By: Derek Hawkins//August 10, 2015//
Civil
7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
Writ of Habeas Corpus
No. 13-3312 Renardo Carter v. Timothy Douma
Even though appellant attorney failed to object to use of informant hearsay identification, overwhelming evidence would still likely lead to conviction and was not prejudicial.
“We need not resolve whether the failure to object here to the arguably hearsay identification was deficient performance, however. Even if Carter’s counsel might have been deficient in failing to object to Officer Webster’s testimony about the informant’s identification and its use during closing argument, Carter cannot show that the state court unreasonably determined that the problematic testimony did not prejudice him. See Taylor v. Bradley, 448 F.3d 942, 948–49 (7th Cir. 2006) (declining to resolve whether deficient performance when clear that no prejudice). For a petitioner to have been prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance, he must establish a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had counsel objected to the inadmissible testimony. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 104. A reasonable probability is one that undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The likelihood of a different out- come “must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112. A guilty verdict that is “overwhelmingly sup- ported by the record is less likely to have been affected by errors than one that is only weakly supported by the rec- ord.” Eckstein v. Kingston, 460 F.3d 844, 848 (7th Cir. 2006), quoting Hough v. Anderson, 272 F.3d 878, 891 (7th Cir. 2001). A state court’s application of the prejudice prong of Strick- land is reviewed under the deferential standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).”
Affirmed