00-2830 State v. St. George

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We agree with the defendant that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in excluding the testimony of defendant’s expert witness about the child victim’s recantation and interview techniques used by the State’s expert because the exclusion of such testimony effectively denied the defendant his constitutional right to present a defense.

“[B]ecause Dr. Stonefeld’s testimony was designed to undermine the State’s witnesses, it was relevant to a material issue in the case, Kayla’s and the defendant’s credibility. [Further], Dr. Stonefeld’s testimony was necessary to the defendant’s defense. The case was shaping up as a battle of experts. The State relied upon its experts. The defendant had none. …

“Because we conclude that Dr. Stonefeld’s expert testimony was admissible, that the testimony was relevant and necessary to the defendant’s case, and that the probative value of the testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect, we determine that the State’s interest in excluding the evidence on the basis of a discretionary decision of the circuit court that failed to weigh constitutional considerations was not so compelling that it outweighed the defendant’s constitutionally protected interest in presenting a defense.”

Reversed and remanded.

CONCURRING OPINION: Sykes, J. “I agree completely with the majority’s resolution of the rape shield law issue under State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990).

“I also agree generally with the majority’s analysis of the trial court’s decision to exclude the defense expert witness under Wis. Stat. § 907.02…. I write separately to emphasize my concern about constitutionalizing the multitude of discretionary evidentiary decisions that occur on a daily basis in criminal trials in the circuit courts of this state. In that sense, I agree with the dissent’s position that we generally should not require circuit court judges to engage in convoluted ‘mental gymnastics, in order to issue decisions on the admissibility of evidence.'”

DISSENTING OPINION: Crooks, J., with whom Wilcox, J., joins. “I respectfully dissent, however, because on the second issue, the majority opinion ignores the rule that a defendant does not have a constitutional right to present irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible evidence. … I would conclude, therefore, that the defendant was not denied his constitutional right to present a defense when the circuit court exercised its discretion and excluded the testimony of the defendant’s witness, Dr. Stonefield.”

Court of Appeals; Abrahamson, Ch. J.

Attorneys:

For Appellant: Donald T. Lang, Madison

For Respondent: Gregory M. Weber, James E. Doyle, Madison