Carjacking — jury instructions

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United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Criminal

Carjacking — jury instructions

Omitting the phrase “to cause death” from the jury instructions did not alter the mental state required to prove carjacking.

“Although the statute is written in the disjunctive, the defendants argue that ‘the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm’ describes a single mental state: ‘the specific intent to kill or its near equivalent.’ (Appellants’ Br. at 13.) Omitting the phrase ‘to cause death’ from the jury’s instructions, the defendants conclude, alters the mental state required by § 2119. We disagree. The carjacking statute is written in the disjunctive: a defendant must possess the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm. ‘Canons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise.’ Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979). Here, the inference that Congress intended these terms to have a separate meaning is buttressed by the fact that § 2119 explicitly distinguishes between serious bodily injury and death only a few sentences after describing the requisite mental state. A defendant may be sentenced to up to twenty-five years’ imprisonment if she causes serious bodily injury, but may be sentenced to life imprisonment or death if she causes death. 18 U.S.C. § 2119(2), (3); see also Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239- 52 (1999) (holding that § 2119 defines three distinct crimes: simple carjacking, carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury, and carjacking resulting in death). The plain language of the statute indicates that a defendant can satisfy the requisite mental state by acting with the intent to cause either death or serious bodily harm.”

Affirmed.

11-3608 U.S. v. Carter

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Grady, J., Kanne, J.