Discrimination Case Analysis

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Because most age discrimination cases the Seventh Circuit considers involve summary judgment, rather than a trial, the decision in this case is particularly useful as precedent. That the plaintiff was successful also makes the case noteworthy.

The case is most significant, however, for the discussion of who is the relevant decisionmaker.

Here, that person was Schriefer. However, arguably the most directly damning piece of evidence of age discrimination in the case was not the shifting explanations of Schriefer, or the disparate treatment of Appelbaum compared to DeLeon, but the previous layoff attempt by another supervisor, Hinrichs.

The court appears to take it as a given that, had Appelbaum actually been laid off during the earlier RIF, the case for age discrimination would have been a slam-dunk.

The court states that the earlier decision was made “notwithstanding glaring problems with Reynolds-Taylor’s [the younger employee who was not to be laid off] performance.”

The court later calls Reynolds-Taylor “substantially younger and so evidently less qualified.”

However, the only involvement the court notes of Hinrichs, in the later decision to fire Appelbaum, was that Schriefer reported to Hinrichs and consulted her in making the decision.

The seminal case in the Seventh Circuit on determining the relevant decisionmaker is Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc. 103 F.3d 1394 (7th Cir. 1997). Yet the court did not mention Wallace in its discussion of the prior layoff decision, but only in its discussion of whether Schriefer or McCabe “wielded the axe.”

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The evidence of Hinrichs’ prior action does not fit within the narrow situation set forth in Wallace in which an employee’s prejudices are imputed to the one with formal authority over the plaintiff’s job. However, the issue was not whether Schriefer or Hinrichs was the relevant decisionmaker. Instead, the issue was whether the evidence of the prior layoff by Hinrichs could be considered by the jury at all.

In most discrimination cases, the plaintiff attempts to impute the discriminatory animus of a coworker to a superior decisionmaker. To do so, the plaintiff must meet the rigorous requirements of Wallace.

Here, however, the plaintiff sought to impute the discriminatory animus of a superior to a subordinate decisionmaker, and the court held that the jury could infer such animus based on the status of the two, and on the fact that the decisionmaker conferred with the superior about the termination decision.

The question in future cases is when such animus can be imputed to the inferior in the absence of such a consultation. Arguably, in some cases, the mere status of the respective parties could be sufficient.

– David Ziemer

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David Ziemer can be reached by email.