By: dmc-admin//March 31, 2003//
“To obtain grand jury material, despite the presumptive secrecy imposed by Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e), a litigant must show that the information ‘is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding, that the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy, and that [the] request is structured to cover only material so needed.’ Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979). Campbell does not satisfy these requirements. He pleaded guilty, which waives any challenge to the indictment or other matters preceding the plea, see United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989), and at all events has used up the single collateral attack to which a prisoner is entitled. There is accordingly no other judicial proceeding in which the grand jury materials could be used to avoid injustice. What is more, Campbell’s observation that the indictment mentioned sec. 846 and not sec. 841(b) not only comes too late but also does not require anyone to peer behind the surface of the charge. Finally, Campbell did not try to tailor his request; a demand for all transcripts of all testimony is a fishing expedition, which Rule 6(e) forbids.”
Affirmed.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, Crabb, J., Per Curiam.