Court reviews claims for plea withdrawal

Listen to this article

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals issued two decisions addressing the standard for plea withdrawals, holding in both cases that the motion for withdrawal was properly denied.

Package Pleas

In the first case, Timothy Goyette was charged with three others in the fatal beating of a man. Initially they were charged with first-degree intentional homicide, as party to a crime.

Ultimately, however, the prosecutor offered a “package plea agreement” — a plea agreement contingent upon three of the co-defendants pleading guilty (the fourth’s case was resolved by separate agreement). Under the agreement, the defendants pleaded guilty to second-degree reckless homicide, and aggravated battery with a gang enhancer.

At a joint plea hearing with the three defendants, Goyette pleaded guilty. During the colloquy, Goyette stated that nobody had threatened or pressured him to get him to enter the agreement.

After Goyette was sentenced to 25 years in prison, he moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that he believed he was innocent, but that he pleaded guilty under pressure, so that the codefendants could reach plea agreements.

La Crosse County Circuit Court Judge Dale T. Pasell held an evidentiary hearing, but denied the motion. Goyette appealed, but the court of appeals affirmed in a decision by Judge Paul G. Lundsten.

The court held that the “package” nature of the plea did not render it involuntary. The court found the pressure to be no different than in the cases of Craker v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 222, 223 N.W.2d 872 (1974); Seybold v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 227, 212 N.W.2d 146 (1973); and Drake v. State, 45 Wis. 2d 226, 172 N.W.2d 664 (1969).

In Craker, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held a plea was voluntary, although the defendant claimed he was coerced by pressure from family, friends, and clergy.

In Seybold, the plea agreement provided that the defendant’s wife, a co-defendant, would receive only probation. In Drake, the defendant claimed he pleaded guilty only to avoid implicating his wife. In both cases, the Supreme Court held the pleas voluntary, notwithstanding such outside pressure.

Applying those cases to Goyette, the court of appeals concluded, “Collectively, Craker, Seybold, and Drake reject the proposition that a plea is constitutionally involuntary if it is motivated by a desire to obtain a benefit for another. None of these cases involved a package plea agreement, but Goyette suggests no reason why their reasoning should not apply here.”

The court acknowledged that package plea agreements carry the risk that one of the defendants will be improperly pressured into entering a plea. But the court found nothing improper about such pressure, calling it “the same type of self-imposed pressure at issue in Craker, Seybold, and Drake.”

Accordingly, the court affirmed.

Party to a Crime

In the second case, Andrae D. Howell was charged in the shooting of Marcus Pearson. The complaint was later amended to allege party-to-a-crime liability, based on evidence suggesting that Howell was not the shooter.

After Howell pleaded guilty and was sentenced, he moved to withdraw his plea, claiming he did not understand
party-to-a-crime liability, but Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Jean W. DiMotto denied the motion, without holding an evidentiary hearing.

Howell appealed, but the court of appeals affirmed, in a decision also written by Judge Lundsten, and joined by Judge Margaret J. Vergeront. Judge Charles P. Dykman dissented.

	Related Links Wisconsin Court System Related Article Case Analysis

Finding that Howell failed to allege a defect in the plea itself, the court held that he was not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing, pursuant to State v. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).

Instead, the court applied Nelson v. State, 54 Wis.2d 489, 195 N.W.2d 629 (1972), and State v. Bentley, 201 Wis.2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 60 (1996). Because it found Howell’s allegations to be only conclusory, it affirmed the denial of the hearing.

In Howell’s motion, he asserted that he entered his plea under the mistaken belief that his mere presence at the shooting and failure to prevent it was sufficient for party-to-a-crime liability.

However, Howell admitted during the plea colloquy that he knew the other actor had a gun when they exited the car and approached the victim.

In addition, the circuit court had explained party-to-a-crime liability to Howell as follows: “State would have to prove either that you were the person who did all those things or that you intentionally assisted someone else who was doing those things, knowing what they were doing.”

Accordingly, the court concluded that Howell understood party-to-a-crime liability, and affirmed.

Judge Dykman dissented, concluding that, because understanding party-to-a-crime liability is a prerequisite to a voluntary plea, Bangert does apply.

Dykman wrote, “Howell tells us that he did not understand party-to-a-crime liability, a complex and not totally intuitive subject to begin with. He says that his attorney explained party-to-a-crime in a way that led him to believe that his presence at a shooting would permit a jury to find him guilty. The majority would require something more than Howell’s misunderstanding, though that would not be possible except under the most unusual of circumstances.”

Arguing that, under the majority’s decision, defendants who really do not understand vital information will nevertheless be held to the results of involuntary pleas, Dykman dissented.

Click here for Case Analysis.

David Ziemer can be reached by email.