Criminal Procedure – Self-representation

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U.S. Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Criminal

Criminal Procedure – Self-representation

It was not error for the district court to revisit whether a defendant was competent to represent himself, even though a magistrate judge had earlier found him competent to do so.

“Clark argues Faretta held that a court may not revisit the issue since the Supreme Court said a knowing and intelligent waiver ‘must be honored out of “that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.”’ Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350–51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). We do not read Faretta that way and also reject the premise of Clark’s argument, namely, that the district court revisited the issue. The magistrate judge’s ruling was that Clark’s waiver of counsel was valid ‘at this point, this juncture.’ If the district court had not conducted a Faretta colloquy, it is likely that Clark would now be arguing that the magistrate judge’s ruling was unclear and that Clark did not know whether his waiver was valid for the entire proceedings or whether he had to revisit the issue later. Instead, the district court judge took it upon herself to ensure that the waiver was valid and not to accept the limited finding. The role of determining whether the waiver was valid falls squarely on the judge, and she took that role seriously. Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 723–24. We commend the district court in her efforts to protect that right and make sure it was properly invoked.”

Affirmed.

12-1417 U.S. v. Clark

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Barker, J., Williams, J.

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