By: Derek Hawkins//April 30, 2018//
7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Case Name: Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc., et al. v. Commissioner of the Indiana State Department of Health, et al.
Case No.: 17-3163
Officials: BAUER, FLAUM, and MANION, Circuit Judges.
Focus: Statutory Interpretation
On March 24, 2016, the Governor of Indiana signed into law House Enrolled Act No. 1337 (HEA 1337), which created new provisions and amended others that regulate abortion procedures within Indiana. Shortly thereafter, Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky (“PPINK”) filed a lawsuit against the Commissioner of the Indiana State Department of Health, the prosecutors of Marion, Lake, Monroe and Tippecanoe Counties, and members of the Medical Licensing Board of Indiana (collectively, “the State”). PPINK sought declaratory and injunctive relief from three particular parts of the law: (1) the new provisions titled “Sex Selective and Disability Abortion Ban,” Ind. Code § 16-34-4 (2016), which prohibit a person from performing an abortion if the person knows the woman is seeking an abortion solely for one of the enumerated reasons (collectively, “the nondiscrimination provisions”); (2) an added provision to the informed consent process, instructing those performing abortions to inform women of the non-discrimination provisions, § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1)(K); and (3) numerous amendments to the provisions dealing with the disposal of aborted fetuses, §§ 16-34-3-4(a); 16-41-16-4(d); 16-41-16-5; 16-41-16-7.6 (collectively, “the fetal disposition provisions”).
The district court initially entered a preliminary injunction on June 30, 2016, and both parties subsequently filed motions for summary judgment. The court granted PPINK’s motion for summary judgment on September 22, 2017, declaring the three parts of HEA 1337 unconstitutional and permanently enjoining the State from enforcing them.
We affirm. The non-discrimination provisions clearly violate well-established Supreme Court precedent holding that a woman may terminate her pregnancy prior to viability, and that the State may not prohibit a woman from exercising that right for any reason. Because the non-discrimination provisions are unconstitutional, so too is the provision that a woman be informed of them. Additionally, the amended fetal disposition provisions violate substantive due process because they have no rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.
Affirmed