02-0236 Village of Lannon v. Wood-Land Contractors, Inc.

Listen to this article

“The problem with Lannon’s reading, as adopted by the court of appeals, is that it shifts the focus of the statute from the use of the equipment to the nature of the business seeking the exemption. We believe that such a reading runs contrary to legislative intent…. On its face, the statutory exemption contains no language that the equipment be used by a certain business model or industry. Moreover, the exemption contains no language that the user’s ‘primary purpose’ is to harvest forest products….

“In sum, we find nothing in the exemption’s language, context, or history to support Lannon’s construction. To the contrary, such an examination reveals that the use of the equipment test is applied under Wis. Stat. § 70.111(20) when determining whether the equipment is exempt from taxation….

“On remand, the circuit court should consider what equipment of Wood-Land’s is used: (1) to cut trees for the commercial use of forest products, (2) to transport trees in logging areas for the commercial use of forest products, or (3) to clear land of trees for the commercial use of forest products. Wood-Land will bear the burden of proving entitlement to the exemption. …

“In sum, we determine that the court of appeals erred in adopting the ‘primary purpose’ of the business test. We agree with Wood-Land that § 70.111(20) is defined by the use of the equipment. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court to determine what equipment is entitled to a tax exemption under the statutory provision.”

CONCURRING OPINION: Abrahamson, Ch. J. “I agree with Judge Nettesheim’s dissent that summary judgment is not appropriate in the present case. I, like Judge Nettesheim, agree with the test set forth by the court of appeals. He and I conclude that competing reasonable inferences can be drawn on the question of whether Wood-Land’s primary business activity is logging or whether it is the clearing of land with timbering as an ancillary activity. Like Judge Nettesheim, I would remand the cause to the circuit court for trial on that question.”

CONCURRING OPINION: Prosser, J. “I join the majority opinion with reservation because of the statutory directive that property tax exemptions ‘shall be strictly construed in every instance.’

CONCURRING OPINION: Roggensack, J., with whom Wilcox and Crooks, JJ., join. “I agree with the conclusions reached in the majority opinion. However, I write separately to point out that the majority opinion’s statutory analysis of Wis. Stat. § 70.111(20) is a departure from that which has been this court’s mode of statutory analysis and that it is not one that the court has discussed and decided to adopt….

“The majority opinion employs the analytic framework for a statute that is ambiguous, while purposely not analyzing whether Wis. Stat. § 70.111(20) is ambiguous. This is a change in our traditional analysis, which is set out above. I offer no opinion about whether our mode of statutory analysis ought to be changed. However, when we change the statutory analysis in a majority opinion without explaining that the majority of the court has not decided to change its analysis, we lead our readers to conclude that we have changed. This can cause confusion among those we write to assist and make our opinions less useful to the public.

Accordingly, I respectfully concur.”

Court of Appeals, Bradley, J.

Attorneys:

For Appellant: Robert F. Klaver, Jr., James J. Carrig, Menomonee Falls

For Respondent: Mark G. Blum, Waukesha