99-1522United Methodist v. Ronald Culver

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And this is so even though the Elo congregation continued to function as a church.”In this case, we are not concerned with the intra-church dispute that fueled the Elo congregation’s departure. Moreover, we have not been invited to determine whether the Elo church has abandoned the UMC by a departure from doctrine. Nor would we accept such an invitation, as such considerations are anathema under the Constitution. … Rather than deal in such constitutionally impermissible shades of gray, today’s case presents us with the Elo church’s unequivocal resolution to withdraw from the Conference and the UMC. …

“We are persuaded by the Conference’s and the court of appeals’ interpretation of the statute. The words ‘defunct’ or ‘dissolved’ cannot be read in isolation. They are modified by the term ‘local Methodist church or society.’ The existence of the local Methodist church or society is defined by its denominational affiliation, not solely by its continuation as an active congregation. The cessation of ties to the UMC and the statewide conference renders a local Methodist church or society defunct or dissolved under the statute. …

“As the court of appeals explained, the statute is not ‘designed to resolve schisms between local churches and the UMC.'[citation]. It is, however, designed to dictate the resolution of property rights where there has been a total dissolution of the relationship between the local church and the UMC by the local church as evidenced in the incontrovertible fashion presented in this case.”

The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

DISSENTING OPINION: Abrahamson, Ch. J. “Today’s decision rests upon a reasonable interpretation of Wis. Stat. sec. 187.15, governing the disposal of Methodist church property. I agree with the majority opinion that the application of the statute represents neither an unconstitutional taking nor an impermissible preference for church hierarchy, the bases on which the Elo trustees ground their appeal. Nevertheless, I would remand the case for resolution of this property dispute on non-statutory grounds. … Because the issue was not briefed, I do not write to decide this issue. I do, however, express a question about the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. sec. 187.15.”

DISSENTING OPINION: Wilcox, J. “I concur with Chief Justice Abrahamson’s dissent; I agree that Wis. Stat. sec. 187.15 (1997-98) is problematic. I write separately only to emphasize that this dispute should be remanded to be resolved on the terms of the deed.”

Court of Appeals, Bradley, J.