By: Derek Hawkins//April 23, 2018//
7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Case Name: Patrick Quinn, et al., v. State of Illinois, et al.,
Case No.: 17-1565
Officials: EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges
Focus: Equal Protection Claim
Illinois law provides that the Mayor of Chicago appoints the City’s Board of Education. 105 ILCS 5/34-3. Until 1995, when this law took effect, the Mayor needed the consent of the City Council; now the Mayor acts on his own. In this suit under §2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. §10301, plaintiffs (registered voters, some of whom are parents or grandparents of school-age children) contend that this system deprives black and Latino citizens of their right to vote. School boards elsewhere in Illinois are elected; plaintiffs say that failure to elect the school board in Chicago has a disproportionate effect on minority voters. The district court dismissed the complaint. 234 F. Supp. 3d 922 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
This equal-protection theory is brought up short by Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967), which holds that appointing a school board is constitutionally permissible, and by Hearne v. Board of Education, 185 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 1999), which holds that the 1995 Illinois statute is valid notwithstanding the line it draws between Chicago and every other city in Illinois. Accord, Quinn v. Board of Education, 2018 IL App (1st) 170834 (Mar. 29, 2018) (applying the Constitution of Illinois). Plaintiffs insist that Sailors and Hearne are outdated, but we must follow the Supreme Court no maper what arguments can be leveled against its decisions. And we are quite content to follow Hearne, whose reasoning is as strong now as it was when it was issued 19 years ago.
Hearne addresses and rejects the sort of racial-impact contention that plaintiffs pursue. 185 F.3d at 775–76. This approach is just a repackaged version of the contention that some citizens have been disfranchised. We have explained why that is wrong: all citizens of Chicago have equal influence, though it is exercised indirectly (by voting for Mayor) rather than directly (by voting for the Board’s members). There is neither disparate treatment nor disparate impact— and, as Hearne observed, disparate impact does not violate the Equal Protection Clause at all. See Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Affirmed