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Statutory Interpretation – Facilities for Interchange or Traffic

By: Derek Hawkins//February 28, 2022//

Statutory Interpretation – Facilities for Interchange or Traffic

By: Derek Hawkins//February 28, 2022//

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Wisconsin Central LTD., v. Surface Transportation Board, et al.,

Case No.: 20-3507

Officials: EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Statutory Interpretation – Facilities for Interchange or Traffic

This case pits Wisconsin Central (a subsidiary of Canadian National) against Soo Line (a subsidiary of Canadian Pacific). The question is where, in the Chicago area, Wisconsin Central will receive traffic from Soo Line. Wisconsin Central prefers Belt Railway’s yard; Soo Line prefers the Spaulding yard near Bartle`, Illinois, about 25 miles to the west. The Surface Transportation Board ruled that Wisconsin Central cannot insist that Soo Line deliver to Belt Railway. 2020 STB LEXIS 428 (Oct. 29, 2020).

According to the Board, a carrier’s power to designate a place where it will receive traffic is limited to portions of line that the designating carrier owns. Because Wisconsin Central does not wholly own Belt Railway, it may be used to interchange traffic only with the consent of the other carrier. We get the sense that this fight is principally about who should bear the cost of Belt Railway’s services, but the Board did not resolve that dispute. Instead it held categorically that, in the absence of agreement about where to exchange traffic, the receiving carrier must designate a place on its own property.

The exchange of rail traffic is governed by statute, not by regulation or common law. The governing statute is 49 U.S.C. §10742, which provides: “A rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Board under this part shall provide reasonable, proper, and equal facilities that are within its power to provide for the interchange of traffic between

Still, the Board insists, it is entitled to resolve such issues for itself with the benefit of judicial deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). We do not think that Chevron helps the Board, for two reasons. First, the phrase “that are within its power to provide” is not ambiguous and cannot reasonably be treated the same as “on its own track.” Second, the Board did not even purport to be making policy choices using authority delegated by Congress. Cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). It did not see any ambiguity in the statutory language or the historical practice; instead the Board wrote that it was applying a deterministic framework established long ago. By taking that approach, the Board cut itself off from any support in Chevron. See, e.g., Meza Morales v. Barr, 973 F.3d 656, 667 n.7 (7th Cir. 2020); Transitional Hospitals Corp. v. Shalala, 222 F.3d 1019, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Alarm Industry Communications Committee v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1066, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The statutory word “reasonable” gives the Board interpretive leeway; the statutory phrase “that are within its power to provide” does not.

The petition for review is granted, the Board’s decision is vacated, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petition granted. Vacated and remanded.

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Derek A Hawkins is Corporate Counsel, at Salesforce.

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