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Decisions v. Dispositions

By: dmc-admin//March 26, 2007//

Decisions v. Dispositions

By: dmc-admin//March 26, 2007//

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What the court held

Case: Wambolt v. West Bend Mutual Ins. Co., No. 2005AP1874; Tyler v. The RiverBank, No. 2005AP2336.

Issue: Is an order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, but not dismissing the defendant from the case, a final order for purposes of appeal?

Holding: No. Such an order may “decide” the substantive issues, but it does not “dispose” of them.

Attorneys: 2005AP1874: For Appellant: Skow, Ardell W., River Falls; Heidt, Martha H, Mondovi; For Respondent: Eiden, Timothy J., Menomonie. 2005AP2336: For Appellant: Sullivan, Dennis M., Eau Claire; Finn, Stephanie L., Eau Claire; For Respondent: Reinhardt, Peter M., Menomonie

The Wisconsin Supreme Court on Mar. 21 issued two decisions clarifying when a final judgment is entered, triggering the period for filing a notice of appeal.

The court held that a final order must contain an explicit statement either dismissing the entire matter in litigation or adjudging the entire matter in litigation as to one or more parties.

To avoid future confusion, the court also ordered that, commencing Sept. 1, 2007, final orders or judgments must contain a statement on the face of the document that it is final for the purpose of appeal.

The court added that, absent such a statement, appellate courts should liberally construe ambiguities to preserve the right of appeal.

The more detailed discussion of finality is contained in Wambolt v. West Bend Mutual Ins. Co. The other case, Tyler v. The RiverBank, applies the standard discussed more fully in Wambolt.

Wambolt

In Wambolt, the plaintiffs filed suit seeking UIM coverage against three insurers. The circuit court filed a memorandum decision on Apr. 25, 2005, granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

On May 9, the plaintiffs moved for reconsideration. On June 6, the court denied the motion in an order stating that the insurer is “dismissed from this action.” On July 12, 79 days after the memorandum decision, and 36 days after the June 6 order, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal, which the court of appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, in a decision by Justice Ann Walsh Bradley.

The court began by setting forth the previous governing standard, set forth in Harder v. Pfitzinger, 2004 WI 102, 274 Wis.2d 324, 682 N.W.2d 398: “when an order or a judgment is entered that disposes of all of the substantive issues in the litigation, as to one or more parties, as a matter of law, the circuit court intended it to be the final document for purposes of appeal, notwithstanding the label it bears or subsequent actions taken by the circuit court.”

In Wambolt’s case, the court concluded, the court of appeals went awry by interpreting the circuit court’s “deciding” the substantive issues on April 25 as “disposing” of them.

The court concluded that this misinterprets Harder. The final order in Harder did not contain legal reasoning; it simply and explicitly dismissed all causes of action. The April 25 order, in contrast, contained extensive reasoning, but did not explicitly dismiss or adjudge the case.

The court explained, “‘Deciding’ a case in the sense of merely analyzing legal issues and resolving questions of law does not dispose of an entire matter in litigation as to one or more parties. Rather, consistent with Wis. Stat. 808.03(1), the circuit court must act by explicitly dismissing or adjudging the entire matter in litigation as to one or more parties.”

Because the April 25 order did not contain an explicit statement dismissing the action against the insurer, the court held it was not a final judgment, and reversed.

New Rule

Before concluding, however, the court asked itself, “We all agree that the rules for appellate procedure should be clear. We nod our collective heads in affirming that the rules should not serve as traps for the unwary. But why, we ask, do the unwary continue to be trapped?”

Finding that merely issuing statements encouraging clear statements of finality have failed, the court decided to require, effective September 1, that all final orders and
judgments state explicitly that they are final for purposes of appeal, and that, absent such a statement, appellate courts should liberally construe ambiguities to preserve the right of appeal.

Tyler

In the second case, the plaintiff sued the defendant under a number of theories: breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence, seeking exemplary damages and actual attorney fees. The plaintiff alleged the defendant allowed unauthorized withdrawals from his IRA and CD accounts.

The case proceeded to trial after partial summary judgment was entered in favor of the defendant. After the trial, the unsuccessful plaintiff filed post-verdict motions, which were denied on May 24, 2005 in an order. On June 16, the court entered a document titled “Judgment,” stating that the claims are dismissed with prejudice.

110 days after the Order, and 88 days after the Judgment, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal.

The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely, but, as in Wambolt, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.

Applying the reasoning in Wambolt, the court held the May 24 order was not final. Although it contained findings of fact, and denied the request for a new trial, it failed to include language such as, “the claims of the Plaintiff are dismissed with prejudice,” which was included in the June 16 Judgment.

As in Wambolt, the earlier order “decided” the substantive issues, but failed to “dispose” of the action. Accordingly, the court reversed.

David Ziemer can be reached by email.

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