: Statutory Interpretation – Ordinance Changes
The National Labor Relations Act and its amendments establish a national system of industrial-labor relations. The question before us in this case is whether a municipality—specifically, the Village of Lincolnshire, Illinois— can add to or change that system through a local ordinance. Lincolnshire passed an ordinance that purports to do three things: (1) forbid the inclusion of union-security or hiring-hall provisions in collective bargaining agreements, (2) forbid the mandatory use of hiring halls, and (3) forbid dues checkoff arrangements. The Village asserted that it had the right to do so under section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b), which permits states to bar compulsory union membership as a condition of employment. Lincolnshire contends that, as a political subdivision of Illinois, it is entitled to exercise the state’s power in this respect.
Whether a local law, rather than a state-wide law, falls within the scope of section 14(b) is a subject that has divided other courts. The Sixth Circuit, in United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America Local 3047 v. Hardin County, Kentucky, 842 F.3d 407 (6th Cir. 2016), agreed with the Village that it does, but only for union-security clauses. The Sixth Circuit found hiring-hall and dues-checkoff provisions comparable to those in the Lincolnshire ordinance to be outside the scope of section 14(b) and thus preempted by the NLRA. On the other side of the fence, Kentucky’s highest court has held that section 14(b) does not permit local legislation on the topic of either union-security or mandatory use of hiring-halls or dues-checkoffs. See Kentucky State AFL-CIO v. Puckett, 391 S.W. 2d 360 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965). With all due respect to our sister circuit, on the union-security clause issue we find ourselves persuaded by the position that Kentucky took, although our reasons differ somewhat. We agree with both courts that localities may not address the subjects of hiring halls or dues checkoffs. We thus conclude that the authority conferred in section 14(b) does not extend to the political subdivisions of states and affirm the judgment of the district court holding Lincolnshire’s ordinance preempted and without force.
Affirmed