01-309 Hope v. Pelzer

Listen to this article

In its assessment, the Eleventh Circuit erred in requiring that the facts of previous cases and Hope’s case be “materially similar.” Qualified immunity operates to ensure that before they are subjected to suit, officers are on notice that their conduct is unlawful. Officers sued in a sec. 1983 civil action have the same fair notice right as do defendants charged under 18 U.S.C. sec. 242, which makes it a crime for a state official to act willfully and under color of state to deprive a person of constitutional rights. This Court’s opinion in United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, a sec. 242 case, makes clear that officials can be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual situations. Indeed, the Court expressly rejected a requirement that previous cases be “fundamentally similar.” Accordingly, the salient question that the Eleventh Circuit should have asked is whether the state of the law in 1995 gave respondents fair warning that Hope’s alleged treatment was unconstitutional.A reasonable officer would have known that using a hitching post as Hope alleged was unlawful. The obvious cruelty inherent in the practice should have provided respondents with some notice that their conduct was unconstitutional.

240 F.3d 975, reversed.

Local effect:

The Seventh Circuit has never adopted a “materially similar” requirement to overcome qualified immunity.

Stevens, J.; Thomas, J., dissenting.