10-5400 Tapia v. U.S.

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Sentencing
Rehabilitation

18 U.S.C. 3582(a) does not permit a sentencing court to impose or lengthen a prison term in order to foster a defendant’s rehabilitation.

Section 3582(a)’s context supports this textual conclusion. By restating §3582(a)’s message to the Sentencing Commission, Congress ensured that all sentencing officials would work in tandem to implement the statutory determination to “reject imprisonment as a means of promoting rehabilitation.” Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 367. Equally illuminating is the absence of any provision authorizing courts to ensure that offenders participate in prison rehabilitation programs. When Congress wanted sentencing courts to take account of rehabilitative needs, it gave them authority to do so. See, e.g., §3563(b)(9).In fact, although a sentencing court can recommend that an offender be placed in a particular facility or program, see §3582(a), the authority to make the placement rests with the Bureau of Prisons, see, e.g., §3621(e). The point is well illustrated here, where the District Court’s strong recommendations that Tapia participate in RDAP and be placed in a particular facility went unfulfilled. Finally, for those who consider legislative history useful, the key Senate Report on the SRA provides corroborating evidence.

376 Fed. Appx. 707, reversed and remanded.

10-5400 Tapia v. U.S.

Kagan, J.; Sotomayor, J., concurring.

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