Weekly Case Digests – February 28, 2022 – March 4, 2022

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7^th Circuit Digests

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Roscoe Chambers v. Andrew Ciolli, Warden

Case No.: 21-1485; 21-1486

Officials: ROVNER, SCUDDER, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Habeas Relief – Due Process Violation

Roscoe Chambers, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of two petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, see 28 U.S.C. § 2241, asserting that he was denied due process in prison disciplinary hearings. The district court in both cases found that Chambers received the process he was due. Because the issues presented in the two appeals are similar, we have consolidated them for disposition and affirm.

Both of Chambers’s petitions concern his loss of good-time credit arising out of incidents that occurred during a six-month period between 2018 and 2019 at his prior facility, the United States Penitentiary Lewisburg in Pennsylvania. In the first case (No. 19-cv 50247), Chambers was disciplined with the loss of 41 days for refusing a prison guard’s instructions to provide a urine sample, disobeying a staff member’s order, and acting with insolence towards the staff member. After an initial hearing before a Unit Disciplinary Committee, the charges were referred to a disciplinary hearing officer who determined that Chambers had committed the infraction. The officer credited the account of the reporting guard over Chambers’s testimony that he never was asked for a urine sample and that this could be confirmed by surveillance video showing that the guard did not have a urine specimen cup while approaching his cell.

In both appeals, Chambers presses similar arguments to those that he raised in the district court. For substantially the same reasons, we agree with the district court’s analysis. Federal courts must affirm prison disciplinary decisions if they are supported by “some evidence,” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985), and the district court was right that the incident reports sufficed to clear that low bar. Further, the court was correct that prison officials may deny access to witnesses whose testimony would be irrelevant. See Pannell v. McBride, 306 F.3d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 2002). The court also appropriately concluded that the record in the second case lacked any evidence of bias. Chambers’s remaining arguments are frivolous.

Chambers, a frequent litigant, is warned that he risks monetary sanctions if he continues to repeat in future cases these arguments that we have found to be frivolous. See Alexander v. United States, 121 F.3d 312, 315–16 (7th Cir. 1997).

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Yorie Von Kahl v. Michael Segal, Warden, et al.,

Case No.: 19-3026

Officials: EASTERBROOK, WOOD, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Plea & Sentencing – Collateral-attack Waivers

Yorie Von Kahl is serving a life sentence, plus consecutive terms of ten and five years’ imprisonment, for murdering two deputy United States Marshals and committing related crimes.* The judgment was affirmed on direct appeal, and a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. §2255 failed. United States v. Faul, 748 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1984); Von Kahl v. United States, 242 F.3d 783 (8th Cir. 2001). A debate about the length of his custody is the principal issue in Von Kahl’s petition under 28 U.S.C. §2241.

Von Kahl also wants to relitigate the issues presented in his collateral attack, but §2241 allows review of a conviction or sentence only when §2255 is inadequate, see §2255(e), and we know that §2255 is adequate to resolve these issues because they were resolved under that statute. Section 2241 is not a means to get a second opinion in a different circuit. See Vialva v. Watson, 975 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2020); Lee v. Watson, 964 F.3d 663 (7th Cir. 2020); Roundtree v. Krueger, 910 F.3d 312 (7th Cir. 2018); Harris v. Warden, 425 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 2005). No more need be said on this subject.

So Von Kahl’s presumptive release date is February 12, 2023. The Bureau must let him go then unless the Commission acts under the statutory proviso and “determines that he has seriously or frequently violated institution rules and regulations or that there is a reasonable probability that he will commit any Federal, State, or local crime.” The onus of making such a finding is on the Commission. We mention the possibility here only to clarify that February 12, 2023, is a presumptive parole release date, not an outer limit to his custody. The outer limit is the end of his life.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Sachin Gupta v. Chad Melloh, et al.,

Case No.: 19-2723

Officials: KANNE, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Summary Judgment – Issue of Material Fact

In the process of arresting a highly inebriated Sachin Gupta, a police officer tugged on his handcuffed arm causing him to fall forward on his head and chest and fracture a vertebra in his neck. The officer asserts that he used a reasonable amount of force on a suspect who was resisting arrest. Gupta asserts that the use of force was excessive given that he was not resisting the arrest, and also intoxicated, unsteady on his feet, and handcuffed with his hands behind his back. As these conflicting accounts make clear, there are material disputes of fact that make resolution of this case on summary judgment inappropriate. We therefore reverse and remand to the district court for the appropriate fact finder to determine which version of the facts might prevail.

Reversed and remanded

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Wisconsin Central LTD., v. Surface Transportation Board, et al.,

Case No.: 20-3507

Officials: EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Statutory Interpretation – Facilities for Interchange or Traffic

This case pits Wisconsin Central (a subsidiary of Canadian National) against Soo Line (a subsidiary of Canadian Pacific). The question is where, in the Chicago area, Wisconsin Central will receive traffic from Soo Line. Wisconsin Central prefers Belt Railway’s yard; Soo Line prefers the Spaulding yard near Bartle`, Illinois, about 25 miles to the west. The Surface Transportation Board ruled that Wisconsin Central cannot insist that Soo Line deliver to Belt Railway. 2020 STB LEXIS 428 (Oct. 29, 2020).

According to the Board, a carrier’s power to designate a place where it will receive traffic is limited to portions of line that the designating carrier owns. Because Wisconsin Central does not wholly own Belt Railway, it may be used to interchange traffic only with the consent of the other carrier. We get the sense that this fight is principally about who should bear the cost of Belt Railway’s services, but the Board did not resolve that dispute. Instead it held categorically that, in the absence of agreement about where to exchange traffic, the receiving carrier must designate a place on its own property.

The exchange of rail traffic is governed by statute, not by regulation or common law. The governing statute is 49 U.S.C. §10742, which provides: “A rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Board under this part shall provide reasonable, proper, and equal facilities that are within its power to provide for the interchange of traffic between

Still, the Board insists, it is entitled to resolve such issues for itself with the benefit of judicial deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). We do not think that Chevron helps the Board, for two reasons. First, the phrase “that are within its power to provide” is not ambiguous and cannot reasonably be treated the same as “on its own track.” Second, the Board did not even purport to be making policy choices using authority delegated by Congress. Cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). It did not see any ambiguity in the statutory language or the historical practice; instead the Board wrote that it was applying a deterministic framework established long ago. By taking that approach, the Board cut itself off from any support in Chevron. See, e.g., Meza Morales v. Barr, 973 F.3d 656, 667 n.7 (7th Cir. 2020); Transitional Hospitals Corp. v. Shalala, 222 F.3d 1019, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Alarm Industry Communications Committee v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1066, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The statutory word “reasonable” gives the Board interpretive leeway; the statutory phrase “that are within its power to provide” does not.

The petition for review is granted, the Board’s decision is vacated, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petition granted. Vacated and remanded.

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America ex rel. John Mamalakis v. Anesthetix Management, et al.,

Case No.: 19-3117

Officials: SYKES, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

Focus: False Claims Act – Pleading Special Matters

Dr. John Mamalakis, a Wisconsin anesthesiologist, filed this qui tam lawsuit under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq., alleging that Anesthetix Management LLC, his former employer, fraudulently billed Medicare and Medicaid for services performed by its anesthesiologists. His central allegation is that the anesthesiologists regularly billed the government using the code for “medically directed” services when their services qualified for payment only at the lower rate for services that are “medically supervised.” A magistrate judge dismissed the case, ruling that the complaint did not provide enough factual particularity to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard for fraud claims. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). The judge gave Mamalakis a chance to amend, directing him to provide representative examples of the alleged fraudulent billing.

Mamalakis obliged, filing an amended complaint that included ten specific examples of inflated billing. Each example identified a particular procedure and anesthesiologist and provided details about how the services did not qualify for payment at the medical-direction billing rate. Six of the ten examples included a specific allegation that the anesthesiologist billed the services using that code; the other four relied on general allegations regarding the group’s uniform policy of billing at the medical-direction rate.

The judge held that the amended complaint still fell short under Rule 9(b) and dismissed the case with prejudice. That was error. Although Rule 9(b) imposes a high pleading bar to protect defendants from baseless accusations of fraud, Mamalakis cleared it. The ten examples, read in context with the other allegations in the amended complaint, provide sufficient particularity about the alleged fraudulent billing to survive dismissal. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Sandy Point Dental, P.C., et al., v. The Cincinnati Insurance Company, et al.,

Case No.: 21-1186; 21-1559; 21-1203

Officials: MANION, WOOD, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Insurance Claim – Direct Physical Loss

No one doubts that the COVID-19 pandemic has inflicted enormous losses on businesses, large and small, throughout the country. It is therefore not surprising that an avalanche of insurance claims has followed in the wake of the pandemic, as the suffering businesses look for assistance in absorbing those losses. We resolve three such claims in this opinion—those brought by plaintiffs Sandy Point Dental, P.C. (“Sandy Point”), the Bend Hotel Development Company (“Bend Hotel”), and TJBC, Inc. (“TJBC”). We refer to the plaintiffs collectively as the Businesses unless the context requires otherwise.

Each Business was required to close or dramatically scale back its operations in response to a series of executive orders issued by Illinois Governor J. B. Pritzker in an effort to curb the spread of the virus in the state. The Businesses held materially identical commercial-property insurance policies, sold by the same insurer, the Cincinnati Insurance Company (“Cincinnati”). In brief, these policies provided coverage for income losses sustained on account of a suspension of operations caused by “direct physical loss” to covered property. The policies also provided coverage for income losses sustained as a result of an action of civil authority prohibiting access to covered property, when such action was taken in response to “direct physical loss” suffered by other property.

Each Business filed claims for coverage under its policy, and each time, Cincinnati denied the claim and litigation ensued. In all three cases, the responsible district court granted Cincinnati’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Each court reasoned that the Business before it did not adequately allege that either the virus that causes COVID-19, SARS-CoV-2, or the resulting closure orders caused “direct physical loss” to property. All three Businesses appealed; we resolve those appeals in this consolidated opinion.

Our review is de novo, but we find little to criticize in the district courts’ resolutions of these cases, and so we affirm the judgments of dismissal. In doing so, we join the four circuits that so far have addressed the central question before us: whether loss of use, unaccompanied by any physical alteration to property, may constitute “direct physical loss” under the relevant insurance policies. See Santo’s Italian Café LLC v. Acuity Ins. Co., 15 F.4th 398 (6th Cir. 2021); Oral Surgeons, P.C. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 2 F.4th 1141 (8th Cir. 2021); Mudpie, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co., 15 F.4th 885 (9th Cir. 2021); Gilreath Family & Cosmetic Dentistry, Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., — F. App’x —, 2021 WL 3870697 (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 2021).

To state a claim under the Policy before us, the Businesses needed to allege more than a partial loss of their preferred use of the insured properties. But they alleged neither a physical alteration to property nor an access- or use deprivation so substantial as to constitute a physical dispossession. They thus have not managed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. Given this conclusion, we see no need to address the Businesses’ additional claims of consumer fraud, common law fraud, or vexatious refusal of coverage. Cincinnati could not have been fraudulent or vexatious in denying coverage where adequate grounds for coverage did not exist in the first place.

We AFFIRM the dismissals of all three cases, as well as the denials of Sandy Point’s motions for reconsideration and for leave to amend its complaint.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Bradley Hotel Corp., v. Aspen Specialty Insurance Company

Case No.: 21-1173

Officials: MANION, WOOD, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Insurance Claim – Coverage

Like today’s decision in Crescent Plaza Hotel Owner, L.P. v. Zurich American Insurance Co., No. 21-1316 (7th Cir. Dec. 9, 2021), this case presents insurance coverage issues related to the partial closure of a hotel during the COVID-19 pandemic. While the parties are different, the result is the same. First, following our analysis in Sandy Point Dental, P.C. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., No. 21-1186 (7th Cir. Dec. 9, 2021), we hold that the term “direct physical loss of or damage to” property does not apply to a business’s loss of use of the property without any physical alteration. Second, we conclude that the loss of use exclusion and the ordinance or law exclusion in this policy provide separate bars to coverage.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Jacqueline Stevens v. United States Department of State

Case No.: 20-3504

Officials: EASTERBROOK, MANION, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

Focus:  Summary Judgment – Freedom of Information Act

Jacqueline Stevens, a Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University, is conducting research into the relations between the foreign campuses of American universities, the federal government, and private‐sector entities. As part of that research, Professor Stevens submitted three Freedom of Information Act requests to the Department of State. A lawsuit followed, terminating in entry of summary judgment for the Department. On appeal, Professor Stevens contends that summary judgment was improper both because the Department’s searches were inadequate and because its withholdings were unwarranted. We are not persuaded by either point, and so we affirm.

Affirmed

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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: CitiMortgage, Inc., v. Jerome M. Davis, et al.,

Case No.: 21-1084; 21-1101

Officials: SYKES, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Foreclosure – FDCPA Violation

For several years, CitiMortgage, Inc., has been locked in a legal battle with Jerome M. Davis and Lynne Ternoir-Davis over a mortgage the couple took out on their residence in 2005. After the Davises defaulted on the loan and filed for bankruptcy, Jerome Davis received a bankrtupcy discharge, which the bankruptcy court later held did not extend to the debt Davis owed CitiMortgage.

Rather than appeal that decision, Davis has attempted to collaterally attack that court’s ruling – first, by attempting to remove Citi Mortgage’s foreclosure action to federal court, and second, by filing a separate suit against CitiMortage. Davis lost in each of those proceedings, and CitiMortage was awarded attorney fees and costs when the court remanded the foreclosure proceeding.

Davis appeals these two decisions. But we lack jurisdiction to review the remand order, and Davis has waived his arguments challenging the attorney fees and costs award. We also agree with the district court’s dismissal of Davis’s suit against CitiMortgage.

Dismissed in part. Affirmed in part.
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7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Nickolas Seekins v. CHEP USA,

Case No.:  20-3270

Officials: KANNE, ROVNER, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Negligence Claim – Duty of Care

Nickolas Seekins lost his left foot as a result of an accident that occurred while he was operating a machine used to lift and transport pallets. Seekins sued CHEP USA and CHEP Recycled Pallet Solutions, LLC (collectively, “CHEP”) in Indiana state court, alleging CHEP was liable for his injuries under a theory of negligence.

After CHEP removed the case to federal court, CHEP and Seekins both moved for summary judgment. Addressing only the duty element of negligence, the district court granted summary judgment to CHEP, holding that CHEP did not owe Seekins a duty of care under Indiana negligence law. We agree with the district court and therefore affirm.

Affirmed

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WI Court of Appeals Digests

WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Anne E. Streckenback

Case No.: 2020AP345-CR

Officials: STARK, P.J.

Focus: 5^th Amendment Violation – Suppression Motion Denied

Anne Streckenbach appeals a judgment convicting her of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), as a second offense. Streckenbach argues that the circuit court should have granted her motion to suppress evidence because the officer who arrested her violated her constitutional right to be free from self-incrimination by “extensively interrogat[ing] her prior to her formal arrest.” We conclude the officer’s questions were permissible within the context of his investigatory stop of Streckenbach’s vehicle. We therefore affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: Menard, Inc., v. City of Hudson

Case No.: 2020AP2005

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Gill, JJ.

Focus: Summary Judgment – Property Tax Assessment 

Menard, Inc., filed this lawsuit challenging as excessive the City of Hudson’s 2018 assessments of two parcels of real property owned by Menard. The City filed a motion for summary judgment, which the circuit court denied in its entirety. The City later filed a second summary judgment motion, which the court granted in part. Specifically, the court granted the City summary judgment on Menard’s excessive assessment claim and on its claim alleging a non-uniform tax assessment. The court denied the City’s summary judgment motion on Menard’s third claim, however, which sought a declaratory judgment that the assessed value of Menard’s property should be $4,400,000, rather than $10,328,300, as determined by the City. The court remanded the matter to the City’s Board of Review (“the Board”) to conduct a hearing on Menard’s objection to the 2018 assessments.

The City appeals, arguing that the circuit court erred by denying its first summary judgment motion. The City also argues that the court erred by denying its second summary judgment motion with respect to Menard’s declaratory judgment claim and by remanding the matter to the Board for further proceedings. We agree that the court erred by denying the City’s first summary judgment motion. Because Menard failed to appear at a hearing before the Board to present evidence in support of its objection to the 2018 assessments, it is barred from bringing a court action challenging those assessments as excessive. While Menard asserts that the Board violated Menard’s right to due process by denying its requests to waive the hearing on its objection or, alternatively, to appear at the hearing by telephone, Menard did not file a certiorari action challenging the Board’s denials of those requests. Menard cannot challenge the Board’s procedural decisions on those issues in the present lawsuit.

We therefore reverse that portion of the circuit court’s order denying the City summary judgment on Menard’s declaratory judgment claim and remanding to the Board for a hearing on Menard’s objection to the 2018 assessments. We remand this matter to the circuit court with directions that it dismiss Menard’s declaratory judgment claim.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: Amy Cady Krech v. Kimberly A. Mitchell, et al.,

Case No.: 2021AP65

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Gill, JJ.

Focus: Court Error – Issue Preclusion

Amy Cady-Krech appeals an order excluding her as an heir of the Estate of Michael Mikulewicz, who died intestate. Cady-Krech presented evidence raising a rebuttable presumption that Mikulewicz was her father. She further asserted that he raised her and treated her as his daughter. Based on DNA evidence, however, the circuit court found that Cady-Krech was not Mikulewicz’s biological daughter. The court further found that Mikulewicz did not adopt Cady-Krech. The court therefore concluded that Cady-Krech did not qualify as Mikulewicz’s heir for purposes of intestate succession.

Cady-Krech argues that the circuit court should not have permitted DNA testing, or considered the test results, because issue preclusion barred the parties from relitigating Cady-Krech’s status as Mikulewicz’s daughter. Cady-Krech also argues that even if issue preclusion does not apply, the court erred by concluding that she does not qualify as Mikulewicz’s heir under the statutes governing intestate succession. Finally, Cady-Krech asserts that public policy considerations required the court to include her as one of Mikulewicz’s heirs. We reject each of Cady-Krech’s arguments and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: Marathon County v. J.A.E.,

Case No.: 2021AP898

Officials: GILL, J.

Focus: Involuntary Commitment and Medication

James appeals from orders for his commitment and involuntary medication and treatment, both entered pursuant to WIS. STAT. ch. 51. James argues that Marathon County (“the County”) failed to establish that he was dangerous pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2. We conclude that the evidence supports the circuit court’s conclusion that James is dangerous. Accordingly, we affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. A.P.,

Case No.: 2021AP1146; 2021AP001147

Officials: DONALD, P.J.

Focus: Abuse of Discretion – Termination of Parental Rights

A.P. appeals the orders of the trial court terminating his parental rights to his children, C.P. and P.P. A.P. contends that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion at the dispositional hearing when it denied guardianship to the paternal grandmother, S.I. In addition, A.P. contends that the orders terminating his parental rights should be vacated in the interest of justice. We disagree and affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Dallas R. Christel

Case No.: 2020AP1127-CR; 2020AP1128-CR

Officials: Neubauer, Reilly and Grogan, JJ.

Focus: Due Process Violation

In these consolidated appeals, Dallas R. Christel appeals from judgments of conviction and orders denying his postconviction motions. Christel raises both facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to Wisconsin’s statute criminalizing strangulation and suffocation, which a jury convicted him of violating. See WIS. STAT. § 940.235 (2019-20). He also argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that he did not identify a new factor in his postconviction motion that warrants resentencing. We reject Christel’s challenges and therefore affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: Velocity Investments, LLC, v. Mark Ziegler

Case No.: 2021AP556

Officials: GUNDRUM, P.J.

Focus: Court Error – De Novo Review

Mark Ziegler appeals pro se from a judgment of the circuit court entered in Velocity Investments, LLC’s favor. He claims the court erred by: (1) denying him a de novo hearing following a hearing before and a ruling by a court commissioner and (2) “refusing to enforce the arbitration clause contained in [a] Promissory note.” We affirm.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Robert K. Nietzold, Sr.,

Case No.: 2021AP21-CR

Officials: Blanchard, P.J., Kloppenburg, and Nashold.

Focus: Breach of Plea Agreement – Resentencing

Robert Nietzold pleaded no contest to and was convicted of repeated sexual assault of the same child. Under a plea agreement between the State and Nietzold, the prosecutor at sentencing could recommend a prison sentence but could not recommend any specific term of years. However, at the sentencing hearing the prosecutor made comments on the merits of the specific sentence recommendation of the Department of Corrections (the department) and separately recommended a specific term of imprisonment. Nietzold appeals the circuit court’s denial of his motion for a new sentencing hearing on the ground that this was a breach of the plea agreement. We conclude that the prosecutor’s sentencing recommendations constituted a material and substantial breach of the plea agreement and, accordingly, due to the errors by the State and through no fault of the circuit court, we reverse and remand to the circuit court for resentencing by a different judge.

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WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Peter G. Hamilton

Case No.: 2021AP52-CR

Officials: Kloppenburg, Fitzpatrick, and Nashold, JJ.

Focus: Abuse of Discretion – Extended Supervision

Peter Hamilton was convicted in the Columbia County Circuit Court of operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent, and the circuit court placed him on probation for that offense. After Hamilton’s probation was revoked, the court sentenced him to one and one-half years of initial confinement followed by two years of extended supervision. Hamilton argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion at sentencing by failing to consider the gravity of the underlying offense for which he was convicted. We agree and, therefore, reverse and remand this matter to the circuit court for resentencing.

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WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Steven G. Breneman

Case No.: 2021AP166-CR

Officials: Fitzpatrick, Graham, and Nashold, JJ.

Focus: Jury Instructions

Steven Breneman appeals a judgment of conviction for first-degree intentional homicide. Breneman contends that the circuit court erred by failing to give a jury instruction on self-defense, and that the omission of the jury instruction violated Breneman’s due process rights and his right to present a defense. We reject Breneman’s arguments and affirm.

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Supreme Court Digests

United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Whole Woman’s Health, et al., Austin Reeve Jackson, et al.,

Case No.: 21-463

Focus: Injunctive Relief – Texas Heartbeat Act

The Court granted certiorari before judgment in this case to determine whether, under our precedents, certain abortion providers can pursue a pre-enforcement challenge to a recently enacted Texas statute. We conclude that such an action is permissible against some of the named defendants but not others.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded.

Dissenting: THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. ROBERTS, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which BREYER and KAGAN, JJ., joined.

Concurring: THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. ROBERTS, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which BREYER and KAGAN, JJ., joined.

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United States Supreme Court

Case Name: United States v. Texas, et al.

Case No.: 21-588

Focus: Writ of Certiorari – Application for Stay

The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. The application to vacate stay presented to JUSTICE ALITO and by him referred to the Court is denied. It is so ordered.

Decision

Dissenting: JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR would grant the application to vacate stay in No. 21A85 and dissents from the dismissal of No. 21–588 as improvidently granted.

Concurring:
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