01-1375 U.S. v. Navajo Nation

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The IMLA and its regulations do not provide the requisite ‘substantive law’ that ‘mandat[es] compensation by the Federal Government.’ Mitchell II, 463 U.S., at 218. They impose no obligations resembling the detailed fiduciary responsibilities that Mitchell II found adequate to support a claim for money damages. The IMLA simply requires Secretarial approval before coal mining leases negotiated between Tribes and third parties become effective, sec. 396a, and authorizes the Secretary generally to promulgate regulations governing mining operations, sec. 396d. Unlike the ‘elaborate’ provisions before the Court in Mitchell II, 463 U.S., at 225, the IMLA and its regulations do not ‘give the Federal Government full responsibility to manage Indian resources … for the benefit of the Indians,’ id., at 224. The Secretary is neither assigned a comprehensive managerial role nor, at the time relevant here, expressly invested with responsibility to secure ‘the needs and best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs.’ Ibid. Instead, the Secretary’s involvement in coal leasing under the IMLA more closely resembles the role provided for the Government by the GAA regarding allotted forest lands. See Mitchell I, 445 U.S., at 540-544. Although the GAA required the Government to hold allotted land in trust for allottees, that Act did not ‘authoriz[e], much less requir[e], the Government to manage timber resources for the benefit of Indian allottees.’ Id., at 545. Similarly here, the IMLA and its regulations do not assign to the Secretary managerial control over coal leasing. Nor do they even establish the ‘limited trust relationship,’ id., at 542, existing under the GAA; no provision of the IMLA or its regulations contains any trust language with respect to coal leasing. Moreover, as in Mitchell I, imposing fiduciary duties on the Government here would be out of line with one of the statute’s principal purposes, enhancing tribal self-determination.

263 F.3d 1325, reversed and remanded.

Ginsburg, J., Souter, J., dissenting.