Statutory Interpretation – 1st Amendment – Right to Free Association

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United States Supreme Court

Case Name: Americans for Prosperity Foundation, et al., v. Rob Bonta

Case No.: 19-251; 19-255

Focus: Statutory Interpretation – 1^st Amendment – Right to Free Association

To solicit contributions in California, charitable organizations must disclose to the state Attorney General’s Office the identities of their major donors. The State contends that having this information on hand makes it easier to police misconduct by charities. We must decide whether California’s disclosure requirement violates the First Amendment right to free association.

In the First Amendment context, the Court has recognized a “type of facial challenge, whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 473 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Attorney General’s disclosure requirement is plainly overbroad under that standard. The regulation lacks any tailoring to the State’s investigative goals, and the State’s interest in administrative convenience is weak. As a result, every demand that might deter association “creates an unnecessary risk of chilling” in violation of the First Amendment. Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U. S. 947, 968. It does not make a difference in these cases if there is no disclosure to the public, see Shelton, 364 U. S., at 486, if some donors do not mind having their identities revealed, or if the relevant donor information is already disclosed to the IRS as a condition of federal tax-exempt status. California’s disclosure requirement imposes a widespread burden on donors’ associational rights, and this burden cannot be justified on the ground that the regime is narrowly tailored to investigating charitable wrongdoing, or that the State’s interest in administrative convenience is sufficiently important. Pp. 15–19.

Reversed and remanded

Dissenting: SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER and KAGAN, JJ., joined.

Concurring: THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.

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Derek A Hawkins is Corporate Counsel, at Salesforce.