By: Derek Hawkins//March 14, 2016//
7TH Circuit Court of Appeals
Case Name: William Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc.,
Case No.: 15-1935
Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, ROVNER, Circuit Judge, and SHAH, District Judge.
Focus: Age Discrimination
Company did not meet the definition of an “employer” by statute, warranting summary judgment for employer in age discrimination suit.
“It was Mike Stephenson, operations manager at Logansport, who fired Bridge. Stephenson, however, told Bridge that the decision was actually Straeter’s, so for purposes of summary judgment, we assume that Straeter was responsible. But in what capacity? Straeter was operations manager at Rochester, not Logansport, so Bridge contends that Straeter must have been acting on Rochester’s behalf when he directed that Bridge be let go. But Straeter was also an owner and director—of Rochester and of Logansport. Where the same officer or director works for two separate but commonly-owned entities, he at times represents one corporation and at times represents the other. That is, he “changes hats.” See Lusk v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 129 F.3d 773, 779 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). There are no facts from which it may reasonably be inferred that, when Straeter told Stephenson to fire Bridge, Straeter was wearing anything but a Logansport hat. Straeter, a Logansport owner and director, instructed the Logansport manager (also a coowner and director of that corporation) to fire a Logansport employee. What has Rochester to do with it? Bridge emphasizes that Straeter had a Rochester email address, and that the meeting between Straeter and Stephenson occurred at Rochester; but there is no evidence that Straeter conducted only Rochester business at his office (his only office), and there is no dispute that Straeter had responsibilities with both companies. Neither the email address nor the location of the meeting signals anything about the company Straeter represented when he directed Bridge’s firing. To defeat summary judgment on an issue on which he bears the ultimate burden of proof, Bridge was required to present evidence on which a jury could rely to find in his favor. The email address and Straeter-Stephenson meeting are insufficient.
Affirmed