Discipline decision looks at issue of sex with client’s wife

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If you’ve practiced law for any length of time, you come across disciplinary decisions by the Supreme Court concerning attorneys you’ve dealt with, and you say, “It’s about time somebody did something about ‘that guy.’”

Other times, you feel bad for the attorney, and you hope he gets his life back together.

But then you come across a decision like OLR v. Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, decided last month. An opinion like this is best read not at the office, but at home, as a guilty pleasure.

Remarkably, the decision actually contains several fine legal delineations between what does, and does not, violate the Rules of Professional Responsibility. However, any attorney who needs to cite these distinctions to defend his conduct should probably find a new line of work.

Fifteen counts were lodged by the OLR against attorney Michael R. Inglimo, of Superior, several of which were garden variety violations for failure to maintain proper trust account records, and drawing on funds belonging to a client.

Other counts were a bit more unusual.

For example, every attorney knows that it violates SCR 20:1.8(k)(2) to have sexual relations with a client, unless the relationship pre-dates the representation.

But does it violate the rule to have a ménage-a-trois with a client, and the client’s girlfriend? Apparently not, as long as you do it carefully enough.

The referee found that the three-some occurred (a finding the Supreme Court found supported by the evidence); however, both the referee and the Supreme Court agreed that the OLR failed to prove a violation of the Rule.

The reasoning: while Inglimo had sexual contact with the client’s girlfriend, at the same time the girlfriend was having sexual contact with Inglimo’s client, there was no direct sexual contact between Inglimo and the client.

The OLR contended, “as long as the lawyer and the client are both participating in a sexual act at the same time in the same place, they are having sexual relations ‘with’ each other.”

But the court disagreed, concluding, “the definitional language of [the rule] clearly indicate that the prohibited ‘sexual relations,’ whether intercourse or touching, must be INTENTIONALLY done between the lawyer and one particular person, namely the client (emphasis in original).”

The case also presented the age-old question whether smoking marijuana reflects adversely on an attorney’s honesty, integrity or fitness as a lawyer.

However, the court found it unnecessary to decide whether use alone violates the rules or not, inasmuch as it found that, not only did Inglimo smoke it, but he smoked it with clients, delivered it to clients, and smoked it with a minor.

The court rejected the argument of Inglimo (accepted by the referee) that such conduct does not violate the rules unless it affects the legal services rendered by the attorney.

The court concluded, “using an illegal drug with clients reflects adversely on an attorney’s fitness as a lawyer… [C]lients gain their impression of the law and the legal system primarily from their lawyer. A lawyer’s use of illegal substances with a client contradicts [the duty to show respect for the legal system] by showing the client that the lawyer has a disregard for the law.”

As if all this were not enough, the allegations get even stranger.

Count 14 alleged that Inglimo represented a married couple, P.K. (husband) and K.K (wife), and that while Inglimo was still representing P.K., he had sexual intercourse with K.K., in P.K.’s presence.

Not only that, but the OLR claimed the sex was performed in exchange for Inglimo’s legal services, and the intercourse was videotaped “to ensure that there was no dispute that the bill for legal fees had been paid in full.”.

Inglimo disputed that the sex was in exchange for his services as a lawyer, but the court found the issue irrelevant.

The court concluded, “we agree with the referee’s conclusion that Attorney Inglimo engaged in sexual intercourse with a client’s wife in the client’s presence for his own personal interests. Attorney Inglimo has not shown that his conduct with K.K. somehow benefited his client P.K. It is self-evident that an attorney’s personal interest in having sex with the spouse of a client may materially limit the attorney’s representation of that client.”

Ultimately, the court imposed a three-year suspension, and more than $42,000 in costs.