2004AP Cefalu v. Theys, et al. (63072)

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“Our substantial factor analysis is best conducted by highlighting the factual distinctions between the circumstances surrounding the two accidents in this case and the circumstances surrounding the accidents in Johnson I, Johnson II and Voigt. First, in all three of the multi-vehicle collision cases, the subsequent accident occurred when another vehicle physically collided with the scene of the earlier accident. Here, there was a physical separation between the two accidents. The Cefalu-Wojnowski accident took place at the intersection of Highways 36 and 45. The overturned truck and its spilled load, while visible from the intersection, were not in the intersection. Second, in Johnson I, Johnson II and Voigt, the initial and subsequent collisions were slightly closer in time than the two accidents in this case. The Cefalu-Wojnowski accident took place nearly thirty minutes after Theys’ rollover accident. Third, in the three previous cases, the subsequent accident occurred before the accident scene had been secured by emergency personnel. Here, during the thirty minutes between accidents, emergency personnel from various departments arrived at the accident scene. The officers secured the scene with flares and squad cars, closed Highway 45 to traffic and placed a police officer to direct traffic at the intersection of Highways 36 and 45. These steps taken to secure the area substantially decreased the likelihood of another collision with the overturned truck. Thus, despite Wojnowski’s protestations that emergency personnel and their equipment created commotion and chaos, their presence actually made the scene safer than it was immediately following the accident. …

“Even were Theys’ negligence a cause-in-fact of the Cefalu-Wojnowski accident, we would still refuse to impose liability on Theys on grounds of public policy because Cefalu’s injuries were too remote from Theys’ alleged negligence and allowance of recovery would enter into a field that has no sensible or just stopping point. …

“[A]s the list of public policy factors reflects, ‘we trace the consequences of one’s negligent acts, not indefinitely, but to a certain point.’ See Conroy v. Marquette Univ., 220 Wis. 2d 81, 90, 582 N.W.2d 126 (Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted). We have reached that point here. Emergency personnel are called to most accident scenes. If we accept Wojnowski’s position, then every tortfeasor who causes an initial accident is liable for damages resulting from a second accident even after emergency personnel respond and secure the area. This becomes apparent when we consider the hypotheticals Wojnowski and the insurers set forth in their briefs: Would a ‘rubbernecker’ who collides with a vehicle in front of him or her while viewing the original accident have a claim against the tortfeasor who caused the original accident? Would a pedestrian who crosses the street on a ‘don’t walk’ sign because he or she is watching emergency personnel and is hit by a car have a claim against the tortfeasor who caused the original accident? As these hypotheticals demonstrate, if liability attaches in this case, we would have no clear or obvious guideposts for the cessation of liability. We would inappropriately enter a field that has no just or sensible stopping point.”

Affirmed.

Dist II, Waukesha County, Gempeler, J., Anderson, P.J.