Airbag Case Analysis

Listen to this article

The court concluded its analysis of the jurisdictional issues by rhetorically asking itself, “Are we being fusspots and nitpickers in trying (so far with limited success) to enforce rules designed to ensure that federal courts do not exceed the limits that the Constitution and federal statues impose on their jurisdiction?”

Many attorneys in the Seventh Circuit would enthusiastically answer, “Yes,” but the court sees it differently, and it will be attorneys who need to adjust.

The presumptive sanction for the attorneys’ incorrect jurisdictional statements in this case is set by BondPro Corp. v. Siemens Power Generation, Inc., 466 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2006), at $1,000.

That the judges on the Seventh Circuit are particular about jurisdictional statements is not news. Nevertheless, this case is noteworthy for two reasons.

First, the court is considering as a sanction a requirement that the attorneys attend CLE programs on federal jurisdiction. The court notes that it has approved such sanctions before. In re Maurice, 69 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 1995).

Maurice, however, involved flagrant misunderstanding of the substantive rules of bankruptcy, and grossly unethical behavior by the attorney. Among the required CLE was eight credits of ethics classes. So, imposing such a sanction merely for filing a defective jurisdictional statement goes well beyond what the court has previously done in this context.

Second, the case is noteworthy for just how minor some of the errors are that the court points out. First, the plaintiff’s statement provides that diversity jurisdiction exists because the amount in controversy is $75,000, rather than that the amount “exceeds” $75,000.

Second, the defendant’s statement provides that the amount in controversy “allegedly” exceeds $75,000, rather than stating that the amount does exceed $75,000.

Given the other, more significant deficiencies of the parties’ jurisdictional statements, these errors could have been overlooked. To be on the safe side, attorneys should add these errors to the list of potential mistakes to avoid when drafting a jurisdictional statement.

Attorneys also need to be aware that it doesn’t matter whether jurisdiction is actually present or not. A defective jurisdictional statement is grounds for sanction, even if the errors are harmless, and jurisdiction is indisputably present. Where there is no jurisdiction, the sanctions can be much higher. The court once ordered the attorneys to relitigate the case in state court at no cost to their clients. Belleville Catering Co. v. Champaign Market Place, LLC, 350 F.3d 691 (7th Cir. 2003).

Finally, it should also be noted that federal jurisdiction could have been avoided in this case, merely by adding, as a defendant, some party who would be a Wisconsin citizen, such as the retailer who sold the car. The standards for who qualifies as an expert witness in Wisconsin state court are far more relaxed than in federal court, so, had a Wisconsin citizen been named as a defendant, the plaintiff may have been able to proceed to a jury trial in state court.

Apart from the jurisdictional issues, the case is significant for its discussion of expert testimony and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the product liability context.

The court cited two Louisiana cases for the proposition that, in some instances, deployment of an airbag, where there was no accident, could give grounds for a res ipsa loquitur instruction, and the plaintiff would not need to present any expert testimony: Lawson v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America, Inc., 938 So.2d 35 (La.2006); and Edwards v. Ford Motor Co., 934 So.2d 221 (La.App.2006).

In Lawson, the airbag deployed after the driver honked his horn; in Edwards, it deployed when the driver reentered the car and shut the door, after having exited the vehicle and left the motor running.

The Seventh Circuit analogized these two cases to the case of a surgeon leaving a sponge in a patient’s body during surgery. No expert testimony would be needed to prove that a surgeon should not do that.

The Seventh Circuit cites Lawson and Edwards as examples where a res ipsa loquitur instruction would be appropriate, and the plaintiff would not need to present any expert testimony.

At first blush, the court’s analogy seems appropriate. In fact, however, the issue is more complex, and notwithstanding the Seventh Circuit’s use of these cases, in both, the Louisiana courts held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply.

	Related Article Res ipsa loquitor inapplicable

In Edwards, the defendant presented expert testimony that the vehicle had been tampered with, and that the tampering could have caused the airbag to deploy. Because of this testimony, the court of appeals reversed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and directed that judgment be entered in favor of the defendant. Edwards, 934 So.2d at 224.

In Lawson, the plaintiff did present expert testimony, although he was proceeding under a res ipsa loquitur theory. Still, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the doctrine did not apply, also because of the possibility of tampering. Lawson, 938 So.2d at 50-51.

As a result, the use of these two cases by the Seventh Circuit, to support the idea that, in some product liability cases, a plaintiff can proceed under the doctrine without any expert testimony, is suspect.

In the case at bar, the plaintiff disposed of the vehicle, before it could be inspected by any experts, either for the plaintiff or defendant. Thus, the plaintiff made it impossible for the defendant to prove it was not negligent.

Thus, even if the facts in the case at bar were similar to those in Edwards or Lawson, and the airbag deployed when it indisputably should not have, the plaintiff’s actions in disposing of the vehicle may have been grounds to preclude the plaintiff from proceeding on a res ipsa loquitur theory.

Click here for Main Story.

David Ziemer can be reached by email.