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Weekly Case Digests — Nov. 13-Nov. 17, 2017

By: WISCONSIN LAW JOURNAL STAFF//November 22, 2017//

Weekly Case Digests — Nov. 13-Nov. 17, 2017

By: WISCONSIN LAW JOURNAL STAFF//November 22, 2017//

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7th Circuit Digests

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Authenticom, Inc., v. CDK Global, LLC, et al.

Case No.: 17-2540 & 17-2541

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Preliminary Injunction – Antitrust

Authenticom’s case centers on agreements—actual and alleged—between Reynolds and CDK. The actual agreements are the ones signed in 2015; the alleged agreement is one described by Authenticom’s CEO, Cottrell, when he said that executives at Reynolds and CDK confessed that they were determined to block Authenticom from their systems.  The proper remedy for a section 1 violation based on an agreement to restrain trade is to set the offending agreement aside. From the standpoint of preliminary injunctive relief, that would mean ordering Reynolds and CDK not to implement their 2015 agreements or any alleged agreement collectively to bar Authenticom from their data management systems. Authenticom also contends that Reynolds and CDK have agreed to tie their data management systems to data integration.

We appreciate the district court’s concern to ensure that a potentially sound antitrust case should not disappear before its eyes because the plaintiff runs a high risk of going out of business while the litigation drags on. That does not, however, justify a preliminary injunction that goes so far beyond a measure that restores what the market would look like in the absence of the alleged violation. After trial, the court will be better able to assess the competitive significance of CDK and Reynolds’s business models, of the 2015 agreements, and of any other agreement Authenticom is able to prove. In the meantime, however, the court must vacate the preliminary injunction that it entered on July 28, 2017. The preliminary injunction is VACATED and the case is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Vacated and Remanded

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: James O. Acquaah v. Jefferson B. Sessions III

Case No.: 16-3277

Officials: RIPPLE, ROVNER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges

Focus: Deportation – Statutory Waiver

The procedural history of this case is complicated, but the issue before us in the present petition is a narrow one: whether, when issuing a final decision in 2015 on Mr. Acquaah’s first petition to remove the conditions on his residency, the Board erred in determining that Mr. Acquaah was statutorily ineligible for a fraud waiver. We conclude that the Board erred in construing the statutory waiver and therefore remand this case to the Board for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Granted in part and Denied in part

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Michael A. White, et al., v. Steven L. Hefel, et al.,

Case No.: 16-1051

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Expert Testimony and Jury Instructions

Trying another tack against the GPS evidence, the Whites also argue that the district court erred by refusing at the trial to admit the GPS evidence and some exhibits related to it.

The court concluded that it was expert testimony for purposes of Rule 702. This meant that the Whites had a duty to disclose it to the defendants, FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2), and they had done no such thing. The Whites argue that Ryczek was not an expert, because he was simply explaining the GPS charts and how the data could be used. The Whites also insist on appeal that the court should have allowed the jury to see the computer recreation of the chase prepared by their paralegal. They emphasize that all the paralegal did was to take GPS coordinates, plug them into a bigger map, and deduce the route that each squad car must have taken.

This brings us to the entry and search of the Whites’ home. They begin by arguing that the district court erred when it found that the police had probable cause to enter the house. That finding lay behind the court’s decision to grant judgment as a matter of law on several of the claims.

The Whites also touch on several other alleged errors at the end of their principal brief, including (1) that the court should have permitted Michael Sr. to introduce evidence of his medical bills (according to him, $4,610.37), which he incurred as a result of injuries he suffered when he was pushed down the stairs by the police; (2) that the court erred by instructing the jury that it had to find that the Whites were harmed in order to recover on their excessive‐force claims; and (3) that it gave the jury the option of finding nominal damages of $1, over the Whites’ objection.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Brian L. Redden

Case No.: 17-1405

Officials: EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Frivolous Appeal – Plea Withdrawal

After pleading guilty to possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1), Brian Redden was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release. He appealed, but his appointed lawyer has moved to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), representing that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted, and the appeal is dismissed as frivolous.

Granted and Dismissed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Kevin Johnson, et al.,

Case No.: 16-1459; 16-1694

Officials: FLAUM, KANNE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Statutory Interpretation

Defendants Kevin Johnson and Tyler Lang traveled from California to a mink farm in Illinois where they released approximately 2000 minks from their cages and destroyed or damaged other property on the farm. While on their way to damage a fox farm, Johnson and Lang were arrested on state charges of possession of burglary tools. Johnson and Lang were ultimately charged in federal court with violating the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA), 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(C). They moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that: (1) AETA is unconstitutionally overbroad because, by prohibiting damaging “real or personal property” of an animal enterprise, AETA criminalizes speech or expressive conduct that causes an animal enterprise to lose profits or goodwill; (2) AETA is void for vagueness because it is so broad that it invites discriminatory prosecutions; and (3) by labeling them “terrorists,” AETA violated their right to substantive due process. The district court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment.

Defendants entered conditional guilty pleas, reserving the right to appeal the district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss the indictment. We agree with the district court that AETA is not overbroad and does not violate the First Amendment because it does not prohibit lawful advocacy that causes only loss of profits or goodwill. Also, we conclude that AETA is not void for vagueness as its definite terms do not invite discriminatory prosecutions. Finally, we find that having the word “terrorism” in the title of the statute does not violate Defendants’ substantive due process rights because Congress had a rational basis for using the word. For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Sonoku Tagami v. City of Chicago, et al.

Case No.: 16-1441

Officials: EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause Violation

Sonoku Tagami celebrated “GoTopless Day 2014” by walking around the streets of Chicago naked from the waist up, though wearing “opaque” body paint on her bare breasts. She was cited for violating a Chicago ordinance prohibiting public nudity. She responded with this lawsuit alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional. She contends that banning women from exposing their breasts in public violates the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech and amounts to an impermissible sex-based classification in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The district court dismissed the suit and we affirm.

Affirmed

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WI Court of Appeals Digests

 

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Luegene Antoine Hampton

Case No.: 2016AP371-CR

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Sentencing Guidelines

Luegene Hampton, pro se, appeals orders amending a judgment of conviction as it relates to Hampton’s parole eligibility date and denying Hampton’s “motion for reconsideration and/or clarification.” Hampton argues that when his sentence was imposed in 1995, the circuit court erred by failing to set a specific day, month and year for his parole eligibility. Hampton further contends that the circuit court’s failure to set a date certain cannot be cured by simply amending the judgment but, rather, requires that either the sentence be commuted or that he be resentenced. We reject Hampton’s arguments and affirm the orders.

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Jesus David Gutierrez-Mendoza

Case No.: 2016AP975-CR

Officials: Brennan, P.J., Kessler and Dugan, JJ.

Focus: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Jesus David Gutierrez-Mendoza appeals a judgment convicting him of the following charges: one count of second-degree sexual assault of a child; one count of child enticement (exposing a sex organ); one count of repeated sexual assault of the same child (at least three violations of first- or second-degree sexual assault); and ten counts of sex with a child age sixteen or older. See WIS. STAT. §§ 948.02(2), 948.07(3), 948.025(1)(e), 948.09 (2009-10).  He also appeals the order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Gutierrez-Mendoza argues that his trial counsel gave him ineffective assistance and that he should be permitted to submit the victim’s journal for postconviction forensic testing. We resolve these issues against Gutierrez Mendoza. Accordingly, we affirm.

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Andrew Carter

Case No.: 2016AP1373-CR

Officials: Brennan, P.J., Kessler and Dugan, JJ.

Focus: Motion to Suppress Evidence Denied

Andrew Carter appeals a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of six crimes. The issue he presents is whether the circuit court properly denied his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: Milwaukee District Council 48 v. Milwaukee County

Case No.: 2016AP1525

Officials: Brennan, P.J., Kessler and Dugan, JJ.

Focus: Collective Bargaining Agreement

Milwaukee County appeals an order granting summary judgment to Milwaukee District Council 48 (DC 48) finding that certain Milwaukee County employees, represented by DC 48, were not covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) at the time Milwaukee County General Ordinance (MCGO) § 201.24(4.1) took effect, thus rendering them eligible for certain retirement benefits. We affirm.

Recommended for Publication

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: 2016AP1710

Case No.: Ronald L. Dassow, et al., v. Dwayne W. Hamann, et al.

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Court Error – Exemplary Damages

Ronald and Sharon Dassow appeal from a judgment awarding them compensatory damages and taxable costs in a nuisance case stemming from their being blocked access to certain real property. The Dassows argue the circuit court erred by denying them exemplary damages and costs of investigation and litigation for damage to property under WIS. STAT. §§ 943.01 and 895.446 (2015-16).  The Dassows also argue the court erroneously failed to award them monetary sanctions for the defendants’ failure to admit a discovery request under WIS. STAT. § 804.12(3). We affirm.

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Christopher P. Davis-Clair

Case No.: 2016AP1748-CR

Officials: Brennan, P.J., Kessler and Dugan, JJ.

Focus: Postconviction Motion Denied

Christopher Davis-Clair (Davis) appeals a judgment of conviction, following a guilty plea, of one count of first-degree intentional homicide as a party to a crime, and one count of first-degree reckless injury. He also appeals the order denying his postconviction motion for postconviction discovery and a new trial. We affirm.

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: Ryan T. Trapp v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the City of Milwaukee

Case No.: 2016AP1970

Officials: Brennan, P.J., Kessler and Brash, JJ

Focus: Court Error –  Theory of Law

On certiorari review we review the Board’s decision, not the circuit court’s. Herek v. Police & Fire Comm’n of Menomonee Falls, 226 Wis. 2d 504, 510, 595 N.W.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1999). Our review is narrower than the usual certiorari review because Trapp had a statutory review before the circuit court. Id. In these cases, certiorari review is limited to two questions: “whether the [Board] kept within its jurisdiction and whether it proceeded on a correct theory of the law.” Id. Trapp does not challenge the Board’s jurisdiction.

Trapp argues that the Board proceeded on an incorrect theory of law in two respects. First, he argues that the Board improperly deferred to the Chief’s recommendation when it made its “good of the service” determination and that in so doing it violated the law on the preponderance burden. Second, he argues that his right to due process was violated in two ways. He argues he was deprived of his due process right to be judged by an impartial board when the Board “forfeited its independence” and deferred to the Chief on the question of discharge. He also argues that he was deprived of his due process right to fair notice when the Board “disregarded both the Chief’s own written policies and past disciplinary practices,” and sustained discipline that is more severe than Trapp had notice of.

We conclude that the Board proceeded on a correct theory of the law when it determined that the good of the service required that Trapp be permanently discharged. The Board’s written decision makes clear that it properly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard to each of the just cause standards as required by the statute and gave no deference to the Chief on these points. Contrary to Trapp’s assertion, the Board’s ultimate decision as to “the good of the service” did not violate the statute because the statute does not work the way he thinks it does. We conclude that to the extent that Trapp’s due process arguments are about the reasonableness of the discipline, they were addressed by the circuit court and are unreviewable by this court.

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: Wauwatosa School District v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association

Case No.: 2016AP2260

Officials: Kessler, Brash and Dugan, JJ.

Focus: Court Error – Failure to State a Claim  

Wauwatosa School District appeals an order dismissing its action against Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association (WIAA). The issue is whether the District’s action fails to state a claim. We affirm.

The District argues that WIAA violated the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in its contract with the District by acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it realigned the conferences in which the schools play sports. School Dist. of Slinger v. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 210 Wis. 2d 365, 563 N.W.2d 585 (Ct. App. 1997), is dispositive. Slinger forecloses a breach of contract action against WIAA when the breach relates in some manner to conference realignment. Id. at 378-79.

The District contends that Slinger is distinguishable. The District argues that the school district in Slinger alleged breach of contract on the ground that it had a contractual right to a reasonable athletic conference alignment. Id. at 367. In contrast, the District here alleges breach of contract on the ground that it has an implied contractual right to good faith and fair dealing when WIAA realigns conferences.

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Leander J. Hearvey

Case No.: 2016AP2311-CR; 2016AP2312-CR

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Postconviction Motion Denied and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Leander Hearvey appeals judgments convicting him of two counts of sexual assault of a child. He also appeals an order denying his postconviction motion to withdraw his pleas. The motion alleged ineffective assistance of counsel because Hearvey’s trial attorney did not inform him that entry of the guilty pleas would waive his right to appeal the circuit court’s order granting the State’s motion for joinder of the two cases. The circuit court denied the postconviction motion, finding it conclusory. We affirm the judgments and order.

WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Bryan J. Landwehr

Case No.: 2016AP2536-CR

Officials: STARK, P.J.

Focus: Motion to Suppress Evidence Denied

Bryan Landwehr appeals a judgment of conviction for fourth-offense operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC). Landwehr argues the circuit court erred in denying his suppression motion because he was unlawfully seized in the curtilage of his home without a warrant. The State concedes this issue, but argues that the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement is applicable. We disagree. Accordingly, we reverse and direct the circuit court on remand to grant Landwehr’s suppression motion.

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: Anthony J. D’Acquisto v. Sandra LoCoco, et al.

Case No.: 2017AP145

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Modification of Irrevocable Trust Agreement

Anthony D’Acquisto appeals an order granting a motion filed by his daughters, Sandra LoCoco and Gina Pokorny, to terminate the Kathleen D’Acquisto Irrevocable Trust. It is undisputed that, under the terms of the trust agreement as originally drafted, the Trust should have terminated in 2014, when Pokorny turned forty years old. However, D’Acquisto argues the trust agreement was modified by a 2013 document entitled “Directive to Continue as Trustee,” which provided that D’Acquisto would continue to serve as trustee of the Trust for the remainder of his lifetime, or until he resigned.

We conclude the circuit court properly determined the 2013 Directive was ineffective to modify the trust agreement because it did not satisfy the statutory requirements for modification that were in effect at the time it was executed. We further conclude the 2013 Directive is not enforceable as a standalone contract. Finally, we reject D’Acquisto’s arguments that LoCoco and Pokorny are barred from challenging the 2013 Directive’s validity based on various equitable doctrines. For all of these reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s order terminating the Trust.

WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: Langlade County v. D.J.W.

Case No.: 2017AP1313-FT

Officials: HRUZ, J.

Focus: Sufficiency of Evidence

David appeals orders for involuntary commitment and for involuntary medication and treatment, both issued pursuant to chapter 51 of the Wisconsin Statutes. The sole issue in this appeal is whether Langlade County presented clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2. so as to justify these orders. We conclude it did and affirm.

WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: Headstart Building, LLC, v. National Centers for Learning Excellence, Inc.

Case No.: 2016AP434

Officials: HAGEDORN, J.

Focus: Enforceable Option-to-Purchase Provision

This dispute arises out of an option-to-purchase provision in a lease between Headstart Building, LLC (Headstart), the lessor, and National Centers for Learning Excellence, Inc. (National), the lessee. This case comes before our court because National attempted to exercise its option, and the two appraisers were nowhere close to each other—in large part because they appraised different interests. Following a trial, the circuit court dismissed Headstart’s claims—its ruling partially resting on the conclusion that there was no meeting of the minds regarding the proper appraisal methodology. Following supplemental briefing, the court reaffirmed its conclusion that there was no meeting of the minds and declared the option itself void. Therefore, the court determined that a declaratory judgment ruling regarding the proper appraisal methodology was unnecessary, and it dismissed National’s counterclaim. National appeals from the circuit court’s order declaring the option void.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the option is enforceable. Because the option specified a method to determine the purchase price with reasonable certainty, we conclude that the circuit court erred by declaring the option void and remand for consideration of National’s now resurrected and unaddressed counterclaim for declaratory judgment on the proper interpretation of the option agreement.

Recommended for Publication

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Robert Wayne Huber, Jr.,

Case No.: 2016AP1803-CR

Officials: Neubauer, C.J., Reilly, P.J., and Hagedorn, J

Focus: Sixth Amendment Violation

Robert Wayne Huber, Jr., appeals a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of twenty-five felonies arising out of his enticement and sexual and physical assaults of two adolescents in 2013, and an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Huber argues that he was denied his constitutional rights of self-representation and to a public trial. We reject Huber’s claims and affirm.

WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Keith J. Eggum

Case No.: 2016AP2036-CR

Officials: HAGEDORN, J.

Focus: First Amendment Violation and Jury Instructions

On a Saturday night in July 2014, patrons and pals were enjoying “The Rumble by the River” in Big Bend, a tractor and truck pull regaled with songs and spirits. Rain and storms, however, led police and the event organizers to shut down the festival early. Keith Eggum, with unused (and potentially nonrefundable) beer tickets in hand, was none too pleased and refused to leave. After several minutes of increasingly heated conversation with multiple officers, Big Bend Police Chief Donald Gaglione ordered Eggum to leave the premises. Eggum did not comply and loudly punctuated his defiance with some colorful and crass words. Eggum’s actions disrupted departing patrons and festival organizers, requiring additional officers to divert their attention from helping other guests evacuate safely. Based on these actions, Gaglione arrested Eggum for disorderly conduct.

On appeal, Eggum argues that his tasteless retorts—which he now characterizes as a sort of protest against government action—are the real reason he was charged with disorderly conduct. He argues this was protected speech under the First Amendment and that the jury was erroneously instructed. Eggum also asserts that he was deprived of a fair and impartial trial when he was denied a haircut prior to trial and by the presence of additional officers in the courtroom. We disagree and affirm.

WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Matthew P. Elliott

Case No.: 2016AP2363-CR

Officials: REILLY, P.J.

Focus: Sufficiency of Evidence

Matthew P. Elliott appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), second offense. Elliott argues that he was illegally seized. We affirm as Elliott’s encounter with the officer was consensual and, therefore, no seizure under the Fourth Amendment occurred.

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: American Family Mutual Insurance Company, et al., v. Robert Haas, et al.

Case No.: 2017AP59

Officials: Neubauer, C.J., Reilly, P.J., and Gundrum, J.

Focus: Insurance Claim – Worker’s Compensation

In this worker’s compensation case, American Family Mutual Insurance Company and Preferred Metal Products (hereinafter, American Family) challenge the admissibility of Dr. Cully White’s WKC-16-B (16-B) certified practitioner’s report filed pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 102.17(1)(d)1. (2015-16) and WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DWD 80.22 (Sept. 2017). American Family argues that while White was licensed to practice medicine at the time he filed his report, he was not so licensed when the hearing took place, and, therefore, his report was not admissible. We find that the plain language of § 102.17(1)(d)1. and DWD 80.22 clearly and unequivocally make the report admissible. American Family’s argument goes to the weight of White’s opinion, not its admissibility. We affirm

Recommended for Publication

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Thomas C. Morales

Case No.: 2017AP134-CR

Officials: Lundsten, P.J., Sherman and Kloppenburg, JJ.

Focus: Plea Withdrawal

Thomas Morales appeals from a judgment of conviction for aggravated battery and an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Morales seeks to withdraw his no contest plea because he argues that the circuit court did not establish the necessary factual basis for his plea. We reject Morales’s arguments and affirm.

WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Jamie M. Srb

Case No.: 2017AP307-CR

Officials: SHERMAN, J.

Focus: Inadmissible Evidence

Jamie Srb appeals from a judgment of conviction following a jury trial for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, second offense, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1). Srb contends the circuit court erred in concluding that the results from Srb’s blood alcohol concentration test were admissible at trial. Srb argues that the test results were not admissible because the test was not administered within three hours of driving and because expert testimony establishing the probative value of the test results was not admissible. For reasons explained below, I affirm.

WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Joshua Vue

Case No.: 2017AP509-CR

Officials: Lundsten, P.J., Blanchard and Kloppenburg, JJ.

Focus: Motion to Suppress Evidence Denied

Joshua Vue appeals a judgment convicting him of possession of methamphetamine. The parties argue several issues, but we conclude that the resolution of just one dispute is dispositive. We agree with the circuit court that all of the police officer’s initial investigative activities, including taking steps to have a canine brought to the scene to “sniff” Vue’s car, were supported by reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court.

Vue was charged with possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Vue moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the stop was prolonged beyond the time needed to issue the seat belt citation and that the additional duration of the seizure was not supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity apart from the seat belt violation.

WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. David L. Miller

Case No.: 2017AP685-CR

Officials: SHERMAN, J.

Focus: Motion to Suppress Evidence Denied

David J. Miller appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI), third offense, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a). Miller contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence on the ground that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to perform a traffic stop. For the reasons discussed below, I affirm.

Supreme Court Digests

United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Scott Kernan v. Michael Daniel Cuero

Case No.: 16-1468

Focus: Court Error – Sentencing Guidelines

The question here is whether the state-court decision “involved an unreasonable application o[f] clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Ibid. Did our prior decisions (1) clearly require the state court to impose the lower sentence that the parties originally expected; or (2) instead permit the State’s sentence-raising amendment where the defendant was allowed to withdraw his guilty plea? Because no decision from this Court clearly establishes that a state court must choose the first alternative, we reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision.

Reversed and remanded

Dissenting:

Concurring:

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United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Jefferson Dunn v. Vernon Madison

Case No.: 17-193

Focus: 8TH Amendment  – Suspension of Death Sentence

 

More than 30 years ago, Vernon Madison crept up behind police officer Julius Schulte and shot him twice in the head at close range. An Alabama jury found Madison guilty of capital murder. The trial court sentenced him to death. See Ex parte Madison, 718 So. 2d 104, 105–106 (1998).The state court did not unreasonably apply Panetti and Ford when it determined that Madison is competent to be executed because—notwithstanding his memory loss—he recognizes that he will be put to death as punishment for the murder he was found to have committed. In 2016, as Madison’s execution neared, he petitioned the trial court for a suspension of his death sentence. He argued that, due to several recent strokes, he has become incompetent to be executed.

The trial court denied Madison’s petition. It held that, under this Court’s decisions in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399 (1986), and Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U. S. 930 (2007), Madison was entitled to relief if he could show that he “suffers from a mental illness which deprives [him] of the mental capacity to rationally understand that he is being executed as a punishment for a crime.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 74a. The court concluded that Madison had failed to make that showing. Madison then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. The District Court denied Madison’s petition after concluding that the state court “correctly applied Ford and Panetti” and did not make an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 67a. We disagree. In Panetti, this Court addressed the question whether the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of a prisoner who lacks “the mental capacity to understand that [he] is being executed as a punishment for a crime.” 551 U. S., at 954 (internal quotation marks omitted). The state court did not unreasonably apply Panetti and Ford when it determined that Madison is competent to be executed because—notwithstanding his memory loss—he recognizes that he will be put to death as punishment for the murder he was found to have committed.

Nor was the state court’s decision founded on an unreasonable assessment of the evidence before it. Testimony from each of the psychologists who examined Madison supported the court’s finding that Madison understands both that he was tried and imprisoned for murder and that Alabama will put him to death as punishment for that crime. In short, the state court’s determinations of law and fact were not “so lacking in justification” as to give rise to error “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, supra, at 103. Under that deferential standard, Madison’s claim to federal habeas relief must fail. We express no view on the merits of the underlying question outside of the AEDPA context. The petition for a writ of certiorari and respondent’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis are granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

Petition Granted. Reversed and remanded.

Dissenting:

Concurring: Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor

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United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Charmaine Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, et al.

Case No.: 16-658

Focus: Filing Deadlines – Jurisdictional Rule – Court Error

This case presents a question of time, specifically, time to file a notice of appeal from a district court’s judgment. In Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 210–213 (2007), this Court clarified that an appeal filing deadline prescribed by statute will be regarded as “jurisdictional,” meaning that late filing of the appeal notice necessitates dismissal of the appeal. But a time limit prescribed only in a court-made rule, Bowles acknowledged, is not jurisdictional; it is, instead, a mandatory claim-processing rule subject to forfeiture if not properly raised by the appellee. Ibid.; Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 456 (2004). Because the Court of Appeals held jurisdictional a time limit specified in a rule, not in a statute, 835 F. 3d 761, 763 (CA7 2016), we vacate that court’s judgment dismissing the appeal.

The Court of Appeals erroneously treated as jurisdictional Rule 4(a)(5)(C)’s 30-day limitation on extensions of time to file a notice of appeal. We therefore vacate that court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We note, in this regard, that our decision does not reach issues raised by Hamer, but left unaddressed by the Court of Appeals, including: (1) whether respondents’ failure to raise any objection in the District Court to the overlong time extension, by itself, effected a forfeiture, see Brief for Petitioner 21–22; (2) whether respondents could gain review of the District Court’s time extension only by filing their own appeal notice, see id., at 23–27; and (3) whether equitable considerations may occasion an exception to Rule 4(a)(5)(C)’s time constraint, see id., at 29–43.

Vacated and remanded

Dissenting:

Concurring:

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